/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include <openssl/ssl.h> #include <assert.h> #include <limits.h> #include <string.h> #include <utility> #include <openssl/bytestring.h> #include <openssl/digest.h> #include <openssl/err.h> #include <openssl/mem.h> #include <openssl/stack.h> #include "../crypto/internal.h" #include "internal.h" namespace bssl { enum client_hs_state_t { state_read_hello_retry_request = 0, state_send_second_client_hello, state_read_server_hello, state_read_encrypted_extensions, state_read_certificate_request, state_read_server_certificate, state_read_server_certificate_verify, state_read_server_finished, state_send_end_of_early_data, state_send_client_certificate, state_send_client_certificate_verify, state_complete_second_flight, state_done, }; static const uint8_t kZeroes[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0}; static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_hello_retry_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; assert(ssl->s3->have_version); SSLMessage msg; if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) { return ssl_hs_read_message; } // Queue up a ChangeCipherSpec for whenever we next send something. This // will be before the second ClientHello. If we offered early data, this was // already done. if (!hs->early_data_offered && !ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl)) { return ssl_hs_error; } if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) { return ssl_hs_error; } CBS body = msg.body, extensions, server_random, session_id; uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite; uint8_t compression_method; if (!CBS_get_u16(&body, &server_version) || !CBS_get_bytes(&body, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) || !CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len) || !CBS_get_u16(&body, &cipher_suite) || !CBS_get_u8(&body, &compression_method) || compression_method != 0 || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) || CBS_len(&extensions) == 0 || CBS_len(&body) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); return ssl_hs_error; } if (!CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, kHelloRetryRequest, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_hello; return ssl_hs_ok; } const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); // Check if the cipher is a TLS 1.3 cipher. if (cipher == NULL || SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > ssl_protocol_version(ssl) || SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < ssl_protocol_version(ssl)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return ssl_hs_error; } hs->new_cipher = cipher; if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(ssl_protocol_version(ssl), hs->new_cipher) || !hs->transcript.UpdateForHelloRetryRequest()) { return ssl_hs_error; } bool have_cookie, have_key_share, have_supported_versions; CBS cookie, key_share, supported_versions; SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = { {TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share, &have_key_share, &key_share}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie, &have_cookie, &cookie}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions, &have_supported_versions, &supported_versions}, }; uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types, OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types), 0 /* reject unknown */)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); return ssl_hs_error; } if (!have_cookie && !have_key_share) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EMPTY_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return ssl_hs_error; } if (have_cookie) { CBS cookie_value; if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cookie, &cookie_value) || CBS_len(&cookie_value) == 0 || CBS_len(&cookie) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); return ssl_hs_error; } if (!hs->cookie.CopyFrom(cookie_value)) { return ssl_hs_error; } } if (have_key_share) { uint16_t group_id; if (!CBS_get_u16(&key_share, &group_id) || CBS_len(&key_share) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); return ssl_hs_error; } // The group must be supported. if (!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); return ssl_hs_error; } // Check that the HelloRetryRequest does not request the key share that // was provided in the initial ClientHello. if (hs->key_share->GroupID() == group_id) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); return ssl_hs_error; } hs->key_share.reset(); hs->retry_group = group_id; } if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) { return ssl_hs_error; } ssl->method->next_message(ssl); hs->received_hello_retry_request = true; hs->tls13_state = state_send_second_client_hello; // 0-RTT is rejected if we receive a HelloRetryRequest. if (hs->in_early_data) { return ssl_hs_early_data_rejected; } return ssl_hs_ok; } static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_second_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; // Restore the null cipher. We may have switched due to 0-RTT. bssl::UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> null_ctx = SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher(SSL_is_dtls(ssl)); if (!null_ctx || !ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, std::move(null_ctx))) { return ssl_hs_error; } ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SetVersionIfNullCipher(ssl->version); if (!ssl_write_client_hello(hs)) { return ssl_hs_error; } hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_hello; return ssl_hs_flush; } static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; SSLMessage msg; if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) { return ssl_hs_read_message; } if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) { return ssl_hs_error; } CBS body = msg.body, server_random, session_id, extensions; uint16_t server_version; uint16_t cipher_suite; uint8_t compression_method; if (!CBS_get_u16(&body, &server_version) || !CBS_get_bytes(&body, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) || !CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len) || !CBS_get_u16(&body, &cipher_suite) || !CBS_get_u8(&body, &compression_method) || compression_method != 0 || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) || CBS_len(&body) != 0) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return ssl_hs_error; } if (server_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); return ssl_hs_error; } // Forbid a second HelloRetryRequest. if (CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, kHelloRetryRequest, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return ssl_hs_error; } OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); // Check if the cipher is a TLS 1.3 cipher. const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); if (cipher == nullptr || SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > ssl_protocol_version(ssl) || SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < ssl_protocol_version(ssl)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return ssl_hs_error; } // Check that the cipher matches the one in the HelloRetryRequest. if (hs->received_hello_retry_request && hs->new_cipher != cipher) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return ssl_hs_error; } // Parse out the extensions. bool have_key_share = false, have_pre_shared_key = false, have_supported_versions = false; CBS key_share, pre_shared_key, supported_versions; SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = { {TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share, &have_key_share, &key_share}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key, &have_pre_shared_key, &pre_shared_key}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions, &have_supported_versions, &supported_versions}, }; uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types, OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types), 0 /* reject unknown */)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); return ssl_hs_error; } alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; if (have_pre_shared_key) { if (ssl->session == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); return ssl_hs_error; } if (!ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_serverhello(hs, &alert, &pre_shared_key)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); return ssl_hs_error; } if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return ssl_hs_error; } if (ssl->session->cipher->algorithm_prf != cipher->algorithm_prf) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_PRF_HASH_MISMATCH); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return ssl_hs_error; } if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, ssl->session)) { // This is actually a client application bug. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return ssl_hs_error; } ssl->s3->session_reused = true; // Only authentication information carries over in TLS 1.3. hs->new_session = SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session, SSL_SESSION_DUP_AUTH_ONLY); if (!hs->new_session) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return ssl_hs_error; } ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL); // Resumption incorporates fresh key material, so refresh the timeout. ssl_session_renew_timeout(ssl, hs->new_session.get(), ssl->session_ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout); } else if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 0)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return ssl_hs_error; } hs->new_session->cipher = cipher; hs->new_cipher = cipher; size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_protocol_version(ssl), cipher)); // Set up the key schedule and incorporate the PSK into the running secret. if (ssl->s3->session_reused) { if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(hs, hs->new_session->master_key, hs->new_session->master_key_length)) { return ssl_hs_error; } } else if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(hs, kZeroes, hash_len)) { return ssl_hs_error; } if (!have_key_share) { // We do not support psk_ke and thus always require a key share. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_KEY_SHARE); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION); return ssl_hs_error; } // Resolve ECDHE and incorporate it into the secret. Array<uint8_t> dhe_secret; alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; if (!ssl_ext_key_share_parse_serverhello(hs, &dhe_secret, &alert, &key_share)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); return ssl_hs_error; } if (!tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, dhe_secret.data(), dhe_secret.size()) || !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg) || !tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(hs) || !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open, hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len)) { return ssl_hs_error; } if (!hs->early_data_offered) { // If not sending early data, set client traffic keys now so that alerts are // encrypted. if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len)) { return ssl_hs_error; } } ssl->method->next_message(ssl); hs->tls13_state = state_read_encrypted_extensions; return ssl_hs_ok; } static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_encrypted_extensions(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; SSLMessage msg; if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) { return ssl_hs_read_message; } if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS)) { return ssl_hs_error; } CBS body = msg.body; if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &body)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); return ssl_hs_error; } if (CBS_len(&body) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); return ssl_hs_error; } // Store the negotiated ALPN in the session. if (!ssl->s3->alpn_selected.empty()) { hs->new_session->early_alpn = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup( ssl->s3->alpn_selected.data(), ssl->s3->alpn_selected.size()); if (hs->new_session->early_alpn == NULL) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return ssl_hs_error; } hs->new_session->early_alpn_len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected.size(); } if (ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) { if (hs->early_session->cipher != hs->new_session->cipher || MakeConstSpan(hs->early_session->early_alpn, hs->early_session->early_alpn_len) != ssl->s3->alpn_selected) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ALPN_MISMATCH_ON_EARLY_DATA); return ssl_hs_error; } if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid || hs->received_custom_extension || ssl->token_binding_negotiated) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION_ON_EARLY_DATA); return ssl_hs_error; } } if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) { return ssl_hs_error; } ssl->method->next_message(ssl); hs->tls13_state = state_read_certificate_request; if (hs->in_early_data && !ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) { return ssl_hs_early_data_rejected; } return ssl_hs_ok; } static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; // CertificateRequest may only be sent in non-resumption handshakes. if (ssl->s3->session_reused) { hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_finished; return ssl_hs_ok; } SSLMessage msg; if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) { return ssl_hs_read_message; } // CertificateRequest is optional. if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_certificate; return ssl_hs_ok; } bool have_sigalgs = false, have_ca = false; CBS sigalgs, ca; const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = { {TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, &have_sigalgs, &sigalgs}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities, &have_ca, &ca}, }; CBS body = msg.body, context, extensions, supported_signature_algorithms; uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &context) || // The request context is always empty during the handshake. CBS_len(&context) != 0 || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) || CBS_len(&body) != 0 || !ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types, OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types), 1 /* accept unknown */) || (have_ca && CBS_len(&ca) == 0) || !have_sigalgs || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&sigalgs, &supported_signature_algorithms) || CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 || !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return ssl_hs_error; } if (have_ca) { hs->ca_names = ssl_parse_client_CA_list(ssl, &alert, &ca); if (!hs->ca_names) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); return ssl_hs_error; } } else { hs->ca_names.reset(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null()); if (!hs->ca_names) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return ssl_hs_error; } } hs->cert_request = true; ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(hs); if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) { return ssl_hs_error; } ssl->method->next_message(ssl); hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_certificate; return ssl_hs_ok; } static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; SSLMessage msg; if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) { return ssl_hs_read_message; } if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) || !tls13_process_certificate(hs, msg, 0 /* certificate required */) || !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) { return ssl_hs_error; } ssl->method->next_message(ssl); hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_certificate_verify; return ssl_hs_ok; } static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_certificate_verify( SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; SSLMessage msg; if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) { return ssl_hs_read_message; } switch (ssl_verify_peer_cert(hs)) { case ssl_verify_ok: break; case ssl_verify_invalid: return ssl_hs_error; case ssl_verify_retry: hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_certificate_verify; return ssl_hs_certificate_verify; } if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) || !tls13_process_certificate_verify(hs, msg) || !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) { return ssl_hs_error; } ssl->method->next_message(ssl); hs->tls13_state = state_read_server_finished; return ssl_hs_ok; } static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; SSLMessage msg; if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) { return ssl_hs_read_message; } if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || !tls13_process_finished(hs, msg, 0 /* don't use saved value */) || !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg) || // Update the secret to the master secret and derive traffic keys. !tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, kZeroes, hs->hash_len) || !tls13_derive_application_secrets(hs)) { return ssl_hs_error; } ssl->method->next_message(ssl); hs->tls13_state = state_send_end_of_early_data; return ssl_hs_ok; } static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_end_of_early_data(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; if (ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) { hs->can_early_write = false; ScopedCBB cbb; CBB body; if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) || !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { return ssl_hs_error; } } if (hs->early_data_offered) { if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len)) { return ssl_hs_error; } } hs->tls13_state = state_send_client_certificate; return ssl_hs_ok; } static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; // The peer didn't request a certificate. if (!hs->cert_request) { hs->tls13_state = state_complete_second_flight; return ssl_hs_ok; } // Call cert_cb to update the certificate. if (ssl->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { int rv = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (rv == 0) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); return ssl_hs_error; } if (rv < 0) { hs->tls13_state = state_send_client_certificate; return ssl_hs_x509_lookup; } } if (!ssl_on_certificate_selected(hs) || !tls13_add_certificate(hs)) { return ssl_hs_error; } hs->tls13_state = state_send_client_certificate_verify; return ssl_hs_ok; } static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; // Don't send CertificateVerify if there is no certificate. if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { hs->tls13_state = state_complete_second_flight; return ssl_hs_ok; } switch (tls13_add_certificate_verify(hs)) { case ssl_private_key_success: hs->tls13_state = state_complete_second_flight; return ssl_hs_ok; case ssl_private_key_retry: hs->tls13_state = state_send_client_certificate_verify; return ssl_hs_private_key_operation; case ssl_private_key_failure: return ssl_hs_error; } assert(0); return ssl_hs_error; } static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_complete_second_flight(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; // Send a Channel ID assertion if necessary. if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { if (!ssl_do_channel_id_callback(ssl)) { hs->tls13_state = state_complete_second_flight; return ssl_hs_error; } if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL) { return ssl_hs_channel_id_lookup; } ScopedCBB cbb; CBB body; if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) || !tls1_write_channel_id(hs, &body) || !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { return ssl_hs_error; } } // Send a Finished message. if (!tls13_add_finished(hs)) { return ssl_hs_error; } // Derive the final keys and enable them. if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open, hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) || !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) || !tls13_derive_resumption_secret(hs)) { return ssl_hs_error; } hs->tls13_state = state_done; return ssl_hs_flush; } enum ssl_hs_wait_t tls13_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { while (hs->tls13_state != state_done) { enum ssl_hs_wait_t ret = ssl_hs_error; enum client_hs_state_t state = static_cast<enum client_hs_state_t>(hs->tls13_state); switch (state) { case state_read_hello_retry_request: ret = do_read_hello_retry_request(hs); break; case state_send_second_client_hello: ret = do_send_second_client_hello(hs); break; case state_read_server_hello: ret = do_read_server_hello(hs); break; case state_read_encrypted_extensions: ret = do_read_encrypted_extensions(hs); break; case state_read_certificate_request: ret = do_read_certificate_request(hs); break; case state_read_server_certificate: ret = do_read_server_certificate(hs); break; case state_read_server_certificate_verify: ret = do_read_server_certificate_verify(hs); break; case state_read_server_finished: ret = do_read_server_finished(hs); break; case state_send_end_of_early_data: ret = do_send_end_of_early_data(hs); break; case state_send_client_certificate: ret = do_send_client_certificate(hs); break; case state_send_client_certificate_verify: ret = do_send_client_certificate_verify(hs); break; case state_complete_second_flight: ret = do_complete_second_flight(hs); break; case state_done: ret = ssl_hs_ok; break; } if (hs->tls13_state != state) { ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); } if (ret != ssl_hs_ok) { return ret; } } return ssl_hs_ok; } const char *tls13_client_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { enum client_hs_state_t state = static_cast<enum client_hs_state_t>(hs->tls13_state); switch (state) { case state_read_hello_retry_request: return "TLS 1.3 client read_hello_retry_request"; case state_send_second_client_hello: return "TLS 1.3 client send_second_client_hello"; case state_read_server_hello: return "TLS 1.3 client read_server_hello"; case state_read_encrypted_extensions: return "TLS 1.3 client read_encrypted_extensions"; case state_read_certificate_request: return "TLS 1.3 client read_certificate_request"; case state_read_server_certificate: return "TLS 1.3 client read_server_certificate"; case state_read_server_certificate_verify: return "TLS 1.3 client read_server_certificate_verify"; case state_read_server_finished: return "TLS 1.3 client read_server_finished"; case state_send_end_of_early_data: return "TLS 1.3 client send_end_of_early_data"; case state_send_client_certificate: return "TLS 1.3 client send_client_certificate"; case state_send_client_certificate_verify: return "TLS 1.3 client send_client_certificate_verify"; case state_complete_second_flight: return "TLS 1.3 client complete_second_flight"; case state_done: return "TLS 1.3 client done"; } return "TLS 1.3 client unknown"; } int tls13_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) { if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) { // Ignore tickets on shutdown. Callers tend to indiscriminately call // |SSL_shutdown| before destroying an |SSL|, at which point calling the new // session callback may be confusing. return 1; } UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session = SSL_SESSION_dup( ssl->s3->established_session.get(), SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH); if (!session) { return 0; } ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session.get()); uint32_t server_timeout; CBS body = msg.body, ticket_nonce, ticket, extensions; if (!CBS_get_u32(&body, &server_timeout) || !CBS_get_u32(&body, &session->ticket_age_add) || !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &ticket_nonce) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &ticket) || !CBS_stow(&ticket, &session->tlsext_tick, &session->tlsext_ticklen) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) || CBS_len(&body) != 0) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } // Cap the renewable lifetime by the server advertised value. This avoids // wasting bandwidth on 0-RTT when we know the server will reject it. if (session->timeout > server_timeout) { session->timeout = server_timeout; } if (!tls13_derive_session_psk(session.get(), ticket_nonce)) { return 0; } // Parse out the extensions. bool have_early_data_info = false; CBS early_data_info; const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = { {TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data, &have_early_data_info, &early_data_info}, }; uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types, OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types), 1 /* ignore unknown */)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); return 0; } if (have_early_data_info && ssl->cert->enable_early_data) { if (!CBS_get_u32(&early_data_info, &session->ticket_max_early_data) || CBS_len(&early_data_info) != 0) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } } session->ticket_age_add_valid = 1; session->not_resumable = 0; if ((ssl->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) && ssl->ctx->new_session_cb != NULL && ssl->ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, session.get())) { // |new_session_cb|'s return value signals that it took ownership. session.release(); } return 1; } } // namespace bssl