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/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/*
* SSL3 Protocol
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
/* TODO(ekr): Implement HelloVerifyRequest on server side. OK for now. */
#include "cert.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */
#include "keyhi.h"
#include "secder.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "sechash.h"
#include "sslimpl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"
#include "sslerr.h"
#include "prtime.h"
#include "prinrval.h"
#include "prerror.h"
#include "pratom.h"
#include "prthread.h"
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "secmod.h"
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
#include "blapi.h"
#endif
/* This is a bodge to allow this code to be compiled against older NSS headers
* that don't contain the TLS 1.2 changes. */
#ifndef CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256
#define CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 21)
#define CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 22)
#define CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 23)
#define CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 24)
#endif
/* This is a bodge to allow this code to be compiled against older NSS
* headers. */
#ifndef CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
#define CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 (CKM_NSS + 26)
typedef struct CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS {
CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* This is the nonce. */
CK_ULONG ulIvLen;
CK_BYTE_PTR pAAD;
CK_ULONG ulAADLen;
CK_ULONG ulTagLen;
} CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS;
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB
#include "zlib.h"
#endif
#ifdef LINUX
#include <dlfcn.h>
#endif
#ifndef PK11_SETATTRS
#define PK11_SETATTRS(x,id,v,l) (x)->type = (id); \
(x)->pValue=(v); (x)->ulValueLen = (l);
#endif
static SECStatus ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss);
static void ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss);
static void ssl3_CopyPeerCertsFromSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid);
static PK11SymKey *ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
PK11SlotInfo * serverKeySlot);
static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms);
static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure( sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_InitState( sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate( sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateStatus( sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate( sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_SendNextProto( sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_SendEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished( sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags);
static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHello( sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone( sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange( sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes( sslSocket *ss,
const unsigned char *b,
unsigned int l);
static SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags);
static int ssl3_OIDToTLSHashAlgorithm(SECOidTag oid);
static SECStatus Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen,
int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input,
int inputLen);
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
static SECStatus ssl3_AESGCMBypass(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt,
unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout,
const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
const unsigned char *additionalData,
int additionalDataLen);
#endif
#define MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 32000 /* watch for 16-bit integer overflow */
#define MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 4000
/* This list of SSL3 cipher suites is sorted in descending order of
* precedence (desirability). It only includes cipher suites we implement.
* This table is modified by SSL3_SetPolicy(). The ordering of cipher suites
* in this table must match the ordering in SSL_ImplementedCiphers (sslenum.c)
*
* Important: See bug 946147 before enabling, reordering, or adding any cipher
* suites to this list.
*/
static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = {
/* cipher_suite policy enabled isPresent */
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
{ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
/* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is out of order to work around
* bug 946147.
*/
{ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
{ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
{ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
/* RSA */
{ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
/* 56-bit DES "domestic" cipher suites */
{ SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
/* export ciphersuites with 1024-bit public key exchange keys */
{ TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
/* export ciphersuites with 512-bit public key exchange keys */
{ SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
/* ciphersuites with no encryption */
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
{ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
{ SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
};
/* Verify that SSL_ImplementedCiphers and cipherSuites are in consistent order.
*/
#ifdef DEBUG
void ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency()
{
unsigned int i;
/* Note that SSL_ImplementedCiphers has more elements than cipherSuites
* because it SSL_ImplementedCiphers includes SSL 2.0 cipher suites.
*/
PORT_Assert(SSL_NumImplementedCiphers >= PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites));
for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites); ++i) {
PORT_Assert(SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i] == cipherSuites[i].cipher_suite);
}
}
#endif
/* This list of SSL3 compression methods is sorted in descending order of
* precedence (desirability). It only includes compression methods we
* implement.
*/
static const /*SSLCompressionMethod*/ PRUint8 compressions [] = {
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB
ssl_compression_deflate,
#endif
ssl_compression_null
};
static const int compressionMethodsCount =
sizeof(compressions) / sizeof(compressions[0]);
/* compressionEnabled returns true iff the compression algorithm is enabled
* for the given SSL socket. */
static PRBool
compressionEnabled(sslSocket *ss, SSLCompressionMethod compression)
{
switch (compression) {
case ssl_compression_null:
return PR_TRUE; /* Always enabled */
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB
case ssl_compression_deflate:
return ss->opt.enableDeflate;
#endif
default:
return PR_FALSE;
}
}
static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ PRUint8 certificate_types [] = {
ct_RSA_sign,
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
ct_ECDSA_sign,
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
ct_DSS_sign,
};
/* This block is the contents of the supported_signature_algorithms field of
* our TLS 1.2 CertificateRequest message, in wire format. See
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
*
* This block contains only sha256 entries because we only support TLS 1.2
* CertificateVerify messages that use the handshake hash. */
static const PRUint8 supported_signature_algorithms[] = {
tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_rsa,
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_ecdsa,
#endif
tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_dsa,
};
#define EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH 64 /* bytes */
/* This global item is used only in servers. It is is initialized by
** SSL_ConfigSecureServer(), and is used in ssl3_SendCertificateRequest().
*/
CERTDistNames *ssl3_server_ca_list = NULL;
static SSL3Statistics ssl3stats;
/* indexed by SSL3BulkCipher */
static const ssl3BulkCipherDef bulk_cipher_defs[] = {
/* |--------- Lengths --------| */
/* cipher calg k s type i b t n */
/* e e v l a o */
/* y c | o g n */
/* | r | c | c */
/* | e | k | e */
/* | t | | | | */
{cipher_null, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0},
{cipher_rc4, calg_rc4, 16,16, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0},
{cipher_rc4_40, calg_rc4, 16, 5, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0},
{cipher_rc4_56, calg_rc4, 16, 7, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0},
{cipher_rc2, calg_rc2, 16,16, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0},
{cipher_rc2_40, calg_rc2, 16, 5, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0},
{cipher_des, calg_des, 8, 8, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0},
{cipher_3des, calg_3des, 24,24, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0},
{cipher_des40, calg_des, 8, 5, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0},
{cipher_idea, calg_idea, 16,16, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0},
{cipher_aes_128, calg_aes, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
{cipher_aes_256, calg_aes, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
{cipher_camellia_128, calg_camellia, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
{cipher_camellia_256, calg_camellia, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
{cipher_seed, calg_seed, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
{cipher_aes_128_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 16,16, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8},
{cipher_chacha20, calg_chacha20, 32,32, type_aead, 0, 0,16, 0},
{cipher_missing, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0},
};
static const ssl3KEADef kea_defs[] =
{ /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */
/* kea exchKeyType signKeyType is_limited limit tls_keygen */
{kea_null, kt_null, sign_null, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
{kea_rsa, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
{kea_rsa_export, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE},
{kea_rsa_export_1024,kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 1024, PR_FALSE},
{kea_dh_dss, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
{kea_dh_dss_export, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE},
{kea_dh_rsa, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
{kea_dh_rsa_export, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE},
{kea_dhe_dss, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
{kea_dhe_dss_export, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE},
{kea_dhe_rsa, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
{kea_dhe_rsa_export, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE},
{kea_dh_anon, kt_dh, sign_null, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
{kea_dh_anon_export, kt_dh, sign_null, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE},
{kea_rsa_fips, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_TRUE },
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
{kea_ecdh_ecdsa, kt_ecdh, sign_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
{kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, kt_ecdh, sign_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
{kea_ecdh_rsa, kt_ecdh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
{kea_ecdhe_rsa, kt_ecdh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
{kea_ecdh_anon, kt_ecdh, sign_null, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
};
/* must use ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef to access */
static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] =
{
/* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg */
{SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, mac_null, kea_null},
{SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, mac_md5, kea_rsa},
{SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, cipher_null, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa},
{SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,cipher_rc4_40, mac_md5, kea_rsa_export},
{SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, mac_md5, kea_rsa},
{SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
{SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5,
cipher_rc2_40, mac_md5, kea_rsa_export},
#if 0 /* not implemented */
{SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA, cipher_idea, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
{SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_rsa_export},
#endif
{SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
{SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
{SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
{SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
{TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
#if 0 /* not implemented */
{SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss_export},
{SSL_DH_DSS_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss},
{SSL_DH_DSS_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss},
{SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa_export},
{SSL_DH_RSA_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa},
{SSL_DH_RSA_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa},
{SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss_export},
{SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa_export},
#endif
{SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
{SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
#if 0
{SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_RC4_40_MD5, cipher_rc4_40, mac_md5, kea_dh_anon_export},
{SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon_export},
{SSL_DH_ANON_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon},
{SSL_DH_ANON_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon},
#endif
/* New TLS cipher suites */
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa},
{TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
{TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
{TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa},
{TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
{TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
{TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa},
#if 0
{TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss},
{TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa},
{TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon},
{TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss},
{TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa},
{TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon},
#endif
{TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, cipher_seed, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
{TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
{TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
{TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
{TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
{TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_des, mac_sha,kea_rsa_export_1024},
{TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
cipher_rc4_56, mac_sha,kea_rsa_export_1024},
{SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa_fips},
{SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa_fips},
{TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
{TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa},
{TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa},
{TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa},
{TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa},
{TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
#if 0
{TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon},
{TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon},
{TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon},
{TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon},
{TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon},
#endif
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
};
static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kea_alg_defs[] = {
0x80000000L,
CKM_RSA_PKCS,
CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE,
CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE,
CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE
};
typedef struct SSLCipher2MechStr {
SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cmech;
} SSLCipher2Mech;
/* indexed by type SSLCipherAlgorithm */
static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = {
/* calg, cmech */
{ calg_null , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L },
{ calg_rc4 , CKM_RC4 },
{ calg_rc2 , CKM_RC2_CBC },
{ calg_des , CKM_DES_CBC },
{ calg_3des , CKM_DES3_CBC },
{ calg_idea , CKM_IDEA_CBC },
{ calg_fortezza , CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 },
{ calg_aes , CKM_AES_CBC },
{ calg_camellia , CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC },
{ calg_seed , CKM_SEED_CBC },
{ calg_aes_gcm , CKM_AES_GCM },
{ calg_chacha20 , CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 },
/* { calg_init , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x7fffffffL } */
};
#define mmech_invalid (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L
#define mmech_md5 CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC
#define mmech_sha CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC
#define mmech_md5_hmac CKM_MD5_HMAC
#define mmech_sha_hmac CKM_SHA_1_HMAC
#define mmech_sha256_hmac CKM_SHA256_HMAC
static const ssl3MACDef mac_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */
/* pad_size is only used for SSL 3.0 MAC. See RFC 6101 Sec. 5.2.3.1. */
/* mac mmech pad_size mac_size */
{ mac_null, mmech_invalid, 0, 0 },
{ mac_md5, mmech_md5, 48, MD5_LENGTH },
{ mac_sha, mmech_sha, 40, SHA1_LENGTH},
{hmac_md5, mmech_md5_hmac, 0, MD5_LENGTH },
{hmac_sha, mmech_sha_hmac, 0, SHA1_LENGTH},
{hmac_sha256, mmech_sha256_hmac, 0, SHA256_LENGTH},
{ mac_aead, mmech_invalid, 0, 0 },
};
/* indexed by SSL3BulkCipher */
const char * const ssl3_cipherName[] = {
"NULL",
"RC4",
"RC4-40",
"RC4-56",
"RC2-CBC",
"RC2-CBC-40",
"DES-CBC",
"3DES-EDE-CBC",
"DES-CBC-40",
"IDEA-CBC",
"AES-128",
"AES-256",
"Camellia-128",
"Camellia-256",
"SEED-CBC",
"AES-128-GCM",
"missing"
};
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
/* The ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure defines how various pieces of
* information are laid out within wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey
* for ECDH key exchange. Since wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is
* a 512-byte buffer (see sslimpl.h), the variable length field
* in ECCWrappedKeyInfo can be at most (512 - 8) = 504 bytes.
*
* XXX For now, NSS only supports named elliptic curves of size 571 bits
* or smaller. The public value will fit within 145 bytes and EC params
* will fit within 12 bytes. We'll need to revisit this when NSS
* supports arbitrary curves.
*/
#define MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN 504
typedef struct ECCWrappedKeyInfoStr {
PRUint16 size; /* EC public key size in bits */
PRUint16 encodedParamLen; /* length (in bytes) of DER encoded EC params */
PRUint16 pubValueLen; /* length (in bytes) of EC public value */
PRUint16 wrappedKeyLen; /* length (in bytes) of the wrapped key */
PRUint8 var[MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN]; /* this buffer contains the */
/* EC public-key params, the EC public value and the wrapped key */
} ECCWrappedKeyInfo;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
#if defined(TRACE)
static char *
ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType)
{
char * rv;
static char line[40];
switch(msgType) {
case hello_request: rv = "hello_request (0)"; break;
case client_hello: rv = "client_hello (1)"; break;
case server_hello: rv = "server_hello (2)"; break;
case hello_verify_request: rv = "hello_verify_request (3)"; break;
case certificate: rv = "certificate (11)"; break;
case server_key_exchange: rv = "server_key_exchange (12)"; break;
case certificate_request: rv = "certificate_request (13)"; break;
case server_hello_done: rv = "server_hello_done (14)"; break;
case certificate_verify: rv = "certificate_verify (15)"; break;
case client_key_exchange: rv = "client_key_exchange (16)"; break;
case finished: rv = "finished (20)"; break;
default:
sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType);
rv = line;
}
return rv;
}
static char *
ssl3_DecodeContentType(int msgType)
{
char * rv;
static char line[40];
switch(msgType) {
case content_change_cipher_spec:
rv = "change_cipher_spec (20)"; break;
case content_alert: rv = "alert (21)"; break;
case content_handshake: rv = "handshake (22)"; break;
case content_application_data:
rv = "application_data (23)"; break;
default:
sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType);
rv = line;
}
return rv;
}
#endif
SSL3Statistics *
SSL_GetStatistics(void)
{
return &ssl3stats;
}
typedef struct tooLongStr {
#if defined(IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
PRInt32 low;
PRInt32 high;
#else
PRInt32 high;
PRInt32 low;
#endif
} tooLong;
void SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(long * x)
{
if ((sizeof *x) == sizeof(PRInt32)) {
PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT((PRInt32 *)x);
} else {
tooLong * tl = (tooLong *)x;
if (PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->low) == 0)
PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->high);
}
}
static PRBool
ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(
ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite,
const SSLVersionRange *vrange)
{
switch (cipherSuite) {
/* See RFC 4346 A.5. Export cipher suites must not be used in TLS 1.1 or
* later. This set of cipher suites is similar to, but different from, the
* set of cipher suites considered exportable by SSL_IsExportCipherSuite.
*/
case SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5:
case SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5:
/* SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented
* SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented
* SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented
* SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented
* SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented
* SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5: never implemented
* SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented
*/
return vrange->min <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256:
return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
default:
return PR_TRUE;
}
}
/* return pointer to ssl3CipherSuiteDef for suite, or NULL */
/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */
static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *
ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite)
{
int cipher_suite_def_len =
sizeof(cipher_suite_defs) / sizeof(cipher_suite_defs[0]);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < cipher_suite_def_len; i++) {
if (cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite == suite)
return &cipher_suite_defs[i];
}
PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); /* We should never get here. */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
return NULL;
}
/* Find the cipher configuration struct associate with suite */
/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */
static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *
ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
if (suites[i].cipher_suite == suite)
return &suites[i];
}
/* return NULL and let the caller handle it. */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
return NULL;
}
/* Initialize the suite->isPresent value for config_match
* Returns count of enabled ciphers supported by extant tokens,
* regardless of policy or user preference.
* If this returns zero, the user cannot do SSL v3.
*/
int
ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss)
{
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * suite;
const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def;
SSLCipherAlgorithm cipher_alg;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipher_mech;
SSL3KEAType exchKeyType;
int i;
int numPresent = 0;
int numEnabled = 0;
PRBool isServer;
sslServerCerts *svrAuth;
PORT_Assert(ss);
if (!ss) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return 0;
}
if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
return 0;
}
isServer = (PRBool)(ss->sec.isServer != 0);
for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
if (suite->enabled) {
++numEnabled;
/* We need the cipher defs to see if we have a token that can handle
* this cipher. It isn't part of the static definition.
*/
cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite);
if (!cipher_def) {
suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
continue;
}
cipher_alg = bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg].calg;
PORT_Assert( alg2Mech[cipher_alg].calg == cipher_alg);
cipher_mech = alg2Mech[cipher_alg].cmech;
exchKeyType =
kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType;
#ifndef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + exchKeyType;
#else
/* XXX SSLKEAType isn't really a good choice for
* indexing certificates. It doesn't work for
* (EC)DHE-* ciphers. Here we use a hack to ensure
* that the server uses an RSA cert for (EC)DHE-RSA.
*/
switch (cipher_def->key_exchange_alg) {
case kea_ecdhe_rsa:
#if NSS_SERVER_DHE_IMPLEMENTED
/* XXX NSS does not yet implement the server side of _DHE_
* cipher suites. Correcting the computation for svrAuth,
* as the case below does, causes NSS SSL servers to begin to
* negotiate cipher suites they do not implement. So, until
* server side _DHE_ is implemented, keep this disabled.
*/
case kea_dhe_rsa:
#endif
svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + kt_rsa;
break;
case kea_ecdh_ecdsa:
case kea_ecdh_rsa:
/*
* XXX We ought to have different indices for
* ECDSA- and RSA-signed EC certificates so
* we could support both key exchange mechanisms
* simultaneously. For now, both of them use
* whatever is in the certificate slot for kt_ecdh
*/
default:
svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + exchKeyType;
break;
}
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
/* Mark the suites that are backed by real tokens, certs and keys */
suite->isPresent = (PRBool)
(((exchKeyType == kt_null) ||
((!isServer || (svrAuth->serverKeyPair &&
svrAuth->SERVERKEY &&
svrAuth->serverCertChain)) &&
PK11_TokenExists(kea_alg_defs[exchKeyType]))) &&
((cipher_alg == calg_null) || PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech)));
if (suite->isPresent)
++numPresent;
}
}
PORT_Assert(numPresent > 0 || numEnabled == 0);
if (numPresent <= 0) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED);
}
return numPresent;
}
/* return PR_TRUE if suite matches policy, enabled state and is applicable to
* the given version range. */
/* It would be a REALLY BAD THING (tm) if we ever permitted the use
** of a cipher that was NOT_ALLOWED. So, if this is ever called with
** policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, report no match.
*/
/* adjust suite enabled to the availability of a token that can do the
* cipher suite. */
static PRBool
config_match(ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, int policy, PRBool enabled,
const SSLVersionRange *vrange)
{
PORT_Assert(policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED && enabled != PR_FALSE);
if (policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED || !enabled)
return PR_FALSE;
return (PRBool)(suite->enabled &&
suite->isPresent &&
suite->policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED &&
suite->policy <= policy &&
ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(
suite->cipher_suite, vrange));
}
/* return number of cipher suites that match policy, enabled state and are
* applicable for the configured protocol version range. */
/* called from ssl3_SendClientHello and ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack */
static int
count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy, PRBool enabled)
{
int i, count = 0;
if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
if (config_match(&ss->cipherSuites[i], policy, enabled, &ss->vrange))
count++;
}
if (count <= 0) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
}
return count;
}
/*
* Null compression, mac and encryption functions
*/
static SECStatus
Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, int maxOutputLen,
const unsigned char *input, int inputLen)
{
if (inputLen > maxOutputLen) {
*outputLen = 0; /* Match PK11_CipherOp in setting outputLen */
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
return SECFailure;
}
*outputLen = inputLen;
if (input != output)
PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen);
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* SSL3 Utility functions
*/
/* allowLargerPeerVersion controls whether the function will select the
* highest enabled SSL version or fail when peerVersion is greater than the
* highest enabled version.
*
* If allowLargerPeerVersion is true, peerVersion is the peer's highest
* enabled version rather than the peer's selected version.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion,
PRBool allowLargerPeerVersion)
{
if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
return SECFailure;
}
if (peerVersion < ss->vrange.min ||
(peerVersion > ss->vrange.max && !allowLargerPeerVersion)) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->version = PR_MIN(peerVersion, ss->vrange.max);
PORT_Assert(ssl3_VersionIsSupported(ss->protocolVariant, ss->version));
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random *random)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* first 4 bytes are reserverd for time */
rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random->rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
}
return rv;
}
/* Called by ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and ssl3_SendCertificateVerify */
SECStatus
ssl3_SignHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SECItem *buf,
PRBool isTLS)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE;
int signatureLen;
SECItem hashItem;
buf->data = NULL;
switch (key->keyType) {
case rsaKey:
hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
hashItem.len = hash->len;
break;
case dsaKey:
doDerEncode = isTLS;
/* SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
* In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
if (hash->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
} else {
hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
hashItem.len = hash->len;
}
break;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
case ecKey:
doDerEncode = PR_TRUE;
/* SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
* In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
if (hash->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
} else {
hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
hashItem.len = hash->len;
}
break;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
goto done;
}
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
if (hash->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key);
if (signatureLen <= 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
goto done;
}
buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen;
buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
if (!buf->data)
goto done; /* error code was set. */
rv = PK11_Sign(key, buf, &hashItem);
} else {
rv = SGN_Digest(key, hash->hashAlg, buf, &hashItem);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
} else if (doDerEncode) {
SECItem derSig = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
/* This also works for an ECDSA signature */
rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */
*buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */
} else if (derSig.data) {
PORT_Free(derSig.data);
}
}
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", (unsigned char*)buf->data, buf->len));
done:
if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) {
PORT_Free(buf->data);
buf->data = NULL;
}
return rv;
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange, ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify */
SECStatus
ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, CERTCertificate *cert,
SECItem *buf, PRBool isTLS, void *pwArg)
{
SECKEYPublicKey * key;
SECItem * signature = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
SECItem hashItem;
SECOidTag encAlg;
SECOidTag hashAlg;
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "check signed hashes",
buf->data, buf->len));
key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
if (key == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
hashAlg = hash->hashAlg;
switch (key->keyType) {
case rsaKey:
encAlg = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
hashItem.len = hash->len;
break;
case dsaKey:
encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
/* SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
* In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
if (hash->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
} else {
hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
hashItem.len = hash->len;
}
/* Allow DER encoded DSA signatures in SSL 3.0 */
if (isTLS || buf->len != SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)) {
signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(buf, SECKEY_SignatureLen(key));
if (!signature) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
return SECFailure;
}
buf = signature;
}
break;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
case ecKey:
encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
/* SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
* In that case, we use just the SHA1 part.
* ECDSA signatures always encode the integers r and s using ASN.1
* (unlike DSA where ASN.1 encoding is used with TLS but not with
* SSL3). So we can use VFY_VerifyDigestDirect for ECDSA.
*/
if (hash->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1;
hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
} else {
hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
hashItem.len = hash->len;
}
break;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
default:
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
return SECFailure;
}
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be verified",
hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN || key->keyType == dsaKey) {
/* VFY_VerifyDigestDirect requires DSA signatures to be DER-encoded.
* DSA signatures are DER-encoded in TLS but not in SSL3 and the code
* above always removes the DER encoding of DSA signatures when
* present. Thus DSA signatures are always verified with PK11_Verify.
*/
rv = PK11_Verify(key, buf, &hashItem, pwArg);
} else {
rv = VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(&hashItem, key, buf, encAlg, hashAlg,
pwArg);
}
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key);
if (signature) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(signature, PR_TRUE);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
}
return rv;
}
/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */
/* Called from ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash
* ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash
* which are called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange.
*
* hashAlg: either the OID for a hash algorithm or SEC_OID_UNKNOWN to specify
* the pre-1.2, MD5/SHA1 combination hash.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(SECOidTag hashAlg,
PRUint8 * hashBuf, unsigned int bufLen,
SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (bypassPKCS11) {
if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
MD5_HashBuf (hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen);
SHA1_HashBuf(hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen);
hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
} else if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_SHA1) {
SHA1_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
hashes->len = SHA1_LENGTH;
} else if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_SHA256) {
SHA256_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
hashes->len = SHA256_LENGTH;
} else if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_SHA384) {
SHA384_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
hashes->len = SHA384_LENGTH;
} else if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_SHA512) {
SHA512_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
hashes->len = SHA512_LENGTH;
} else {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
return SECFailure;
}
} else
#endif
{
if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_MD5, hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
goto done;
}
rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
}
hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
} else {
hashes->len = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg);
if (hashes->len > sizeof(hashes->u.raw)) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
rv = SECFailure;
goto done;
}
rv = PK11_HashBuf(hashAlg, hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
}
}
}
hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg;
done:
return rv;
}
/* Caller must set hiLevel error code.
** Called from ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and
** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(SECOidTag hashAlg,
SECItem modulus, SECItem publicExponent,
SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand,
SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11)
{
PRUint8 * hashBuf;
PRUint8 * pBuf;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
unsigned int bufLen;
PRUint8 buf[2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096/8 + 2 + 4096/8];
bufLen = 2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + modulus.len + 2 + publicExponent.len;
if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) {
hashBuf = buf;
} else {
hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen);
if (!hashBuf) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(modulus.len >> 8);
pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(modulus.len);
pBuf += 2;
memcpy(pBuf, modulus.data, modulus.len);
pBuf += modulus.len;
pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(publicExponent.len >> 8);
pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(publicExponent.len);
pBuf += 2;
memcpy(pBuf, publicExponent.data, publicExponent.len);
pBuf += publicExponent.len;
PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen);
rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes,
bypassPKCS11);
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen));
if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: MD5 result",
hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: SHA1 result",
hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
} else {
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: result",
hashes->u.raw, hashes->len));
}
if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL)
PORT_Free(hashBuf);
return rv;
}
/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */
/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. */
static SECStatus
ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(SECOidTag hashAlg,
SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys,
SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand,
SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11)
{
PRUint8 * hashBuf;
PRUint8 * pBuf;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
unsigned int bufLen;
PRUint8 buf[2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096/8 + 2 + 4096/8];
bufLen = 2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + dh_p.len + 2 + dh_g.len + 2 + dh_Ys.len;
if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) {
hashBuf = buf;
} else {
hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen);
if (!hashBuf) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_p.len >> 8);
pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_p.len);
pBuf += 2;
memcpy(pBuf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len);
pBuf += dh_p.len;
pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_g.len >> 8);
pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_g.len);
pBuf += 2;
memcpy(pBuf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len);
pBuf += dh_g.len;
pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_Ys.len >> 8);
pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_Ys.len);
pBuf += 2;
memcpy(pBuf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len);
pBuf += dh_Ys.len;
PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen);
rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes,
bypassPKCS11);
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen));
if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result",
hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result",
hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
} else {
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: result",
hashes->u.raw, hashes->len));
}
if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL)
PORT_Free(hashBuf);
return rv;
}
static void
ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(SSL3SequenceNumber *num)
{
num->low++;
if (num->low == 0)
num->high++;
}
/* Called twice, only from ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec (immediately below). */
static void
ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(ssl3KeyMaterial *mat)
{
if (mat->write_key != NULL) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_key);
mat->write_key = NULL;
}
if (mat->write_mac_key != NULL) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_mac_key);
mat->write_mac_key = NULL;
}
if (mat->write_mac_context != NULL) {
PK11_DestroyContext(mat->write_mac_context, PR_TRUE);
mat->write_mac_context = NULL;
}
}
/* Called from ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs() and
** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs()
** ssl3_DestroySSL3Info
** Caller must hold SpecWriteLock.
*/
void
ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, PRBool freeSrvName)
{
PRBool freeit = (PRBool)(!spec->bypassCiphers);
/* PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); Don't have ss! */
if (spec->destroy) {
spec->destroy(spec->encodeContext, freeit);
spec->destroy(spec->decodeContext, freeit);
spec->encodeContext = NULL; /* paranoia */
spec->decodeContext = NULL;
}
if (spec->destroyCompressContext && spec->compressContext) {
spec->destroyCompressContext(spec->compressContext, 1);
spec->compressContext = NULL;
}
if (spec->destroyDecompressContext && spec->decompressContext) {
spec->destroyDecompressContext(spec->decompressContext, 1);
spec->decompressContext = NULL;
}
if (freeSrvName && spec->srvVirtName.data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(&spec->srvVirtName, PR_FALSE);
}
if (spec->master_secret != NULL) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(spec->master_secret);
spec->master_secret = NULL;
}
spec->msItem.data = NULL;
spec->msItem.len = 0;
ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->client);
ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->server);
spec->bypassCiphers = PR_FALSE;
spec->destroy=NULL;
spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL;
spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL;
}
/* Fill in the pending cipher spec with info from the selected ciphersuite.
** This is as much initialization as we can do without having key material.
** Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello(), ssl3_SendServerHello()
** Caller must hold the ssl3 handshake lock.
** Acquires & releases SpecWriteLock.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss)
{
ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec;
ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec;
ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite;
SSL3MACAlgorithm mac;
SSL3BulkCipher cipher;
SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea;
const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def;
PRBool isTLS;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
PORT_Assert(pwSpec == ss->ssl3.prSpec);
/* This hack provides maximal interoperability with SSL 3 servers. */
cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
/* SSL records are not being MACed. */
cwSpec->version = ss->version;
}
pwSpec->version = ss->version;
isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Set XXX Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite));
suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite);
if (suite_def == NULL) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef */
}
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
/* Double-check that we did not pick an RC4 suite */
PORT_Assert((suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4) &&
(suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4_40) &&
(suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4_56));
}
cipher = suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg;
kea = suite_def->key_exchange_alg;
mac = suite_def->mac_alg;
if (mac <= ssl_mac_sha && mac != ssl_mac_null && isTLS)
mac += 2;
ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = suite_def;
ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[kea];
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea);
pwSpec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher];
PORT_Assert(pwSpec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher);
pwSpec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac];
PORT_Assert(pwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac);
ss->sec.keyBits = pwSpec->cipher_def->key_size * BPB;
ss->sec.secretKeyBits = pwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB;
ss->sec.cipherType = cipher;
pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL;
pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL;
pwSpec->mac_size = pwSpec->mac_def->mac_size;
pwSpec->compression_method = ss->ssl3.hs.compression;
pwSpec->compressContext = NULL;
pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL;
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
return SECSuccess;
}
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB
#define SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE sizeof(z_stream)
static SECStatus
ssl3_MapZlibError(int zlib_error)
{
switch (zlib_error) {
case Z_OK:
return SECSuccess;
default:
return SECFailure;
}
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_DeflateInit(void *void_context)
{
z_stream *context = void_context;
context->zalloc = NULL;
context->zfree = NULL;
context->opaque = NULL;
return ssl3_MapZlibError(deflateInit(context, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION));
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_InflateInit(void *void_context)
{
z_stream *context = void_context;
context->zalloc = NULL;
context->zfree = NULL;
context->opaque = NULL;
context->next_in = NULL;
context->avail_in = 0;
return ssl3_MapZlibError(inflateInit(context));
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_DeflateCompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len,
int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
{
z_stream *context = void_context;
if (!inlen) {
*out_len = 0;
return SECSuccess;
}
context->next_in = (unsigned char*) in;
context->avail_in = inlen;
context->next_out = out;
context->avail_out = maxout;
if (deflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (context->avail_out == 0) {
/* We ran out of space! */
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Ran out of buffer while compressing",
SSL_GETPID()));
return SECFailure;
}
*out_len = maxout - context->avail_out;
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_DeflateDecompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len,
int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
{
z_stream *context = void_context;
if (!inlen) {
*out_len = 0;
return SECSuccess;
}
context->next_in = (unsigned char*) in;
context->avail_in = inlen;
context->next_out = out;
context->avail_out = maxout;
if (inflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
*out_len = maxout - context->avail_out;
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_DestroyCompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused)
{
deflateEnd(void_context);
PORT_Free(void_context);
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused)
{
inflateEnd(void_context);
PORT_Free(void_context);
return SECSuccess;
}
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB */
/* Initialize the compression functions and contexts for the given
* CipherSpec. */
static SECStatus
ssl3_InitCompressionContext(ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec)
{
/* Setup the compression functions */
switch (pwSpec->compression_method) {
case ssl_compression_null:
pwSpec->compressor = NULL;
pwSpec->decompressor = NULL;
pwSpec->compressContext = NULL;
pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL;
pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = NULL;
pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL;
break;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB
case ssl_compression_deflate:
pwSpec->compressor = ssl3_DeflateCompress;
pwSpec->decompressor = ssl3_DeflateDecompress;
pwSpec->compressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE);
pwSpec->decompressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE);
pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = ssl3_DestroyCompressContext;
pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext;
ssl3_DeflateInit(pwSpec->compressContext);
ssl3_InflateInit(pwSpec->decompressContext);
break;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB */
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
/* Initialize encryption contexts for pending spec.
* MAC contexts are set up when computing the mac, not here.
* Master Secret already is derived in spec->msItem
* Caller holds Spec write lock.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_InitPendingContextsBypass(sslSocket *ss)
{
ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec;
const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def;
void * serverContext = NULL;
void * clientContext = NULL;
BLapiInitContextFunc initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)NULL;
int mode = 0;
unsigned int optArg1 = 0;
unsigned int optArg2 = 0;
PRBool server_encrypts = ss->sec.isServer;
SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def;
calg = cipher_def->calg;
if (calg == ssl_calg_aes_gcm) {
pwSpec->encode = NULL;
pwSpec->decode = NULL;
pwSpec->destroy = NULL;
pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL;
pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL;
pwSpec->aead = ssl3_AESGCMBypass;
ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec);
return SECSuccess;
}
serverContext = pwSpec->server.cipher_context;
clientContext = pwSpec->client.cipher_context;
switch (calg) {
case ssl_calg_null:
pwSpec->encode = Null_Cipher;
pwSpec->decode = Null_Cipher;
pwSpec->destroy = NULL;
goto success;
case ssl_calg_rc4:
initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)RC4_InitContext;
pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) RC4_Encrypt;
pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) RC4_Decrypt;
pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext;
break;
case ssl_calg_rc2:
initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)RC2_InitContext;
mode = NSS_RC2_CBC;
optArg1 = cipher_def->key_size;
pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) RC2_Encrypt;
pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) RC2_Decrypt;
pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext;
break;
case ssl_calg_des:
initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)DES_InitContext;
mode = NSS_DES_CBC;
optArg1 = server_encrypts;
pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) DES_Encrypt;
pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) DES_Decrypt;
pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) DES_DestroyContext;
break;
case ssl_calg_3des:
initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)DES_InitContext;
mode = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC;
optArg1 = server_encrypts;
pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) DES_Encrypt;
pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) DES_Decrypt;
pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) DES_DestroyContext;
break;
case ssl_calg_aes:
initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)AES_InitContext;
mode = NSS_AES_CBC;
optArg1 = server_encrypts;
optArg2 = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) AES_Encrypt;
pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) AES_Decrypt;
pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) AES_DestroyContext;
break;
case ssl_calg_camellia:
initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)Camellia_InitContext;
mode = NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC;
optArg1 = server_encrypts;
optArg2 = CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE;
pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) Camellia_Encrypt;
pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) Camellia_Decrypt;
pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) Camellia_DestroyContext;
break;
case ssl_calg_seed:
initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)SEED_InitContext;
mode = NSS_SEED_CBC;
optArg1 = server_encrypts;
optArg2 = SEED_BLOCK_SIZE;
pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) SEED_Encrypt;
pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) SEED_Decrypt;
pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) SEED_DestroyContext;
break;
case ssl_calg_idea:
case ssl_calg_fortezza :
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
goto bail_out;
}
rv = (*initFn)(serverContext,
pwSpec->server.write_key_item.data,
pwSpec->server.write_key_item.len,
pwSpec->server.write_iv_item.data,
mode, optArg1, optArg2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
goto bail_out;
}
switch (calg) {
case ssl_calg_des:
case ssl_calg_3des:
case ssl_calg_aes:
case ssl_calg_camellia:
case ssl_calg_seed:
/* For block ciphers, if the server is encrypting, then the client
* is decrypting, and vice versa.
*/
optArg1 = !optArg1;
break;
/* kill warnings. */
case ssl_calg_null:
case ssl_calg_rc4:
case ssl_calg_rc2:
case ssl_calg_idea:
case ssl_calg_fortezza:
case ssl_calg_aes_gcm:
break;
}
rv = (*initFn)(clientContext,
pwSpec->client.write_key_item.data,
pwSpec->client.write_key_item.len,
pwSpec->client.write_iv_item.data,
mode, optArg1, optArg2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
goto bail_out;
}
pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext;
pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext;
ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec);
success:
return SECSuccess;
bail_out:
return SECFailure;
}
#endif
/* This function should probably be moved to pk11wrap and be named
* PK11_ParamFromIVAndEffectiveKeyBits
*/
static SECItem *
ssl3_ParamFromIV(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mtype, SECItem *iv, CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits)
{
SECItem * param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mtype, iv);
if (param && param->data && param->len >= sizeof(CK_RC2_PARAMS)) {
switch (mtype) {
case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_RC2_ECB:
case CKM_RC2_CBC:
case CKM_RC2_MAC:
case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL:
case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD:
*(CK_RC2_PARAMS *)param->data = ulEffectiveBits;
default: break;
}
}
return param;
}
/* ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader writes the SSL/TLS pseudo-header (the data
* which is included in the MAC or AEAD additional data) to |out| and returns
* its length. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.3 for the
* definition of the AEAD additional data.
*
* TLS pseudo-header includes the record's version field, SSL's doesn't. Which
* pseudo-header defintiion to use should be decided based on the version of
* the protocol that was negotiated when the cipher spec became current, NOT
* based on the version value in the record itself, and the decision is passed
* to this function as the |includesVersion| argument. But, the |version|
* argument should be the record's version value.
*/
static unsigned int
ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(unsigned char *out,
SSL3SequenceNumber seq_num,
SSL3ContentType type,
PRBool includesVersion,
SSL3ProtocolVersion version,
PRBool isDTLS,
int length)
{
out[0] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 24);
out[1] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 16);
out[2] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 8);
out[3] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 0);
out[4] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 24);
out[5] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 16);
out[6] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 8);
out[7] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 0);
out[8] = type;
/* SSL3 MAC doesn't include the record's version field. */
if (!includesVersion) {
out[9] = MSB(length);
out[10] = LSB(length);
return 11;
}
/* TLS MAC and AEAD additional data include version. */
if (isDTLS) {
SSL3ProtocolVersion dtls_version;
dtls_version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version);
out[9] = MSB(dtls_version);
out[10] = LSB(dtls_version);
} else {
out[9] = MSB(version);
out[10] = LSB(version);
}
out[11] = MSB(length);
out[12] = LSB(length);
return 13;
}
typedef SECStatus (*PK11CryptFcn)(
PK11SymKey *symKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, SECItem *param,
unsigned char *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxLen,
const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inLen);
static PK11CryptFcn pk11_encrypt = NULL;
static PK11CryptFcn pk11_decrypt = NULL;
static PRCallOnceType resolvePK11CryptOnce;
static PRStatus
ssl3_ResolvePK11CryptFunctions(void)
{
#ifdef LINUX
/* On Linux we use the system NSS libraries. Look up the PK11_Encrypt and
* PK11_Decrypt functions at run time. */
void *handle = dlopen(NULL, RTLD_LAZY);
if (!handle) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return PR_FAILURE;
}
pk11_encrypt = (PK11CryptFcn)dlsym(handle, "PK11_Encrypt");
pk11_decrypt = (PK11CryptFcn)dlsym(handle, "PK11_Decrypt");
dlclose(handle);
return PR_SUCCESS;
#else
/* On other platforms we use our own copy of NSS. PK11_Encrypt and
* PK11_Decrypt are known to be available. */
pk11_encrypt = PK11_Encrypt;
pk11_decrypt = PK11_Decrypt;
return PR_SUCCESS;
#endif
}
/*
* In NSS 3.15, PK11_Encrypt and PK11_Decrypt were added to provide access
* to the AES GCM implementation in the NSS softoken. So the presence of
* these two functions implies the NSS version supports AES GCM.
*/
static PRBool
ssl3_HasGCMSupport(void)
{
(void)PR_CallOnce(&resolvePK11CryptOnce, ssl3_ResolvePK11CryptFunctions);
return pk11_encrypt != NULL;
}
/* On this socket, disable the GCM cipher suites */
SECStatus
ssl3_DisableGCMSuites(sslSocket * ss)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipher_suite_defs); i++) {
const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def = &cipher_suite_defs[i];
if (cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg == cipher_aes_128_gcm) {
SECStatus rv = ssl3_CipherPrefSet(ss, cipher_def->cipher_suite,
PR_FALSE);
PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* else is coding error */
}
}
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_AESGCM(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys,
PRBool doDecrypt,
unsigned char *out,
int *outlen,
int maxout,
const unsigned char *in,
int inlen,
const unsigned char *additionalData,
int additionalDataLen)
{
SECItem param;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
unsigned char nonce[12];
unsigned int uOutLen;
CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams;
static const int tagSize = 16;
static const int explicitNonceLen = 8;
/* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288#section-3 for details of how the
* nonce is formed. */
memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, 4);
if (doDecrypt) {
memcpy(nonce + 4, in, explicitNonceLen);
in += explicitNonceLen;
inlen -= explicitNonceLen;
*outlen = 0;
} else {
if (maxout < explicitNonceLen) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Use the 64-bit sequence number as the explicit nonce. */
memcpy(nonce + 4, additionalData, explicitNonceLen);
memcpy(out, additionalData, explicitNonceLen);
out += explicitNonceLen;
maxout -= explicitNonceLen;
*outlen = explicitNonceLen;
}
param.type = siBuffer;
param.data = (unsigned char *) &gcmParams;
param.len = sizeof(gcmParams);
gcmParams.pIv = nonce;
gcmParams.ulIvLen = sizeof(nonce);
gcmParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData; /* const cast */
gcmParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen;
gcmParams.ulTagBits = tagSize * 8;
if (doDecrypt) {
rv = pk11_decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen,
maxout, in, inlen);
} else {
rv = pk11_encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen,
maxout, in, inlen);
}
*outlen += (int) uOutLen;
return rv;
}
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
static SECStatus
ssl3_AESGCMBypass(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys,
PRBool doDecrypt,
unsigned char *out,
int *outlen,
int maxout,
const unsigned char *in,
int inlen,
const unsigned char *additionalData,
int additionalDataLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
unsigned char nonce[12];
unsigned int uOutLen;
AESContext *cx;
CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams;
static const int tagSize = 16;
static const int explicitNonceLen = 8;
/* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288#section-3 for details of how the
* nonce is formed. */
PORT_Assert(keys->write_iv_item.len == 4);
if (keys->write_iv_item.len != 4) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv_item.data, 4);
if (doDecrypt) {
memcpy(nonce + 4, in, explicitNonceLen);
in += explicitNonceLen;
inlen -= explicitNonceLen;
*outlen = 0;
} else {
if (maxout < explicitNonceLen) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Use the 64-bit sequence number as the explicit nonce. */
memcpy(nonce + 4, additionalData, explicitNonceLen);
memcpy(out, additionalData, explicitNonceLen);
out += explicitNonceLen;
maxout -= explicitNonceLen;
*outlen = explicitNonceLen;
}
gcmParams.pIv = nonce;
gcmParams.ulIvLen = sizeof(nonce);
gcmParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData; /* const cast */
gcmParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen;
gcmParams.ulTagBits = tagSize * 8;
cx = (AESContext *)keys->cipher_context;
rv = AES_InitContext(cx, keys->write_key_item.data,
keys->write_key_item.len,
(unsigned char *)&gcmParams, NSS_AES_GCM, !doDecrypt,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
if (doDecrypt) {
rv = AES_Decrypt(cx, out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen);
} else {
rv = AES_Encrypt(cx, out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen);
}
AES_DestroyContext(cx, PR_FALSE);
*outlen += (int) uOutLen;
return rv;
}
#endif
static SECStatus
ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305(
ssl3KeyMaterial *keys,
PRBool doDecrypt,
unsigned char *out,
int *outlen,
int maxout,
const unsigned char *in,
int inlen,
const unsigned char *additionalData,
int additionalDataLen)
{
SECItem param;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
unsigned int uOutLen;
CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS aeadParams;
static const int tagSize = 16;
param.type = siBuffer;
param.len = sizeof(aeadParams);
param.data = (unsigned char *) &aeadParams;
memset(&aeadParams, 0, sizeof(aeadParams));
aeadParams.pIv = (unsigned char *) additionalData;
aeadParams.ulIvLen = 8;
aeadParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *) additionalData;
aeadParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen;
aeadParams.ulTagLen = tagSize;
if (doDecrypt) {
rv = pk11_decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, ¶m,
out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen);
} else {
rv = pk11_encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, ¶m,
out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen);
}
*outlen = (int) uOutLen;
return rv;
}
/* Initialize encryption and MAC contexts for pending spec.
* Master Secret already is derived.
* Caller holds Spec write lock.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_InitPendingContextsPKCS11(sslSocket *ss)
{
ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec;
const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def;
PK11Context * serverContext = NULL;
PK11Context * clientContext = NULL;
SECItem * param;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mac_mech;
CK_ULONG macLength;
CK_ULONG effKeyBits;
SECItem iv;
SECItem mac_param;
SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def;
macLength = pwSpec->mac_size;
calg = cipher_def->calg;
PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg);
pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL;
pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL;
if (calg == calg_aes_gcm || calg == calg_chacha20) {
pwSpec->encode = NULL;
pwSpec->decode = NULL;
pwSpec->destroy = NULL;
pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL;
pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL;
if (calg == calg_aes_gcm) {
pwSpec->aead = ssl3_AESGCM;
} else {
pwSpec->aead = ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
** Now setup the MAC contexts,
** crypto contexts are setup below.
*/
mac_mech = pwSpec->mac_def->mmech;
mac_param.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength;
mac_param.len = sizeof(macLength);
mac_param.type = 0;
pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(
mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->client.write_mac_key, &mac_param);
if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(
mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->server.write_mac_key, &mac_param);
if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
/*
** Now setup the crypto contexts.
*/
if (calg == calg_null) {
pwSpec->encode = Null_Cipher;
pwSpec->decode = Null_Cipher;
pwSpec->destroy = NULL;
return SECSuccess;
}
mechanism = alg2Mech[calg].cmech;
effKeyBits = cipher_def->key_size * BPB;
/*
* build the server context
*/
iv.data = pwSpec->server.write_iv;
iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size;
param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits);
if (param == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
serverContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism,
(ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT),
pwSpec->server.write_key, param);
iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len);
if (iv.data)
PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->server.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len);
SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
if (serverContext == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
/*
* build the client context
*/
iv.data = pwSpec->client.write_iv;
iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size;
param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits);
if (param == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
clientContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism,
(ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_DECRYPT : CKA_ENCRYPT),
pwSpec->client.write_key, param);
iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len);
if (iv.data)
PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->client.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len);
SECITEM_FreeItem(param,PR_TRUE);
if (clientContext == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp;
pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp;
pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) PK11_DestroyContext;
pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext;
pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext;
serverContext = NULL;
clientContext = NULL;
ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec);
return SECSuccess;
fail:
if (serverContext != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(serverContext, PR_TRUE);
if (clientContext != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(clientContext, PR_TRUE);
if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context != NULL) {
PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->client.write_mac_context,PR_TRUE);
pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL;
}
if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context != NULL) {
PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->server.write_mac_context,PR_TRUE);
pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL;
}
return SECFailure;
}
/* Complete the initialization of all keys, ciphers, MACs and their contexts
* for the pending Cipher Spec.
* Called from: ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
* ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
* ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart)
* ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart)
* Sets error code, but caller probably should override to disambiguate.
* NULL pms means re-use old master_secret.
*
* This code is common to the bypass and PKCS11 execution paths.
* For the bypass case, pms is NULL.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms)
{
ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec;
ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec;
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
if (pms || (!pwSpec->msItem.len && !pwSpec->master_secret)) {
rv = ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(ss, pms);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done; /* err code set by ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret */
}
}
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 && pwSpec->msItem.len && pwSpec->msItem.data) {
/* Double Bypass succeeded in extracting the master_secret */
const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen ||
(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
pwSpec->bypassCiphers = PR_TRUE;
rv = ssl3_KeyAndMacDeriveBypass( pwSpec,
(const unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
(const unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random,
isTLS,
(PRBool)(kea_def->is_limited));
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
rv = ssl3_InitPendingContextsBypass(ss);
}
} else
#endif
if (pwSpec->master_secret) {
rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(ss);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
rv = ssl3_InitPendingContextsPKCS11(ss);
}
} else {
PORT_Assert(pwSpec->master_secret);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done;
}
/* Generic behaviors -- common to all crypto methods */
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
pwSpec->read_seq_num.high = pwSpec->write_seq_num.high = 0;
} else {
if (cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) {
/* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many
* times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The
* spec says you should be discarding the connection
* and start over, so not much we can do here. */
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
goto done;
}
/* The sequence number has the high 16 bits as the epoch. */
pwSpec->epoch = cwSpec->epoch + 1;
pwSpec->read_seq_num.high = pwSpec->write_seq_num.high =
pwSpec->epoch << 16;
dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&pwSpec->recvdRecords);
}
pwSpec->read_seq_num.low = pwSpec->write_seq_num.low = 0;
done:
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/
if (rv != SECSuccess)
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
/*
* 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported.
*/
static const unsigned char mac_pad_1 [60] = {
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
};
static const unsigned char mac_pad_2 [60] = {
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
};
/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord()
** Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!)
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
ssl3CipherSpec * spec,
PRBool useServerMacKey,
const unsigned char *header,
unsigned int headerLen,
const SSL3Opaque * input,
int inputLength,
unsigned char * outbuf,
unsigned int * outLength)
{
const ssl3MACDef * mac_def;
SECStatus rv;
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: header", header, headerLen));
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLength));
mac_def = spec->mac_def;
if (mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
*outLength = 0;
return SECSuccess;
}
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (spec->bypassCiphers) {
/* bypass version */
const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL;
unsigned int pad_bytes = 0;
PRUint64 write_mac_context[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
switch (mac_def->mac) {
case ssl_mac_null:
*outLength = 0;
return SECSuccess;
case ssl_mac_md5:
pad_bytes = 48;
hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgMD5);
break;
case ssl_mac_sha:
pad_bytes = 40;
hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA1);
break;
case ssl_hmac_md5: /* used with TLS */
hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgMD5);
break;
case ssl_hmac_sha: /* used with TLS */
hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA1);
break;
case ssl_hmac_sha256: /* used with TLS */
hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256);
break;
default:
break;
}
if (!hashObj) {
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (spec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
unsigned int tempLen;
unsigned char temp[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
/* compute "inner" part of SSL3 MAC */
hashObj->begin(write_mac_context);
if (useServerMacKey)
hashObj->update(write_mac_context,
spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data,
spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len);
else
hashObj->update(write_mac_context,
spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data,
spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len);
hashObj->update(write_mac_context, mac_pad_1, pad_bytes);
hashObj->update(write_mac_context, header, headerLen);
hashObj->update(write_mac_context, input, inputLength);
hashObj->end(write_mac_context, temp, &tempLen, sizeof temp);
/* compute "outer" part of SSL3 MAC */
hashObj->begin(write_mac_context);
if (useServerMacKey)
hashObj->update(write_mac_context,
spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data,
spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len);
else
hashObj->update(write_mac_context,
spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data,
spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len);
hashObj->update(write_mac_context, mac_pad_2, pad_bytes);
hashObj->update(write_mac_context, temp, tempLen);
hashObj->end(write_mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size);
rv = SECSuccess;
} else { /* is TLS */
#define cx ((HMACContext *)write_mac_context)
if (useServerMacKey) {
rv = HMAC_Init(cx, hashObj,
spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data,
spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len, PR_FALSE);
} else {
rv = HMAC_Init(cx, hashObj,
spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data,
spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len, PR_FALSE);
}
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
HMAC_Begin(cx);
HMAC_Update(cx, header, headerLen);
HMAC_Update(cx, input, inputLength);
rv = HMAC_Finish(cx, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size);
HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_FALSE);
}
#undef cx
}
} else
#endif
{
PK11Context *mac_context =
(useServerMacKey ? spec->server.write_mac_context
: spec->client.write_mac_context);
rv = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context);
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, header, headerLen);
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLength);
rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size);
}
PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLength == (unsigned)spec->mac_size);
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLength));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
rv = SECFailure;
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
}
return rv;
}
/* Called from: ssl3_HandleRecord()
* Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!)
*
* On entry:
* originalLen >= inputLen >= MAC size
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
ssl3CipherSpec * spec,
PRBool useServerMacKey,
const unsigned char *header,
unsigned int headerLen,
const SSL3Opaque * input,
int inputLen,
int originalLen,
unsigned char * outbuf,
unsigned int * outLen)
{
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macType;
CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params;
SECItem param, inputItem, outputItem;
SECStatus rv;
PK11SymKey * key;
PORT_Assert(inputLen >= spec->mac_size);
PORT_Assert(originalLen >= inputLen);
if (spec->bypassCiphers) {
/* This function doesn't support PKCS#11 bypass. We fallback on the
* non-constant time version. */
goto fallback;
}
if (spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
*outLen = 0;
return SECSuccess;
}
macType = CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
if (spec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
macType = CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
}
params.macAlg = spec->mac_def->mmech;
params.ulBodyTotalLen = originalLen;
params.pHeader = (unsigned char *) header; /* const cast */
params.ulHeaderLen = headerLen;
param.data = (unsigned char*) ¶ms;
param.len = sizeof(params);
param.type = 0;
inputItem.data = (unsigned char *) input;
inputItem.len = inputLen;
inputItem.type = 0;
outputItem.data = outbuf;
outputItem.len = *outLen;
outputItem.type = 0;
key = spec->server.write_mac_key;
if (!useServerMacKey) {
key = spec->client.write_mac_key;
}
rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(key, macType, ¶m, &outputItem, &inputItem);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) {
goto fallback;
}
*outLen = 0;
rv = SECFailure;
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)spec->mac_size);
*outLen = outputItem.len;
return rv;
fallback:
/* ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC expects the MAC to have been removed from the
* length already. */
inputLen -= spec->mac_size;
return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, useServerMacKey, header, headerLen,
input, inputLen, outbuf, outLen);
}
static PRBool
ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid) {
PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
PRBool isPresent = PR_TRUE;
/* we only care if we are doing client auth */
/* If NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH is defined and a platformClientKey is being
* used, u.ssl3.clAuthValid will be false and this function will always
* return PR_TRUE. */
if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) {
return PR_TRUE;
}
/* get the slot */
slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID,
sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID);
if (slot == NULL ||
!PK11_IsPresent(slot) ||
sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries != PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot) ||
sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID != PK11_GetSlotID(slot) ||
sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID != PK11_GetModuleID(slot) ||
(PK11_NeedLogin(slot) && !PK11_IsLoggedIn(slot, NULL))) {
isPresent = PR_FALSE;
}
if (slot) {
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
}
return isPresent;
}
/* Caller must hold the spec read lock. */
SECStatus
ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec,
PRBool isServer,
PRBool isDTLS,
PRBool capRecordVersion,
SSL3ContentType type,
const SSL3Opaque * pIn,
PRUint32 contentLen,
sslBuffer * wrBuf)
{
const ssl3BulkCipherDef * cipher_def;
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 macLen = 0;
PRUint32 fragLen;
PRUint32 p1Len, p2Len, oddLen = 0;
PRUint16 headerLen;
int ivLen = 0;
int cipherBytes = 0;
unsigned char pseudoHeader[13];
unsigned int pseudoHeaderLen;
cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def;
headerLen = isDTLS ? DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH;
if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
/* Prepend the per-record explicit IV using technique 2b from
* RFC 4346 section 6.2.3.2: The IV is a cryptographically
* strong random number XORed with the CBC residue from the previous
* record.
*/
ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size;
if (ivLen > wrBuf->space - headerLen) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(wrBuf->buf + headerLen, ivLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
rv = cwSpec->encode( cwSpec->encodeContext,
wrBuf->buf + headerLen,
&cipherBytes, /* output and actual outLen */
ivLen, /* max outlen */
wrBuf->buf + headerLen,
ivLen); /* input and inputLen*/
if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytes != ivLen) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
}
if (cwSpec->compressor) {
int outlen;
rv = cwSpec->compressor(
cwSpec->compressContext,
wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen, &outlen,
wrBuf->space - headerLen - ivLen, pIn, contentLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
pIn = wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen;
contentLen = outlen;
}
pseudoHeaderLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
pseudoHeader, cwSpec->write_seq_num, type,
cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->version,
isDTLS, contentLen);
PORT_Assert(pseudoHeaderLen <= sizeof(pseudoHeader));
if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
const int nonceLen = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size;
const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size;
if (headerLen + nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > wrBuf->space) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
cipherBytes = contentLen;
rv = cwSpec->aead(
isServer ? &cwSpec->server : &cwSpec->client,
PR_FALSE, /* do encrypt */
wrBuf->buf + headerLen, /* output */
&cipherBytes, /* out len */
wrBuf->space - headerLen, /* max out */
pIn, contentLen, /* input */
pseudoHeader, pseudoHeaderLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
} else {
/*
* Add the MAC
*/
rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, isServer,
pseudoHeader, pseudoHeaderLen, pIn, contentLen,
wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + contentLen, &macLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
p1Len = contentLen;
p2Len = macLen;
fragLen = contentLen + macLen; /* needs to be encrypted */
PORT_Assert(fragLen <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024);
/*
* Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher)
* then Encrypt it
*/
if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
unsigned char * pBuf;
int padding_length;
int i;
oddLen = contentLen % cipher_def->block_size;
/* Assume blockSize is a power of two */
padding_length = cipher_def->block_size - 1 -
((fragLen) & (cipher_def->block_size - 1));
fragLen += padding_length + 1;
PORT_Assert((fragLen % cipher_def->block_size) == 0);
/* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */
pBuf = &wrBuf->buf[headerLen + ivLen + fragLen - 1];
for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) {
*pBuf-- = padding_length;
}
/* now, if contentLen is not a multiple of block size, fix it */
p2Len = fragLen - p1Len;
}
if (p1Len < 256) {
oddLen = p1Len;
p1Len = 0;
} else {
p1Len -= oddLen;
}
if (oddLen) {
p2Len += oddLen;
PORT_Assert( (cipher_def->block_size < 2) || \
(p2Len % cipher_def->block_size) == 0);
memmove(wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + p1Len, pIn + p1Len,
oddLen);
}
if (p1Len > 0) {
int cipherBytesPart1 = -1;
rv = cwSpec->encode( cwSpec->encodeContext,
wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen, /* output */
&cipherBytesPart1, /* actual outlen */
p1Len, /* max outlen */
pIn, p1Len); /* input, and inputlen */
PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart1 == (int) p1Len);
if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart1 != (int) p1Len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
cipherBytes += cipherBytesPart1;
}
if (p2Len > 0) {
int cipherBytesPart2 = -1;
rv = cwSpec->encode( cwSpec->encodeContext,
wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + p1Len,
&cipherBytesPart2, /* output and actual outLen */
p2Len, /* max outlen */
wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + p1Len,
p2Len); /* input and inputLen*/
PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart2 == (int) p2Len);
if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart2 != (int) p2Len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
cipherBytes += cipherBytesPart2;
}
}
PORT_Assert(cipherBytes <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024);
wrBuf->len = cipherBytes + headerLen;
wrBuf->buf[0] = type;
if (isDTLS) {
SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(cwSpec->version);
wrBuf->buf[1] = MSB(version);
wrBuf->buf[2] = LSB(version);
wrBuf->buf[3] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >> 24);
wrBuf->buf[4] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >> 16);
wrBuf->buf[5] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >> 8);
wrBuf->buf[6] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >> 0);
wrBuf->buf[7] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low >> 24);
wrBuf->buf[8] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low >> 16);
wrBuf->buf[9] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low >> 8);
wrBuf->buf[10] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low >> 0);
wrBuf->buf[11] = MSB(cipherBytes);
wrBuf->buf[12] = LSB(cipherBytes);
} else {
SSL3ProtocolVersion version = cwSpec->version;
if (capRecordVersion) {
version = PR_MIN(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, version);
}
wrBuf->buf[1] = MSB(version);
wrBuf->buf[2] = LSB(version);
wrBuf->buf[3] = MSB(cipherBytes);
wrBuf->buf[4] = LSB(cipherBytes);
}
ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(&cwSpec->write_seq_num);
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Process the plain text before sending it.
* Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were successfully sent
* plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the
* output (write) buffer.
* Returns SECFailure on a hard IO error, memory error, or crypto error.
* Does NOT return SECWouldBlock.
*
* Notes on the use of the private ssl flags:
* (no private SSL flags)
* Attempt to make and send SSL records for all plaintext
* If non-blocking and a send gets WOULD_BLOCK,
* or if the pending (ciphertext) buffer is not empty,
* then buffer remaining bytes of ciphertext into pending buf,
* and continue to do that for all succssive records until all
* bytes are used.
* ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER
* As above, except this suppresses all write attempts, and forces
* all ciphertext into the pending ciphertext buffer.
* ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH (for DTLS)
* Forces the use of the provided epoch
* ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION
* Caps the record layer version number of TLS ClientHello to { 3, 1 }
* (TLS 1.0). Some TLS 1.0 servers (which seem to use F5 BIG-IP) ignore
* ClientHello.client_version and use the record layer version number
* (TLSPlaintext.version) instead when negotiating protocol versions. In
* addition, if the record layer version number of ClientHello is { 3, 2 }
* (TLS 1.1) or higher, these servers reset the TCP connections. Lastly,
* some F5 BIG-IP servers hang if a record containing a ClientHello has a
* version greater than { 3, 1 } and a length greater than 255. Set this
* flag to work around such servers.
*/
PRInt32
ssl3_SendRecord( sslSocket * ss,
DTLSEpoch epoch, /* DTLS only */
SSL3ContentType type,
const SSL3Opaque * pIn, /* input buffer */
PRInt32 nIn, /* bytes of input */
PRInt32 flags)
{
sslBuffer * wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf;
SECStatus rv;
PRInt32 totalSent = 0;
PRBool capRecordVersion;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type),
nIn));
PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
capRecordVersion = ((flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION) != 0);
if (capRecordVersion) {
/* ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION can only be used with the
* TLS initial ClientHello. */
PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss));
PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
PORT_Assert(type == content_handshake);
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello);
}
if (ss->ssl3.initialized == PR_FALSE) {
/* This can happen on a server if the very first incoming record
** looks like a defective ssl3 record (e.g. too long), and we're
** trying to send an alert.
*/
PR_ASSERT(type == content_alert);
rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
}
}
/* check for Token Presence */
if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
return SECFailure;
}
while (nIn > 0) {
PRUint32 contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
unsigned int spaceNeeded;
unsigned int numRecords;
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/
if (nIn > 1 && ss->opt.cbcRandomIV &&
ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 &&
type == content_application_data &&
ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block /* CBC mode */) {
/* We will split the first byte of the record into its own record,
* as explained in the documentation for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV in ssl.h
*/
numRecords = 2;
} else {
numRecords = 1;
}
spaceNeeded = contentLen + (numRecords * SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE);
if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 &&
ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block) {
spaceNeeded += ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->iv_size;
}
if (spaceNeeded > wrBuf->space) {
rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, spaceNeeded);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: SendRecord, tried to get %d bytes",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spaceNeeded));
goto spec_locked_loser; /* sslBuffer_Grow set error code. */
}
}
if (numRecords == 2) {
sslBuffer secondRecord;
rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss->ssl3.cwSpec,
ss->sec.isServer, IS_DTLS(ss),
capRecordVersion, type, pIn,
1, wrBuf);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto spec_locked_loser;
PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [1/2]:",
wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len));
secondRecord.buf = wrBuf->buf + wrBuf->len;
secondRecord.len = 0;
secondRecord.space = wrBuf->space - wrBuf->len;
rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss->ssl3.cwSpec,
ss->sec.isServer, IS_DTLS(ss),
capRecordVersion, type,
pIn + 1, contentLen - 1,
&secondRecord);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [2/2]:",
secondRecord.buf, secondRecord.len));
wrBuf->len += secondRecord.len;
}
} else {
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss->ssl3.cwSpec,
ss->sec.isServer,
IS_DTLS(ss),
capRecordVersion,
type, pIn,
contentLen, wrBuf);
} else {
rv = dtls_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss, epoch,
!!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH),
type, pIn,
contentLen, wrBuf);
}
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:",
wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len));
}
}
spec_locked_loser:
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
pIn += contentLen;
nIn -= contentLen;
PORT_Assert( nIn >= 0 );
/* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext,
* or the caller doesn't want us to send the data yet,
* then add all our new ciphertext to the amount previously saved.
*/
if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) ||
(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) {
rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */
return SECFailure;
}
wrBuf->len = 0; /* All cipher text is saved away. */
if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) {
PRInt32 sent;
ss->handshakeBegun = 1;
sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss);
if (sent < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER;
}
}
} else if (wrBuf->len > 0) {
PRInt32 sent;
ss->handshakeBegun = 1;
sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len,
flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK);
if (sent < 0) {
if (PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */
sent = 0;
}
wrBuf->len -= sent;
if (wrBuf->len) {
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
/* DTLS just says no in this case. No buffering */
PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
/* now take all the remaining unsent new ciphertext and
* append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext.
*/
rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf + sent, wrBuf->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */
return SECFailure;
}
}
}
totalSent += contentLen;
}
return totalSent;
}
#define SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER 1024
/* Attempt to send the content of "in" in an SSL application_data record.
* Returns "len" or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock, nor SECSuccess.
*/
int
ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in,
PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags)
{
PRInt32 totalSent = 0;
PRInt32 discarded = 0;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
/* These flags for internal use only */
PORT_Assert(!(flags & (ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH |
ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT)));
if (len < 0 || !in) {
PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->pendingBuf.len > SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER &&
!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)) {
PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->appDataBuffered && len) {
PORT_Assert (in[0] == (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered));
if (in[0] != (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)) {
PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
return SECFailure;
}
in++;
len--;
discarded = 1;
}
while (len > totalSent) {
PRInt32 sent, toSend;
if (totalSent > 0) {
/*
* The thread yield is intended to give the reader thread a
* chance to get some cycles while the writer thread is in
* the middle of a large application data write. (See
* Bugzilla bug 127740, comment #1.)
*/
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); /* PR_Yield(); */
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
}
toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
/*
* Note that the 0 epoch is OK because flags will never require
* its use, as guaranteed by the PORT_Assert above.
*/
sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_application_data,
in + totalSent, toSend, flags);
if (sent < 0) {
if (totalSent > 0 && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked);
break;
}
return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */
}
totalSent += sent;
if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
/* must be a non-blocking socket */
PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked);
break;
}
}
if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
/* Must be non-blocking. */
PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
if (totalSent > 0) {
ss->appDataBuffered = 0x100 | in[totalSent - 1];
}
totalSent = totalSent + discarded - 1;
if (totalSent <= 0) {
PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
totalSent = SECFailure;
}
return totalSent;
}
ss->appDataBuffered = 0;
return totalSent + discarded;
}
/* Attempt to send buffered handshake messages.
* This function returns SECSuccess or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock.
* Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure.
*
* Depending on whether we are doing DTLS or not, this either calls
*
* - ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages if non-DTLS
* - dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages if DTLS
*
* Called from SSL3_SendAlert(), ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(),
* ssl3_AppendHandshake(), ssl3_SendClientHello(),
* ssl3_SendHelloRequest(), ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(),
* ssl3_SendFinished(),
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
{
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
return dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags);
} else {
return ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags);
}
}
/* Attempt to send the content of sendBuf buffer in an SSL handshake record.
* This function returns SECSuccess or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock.
* Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure.
*
* Called from ssl3_FlushHandshake
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
{
static const PRInt32 allowedFlags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER |
ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION;
PRInt32 rv = SECSuccess;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len)
return rv;
/* only these flags are allowed */
PORT_Assert(!(flags & ~allowedFlags));
if ((flags & ~allowedFlags) != 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
rv = SECFailure;
} else {
rv = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_handshake, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf,
ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, flags);
}
if (rv < 0) {
int err = PORT_GetError();
PORT_Assert(err != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
}
} else if (rv < ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) {
/* short write should never happen */
PORT_Assert(rv >= ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
} else {
rv = SECSuccess;
}
/* Whether we succeeded or failed, toss the old handshake data. */
ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len = 0;
return rv;
}
/*
* Called from ssl3_HandleAlert and from ssl3_HandleCertificate when
* the remote client sends a negative response to our certificate request.
* Returns SECFailure if the application has required client auth.
* SECSuccess otherwise.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
{
if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) {
if (ss->sec.peerKey != NULL) {
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey);
ss->sec.peerKey = NULL;
}
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert);
ss->sec.peerCert = NULL;
}
ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
/* If the server has required client-auth blindly but doesn't
* actually look at the certificate it won't know that no
* certificate was presented so we shutdown the socket to ensure
* an error. We only do this if we haven't already completed the
* first handshake because if we're redoing the handshake we
* know the server is paying attention to the certificate.
*/
if ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) ||
(!ss->firstHsDone &&
(ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE))) {
PRFileDesc * lower;
if (ss->sec.uncache)
ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_certificate);
lower = ss->fd->lower;
#ifdef _WIN32
lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND);
#else
lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH);
#endif
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/************************************************************************
* Alerts
*/
/*
** Acquires both handshake and XmitBuf locks.
** Called from: ssl3_IllegalParameter <-
** ssl3_HandshakeFailure <-
** ssl3_HandleAlert <- ssl3_HandleRecord.
** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs <- ssl3_HandleRecord
** ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable <-
** ssl3_HandleHelloRequest <-
** ssl3_HandleServerHello <-
** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange <-
** ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest <-
** ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone <-
** ssl3_HandleClientHello <-
** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello <-
** ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify <-
** ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange <-
** ssl3_HandleCertificate <-
** ssl3_HandleFinished <-
** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage <-
** ssl3_HandleRecord <-
**
*/
SECStatus
SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, SSL3AlertDescription desc)
{
PRUint8 bytes[2];
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send alert record, level=%d desc=%d",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc));
bytes[0] = level;
bytes[1] = desc;
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
if (level == alert_fatal) {
if (!ss->opt.noCache && ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->sec.uncache) {
ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
}
}
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
PRInt32 sent;
sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_alert, bytes, 2,
desc == no_certificate
? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER : 0);
rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent;
}
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
return rv; /* error set by ssl3_FlushHandshake or ssl3_SendRecord */
}
/*
* Send illegal_parameter alert. Set generic error number.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_IllegalParameter(sslSocket *ss)
{
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
: SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER );
return SECFailure;
}
/*
* Send handshake_Failure alert. Set generic error number.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss)
{
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
PORT_SetError( ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
: SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER );
return SECFailure;
}
static void
ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(sslSocket * ss, PRErrorCode errCode)
{
SSL3AlertDescription desc = bad_certificate;
PRBool isTLS = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS;
switch (errCode) {
case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE: desc = unsupported_certificate; break;
case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: desc = certificate_expired; break;
case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: desc = certificate_revoked; break;
case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE:
case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE:
desc = certificate_unknown; break;
case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
desc = isTLS ? access_denied : certificate_unknown; break;
case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_unknown; break;
case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_expired; break;
case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE:
case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID:
case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
default: desc = bad_certificate; break;
}
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: peer certificate is no good: error=%d",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, errCode));
(void) SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
}
/*
* Send decode_error alert. Set generic error number.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss)
{
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal,
ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? decode_error
: illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError( ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
: SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER );
return SECFailure;
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord.
** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf)
{
SSL3AlertLevel level;
SSL3AlertDescription desc;
int error;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle alert record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
if (buf->len != 2) {
(void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT);
return SECFailure;
}
level = (SSL3AlertLevel)buf->buf[0];
desc = (SSL3AlertDescription)buf->buf[1];
buf->len = 0;
SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL3[%d] received alert, level = %d, description = %d",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc));
switch (desc) {
case close_notify: ss->recvdCloseNotify = 1;
error = SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT; break;
case unexpected_message: error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT;
break;
case bad_record_mac: error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT; break;
case decryption_failed_RESERVED:
error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT;
break;
case record_overflow: error = SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT; break;
case decompression_failure: error = SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT;
break;
case handshake_failure: error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT;
break;
case no_certificate: error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE; break;
case bad_certificate: error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT; break;
case unsupported_certificate:error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT;break;
case certificate_revoked: error = SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT; break;
case certificate_expired: error = SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT; break;
case certificate_unknown: error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT;
break;
case illegal_parameter: error = SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT;break;
case inappropriate_fallback:
error = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT;
break;
/* All alerts below are TLS only. */
case unknown_ca: error = SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT; break;
case access_denied: error = SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT; break;
case decode_error: error = SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT; break;
case decrypt_error: error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT; break;
case export_restriction: error = SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT;
break;
case protocol_version: error = SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT; break;
case insufficient_security: error = SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT;
break;
case internal_error: error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; break;
case user_canceled: error = SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT; break;
case no_renegotiation: error = SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT; break;
/* Alerts for TLS client hello extensions */
case unsupported_extension:
error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT; break;
case certificate_unobtainable:
error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT; break;
case unrecognized_name:
error = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; break;
case bad_certificate_status_response:
error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT; break;
case bad_certificate_hash_value:
error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT; break;
default: error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT; break;
}
if (level == alert_fatal) {
if (!ss->opt.noCache) {
if (ss->sec.uncache)
ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
}
if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) &&
(desc == handshake_failure)) {
/* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any handshake failure
* XXX on the client hello is a failure to match ciphers.
*/
error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
}
PORT_SetError(error);
return SECFailure;
}
if ((desc == no_certificate) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_cert)) {
/* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss);
return rv;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Change Cipher Specs
* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone,
* ssl3_HandleClientHello,
* and ssl3_HandleFinished
*
* Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current
* and pending write spec pointers.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss)
{
PRUint8 change = change_cipher_spec_choice;
ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec;
SECStatus rv;
PRInt32 sent;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send change_cipher_spec record",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
}
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1,
ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
if (sent < 0) {
return (SECStatus)sent; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */
}
} else {
rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
}
/* swap the pending and current write specs. */
ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
ss->ssl3.cwSpec = pwSpec;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Write Cipher Suite to Pending",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd ));
/* We need to free up the contexts, keys and certs ! */
/* If we are really through with the old cipher spec
* (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it.
*/
if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) {
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.pwSpec, PR_FALSE/*freeSrvName*/);
} else {
/* With DTLS, we need to set a holddown timer in case the final
* message got lost */
ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = DTLS_FINISHED_TIMER_MS;
dtls_StartTimer(ss, dtls_FinishedTimerCb);
}
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord.
** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks.
*
* Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current
* and pending write spec pointers.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf)
{
ssl3CipherSpec * prSpec;
SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws;
SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice change;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle change_cipher_spec record",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
if (ws != wait_change_cipher) {
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
/* Ignore this because it's out of order. */
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: discard out of order "
"DTLS change_cipher_spec",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
buf->len = 0;
return SECSuccess;
}
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
return SECFailure;
}
if(buf->len != 1) {
(void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
return SECFailure;
}
change = (SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice)buf->buf[0];
if (change != change_cipher_spec_choice) {
/* illegal_parameter is correct here for both SSL3 and TLS. */
(void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
return SECFailure;
}
buf->len = 0;
/* Swap the pending and current read specs. */
ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/
prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec;
ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
ss->ssl3.crSpec = prSpec;
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_finished;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Read Cipher Suite to Pending",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd ));
/* If we are really through with the old cipher prSpec
* (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it.
*/
if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) {
ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec, PR_FALSE/*freeSrvName*/);
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/
return SECSuccess;
}
/* This method uses PKCS11 to derive the MS from the PMS, where PMS
** is a PKCS11 symkey. This is used in all cases except the
** "triple bypass" with RSA key exchange.
** Called from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec. prSpec is pwSpec.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms)
{
ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
const ssl3KEADef *kea_def= ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
unsigned char * cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random;
unsigned char * sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random;
PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen ||
(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
PRBool isTLS12=
(PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
/*
* Whenever isDH is true, we need to use CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
* which, unlike CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, converts arbitrary size
* data into a 48-byte value.
*/
PRBool isDH = (PRBool) ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_dh) ||
(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_ecdh));
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive;
SECItem params;
CK_FLAGS keyFlags;
CK_VERSION pms_version;
CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
if (isTLS12) {
if(isDH) master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256;
else master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256;
key_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256;
keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
} else if (isTLS) {
if(isDH) master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
else master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
} else {
if (isDH) master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
else master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
keyFlags = 0;
}
if (pms || !pwSpec->master_secret) {
if (isDH) {
master_params.pVersion = NULL;
} else {
master_params.pVersion = &pms_version;
}
master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr;
master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr;
master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
params.data = (unsigned char *) &master_params;
params.len = sizeof master_params;
}
if (pms != NULL) {
#if defined(TRACE)
if (ssl_trace >= 100) {
SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms);
if (extractRV == SECSuccess) {
SECItem * keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms);
if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) {
ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret",
keyData->data, keyData->len);
}
}
}
#endif
pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(pms, master_derive,
¶ms, key_derive, CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags);
if (!isDH && pwSpec->master_secret && ss->opt.detectRollBack) {
SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version;
client_version = pms_version.major << 8 | pms_version.minor;
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
client_version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(client_version);
}
if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) {
/* Destroy it. Version roll-back detected. */
PK11_FreeSymKey(pwSpec->master_secret);
pwSpec->master_secret = NULL;
}
}
if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
/* Generate a faux master secret in the same slot as the old one. */
PK11SlotInfo * slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey((PK11SymKey *)pms);
PK11SymKey * fpms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, pwSpec, slot);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if (fpms != NULL) {
pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(fpms,
master_derive, ¶ms, key_derive,
CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags);
PK11_FreeSymKey(fpms);
}
}
}
if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
/* Generate a faux master secret from the internal slot. */
PK11SlotInfo * slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
PK11SymKey * fpms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, pwSpec, slot);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if (fpms != NULL) {
pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(fpms,
master_derive, ¶ms, key_derive,
CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags);
if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
pwSpec->master_secret = fpms; /* use the fpms as the master. */
fpms = NULL;
}
}
if (fpms) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(fpms);
}
}
if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
SECItem * keydata;
/* In hope of doing a "double bypass",
* need to extract the master secret's value from the key object
* and store it raw in the sslSocket struct.
*/
rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pwSpec->master_secret);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
/* This returns the address of the secItem inside the key struct,
* not a copy or a reference. So, there's no need to free it.
*/
keydata = PK11_GetKeyData(pwSpec->master_secret);
if (keydata && keydata->len <= sizeof pwSpec->raw_master_secret) {
memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, keydata->data, keydata->len);
pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret;
pwSpec->msItem.len = keydata->len;
} else {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
}
#endif
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Derive encryption and MAC Keys (and IVs) from master secret
* Sets a useful error code when returning SECFailure.
*
* Called only from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(),
* which in turn is called from
* sendRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
* sendDHClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
* ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
* ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart)
* ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart)
* Caller MUST hold the specWriteLock, and SSL3HandshakeLock.
* ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec does that.
*
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss)
{
ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
unsigned char * cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random;
unsigned char * sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random;
PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen ||
(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
PRBool isTLS12=
(PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
/* following variables used in PKCS11 path */
const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def;
PK11SlotInfo * slot = NULL;
PK11SymKey * symKey = NULL;
void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
int keySize;
CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_material_params;
CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT returnedKeys;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulk_mechanism;
SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
SECItem params;
PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == calg_null);
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
if (!pwSpec->master_secret) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/*
* generate the key material
*/
key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->mac_size * BPB;
key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size* BPB;
key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB;
if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
/* Block ciphers in >= TLS 1.1 use a per-record, explicit IV. */
key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0;
memset(pwSpec->client.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size);
memset(pwSpec->server.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size);
}
key_material_params.bIsExport = (CK_BBOOL)(kea_def->is_limited);
key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr;
key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr;
key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial = &returnedKeys;
returnedKeys.pIVClient = pwSpec->client.write_iv;
returnedKeys.pIVServer = pwSpec->server.write_iv;
keySize = cipher_def->key_size;
if (skipKeysAndIVs) {
keySize = 0;
key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0;
key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0;
returnedKeys.pIVClient = NULL;
returnedKeys.pIVServer = NULL;
}
calg = cipher_def->calg;
PORT_Assert( alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg);
bulk_mechanism = alg2Mech[calg].cmech;
params.data = (unsigned char *)&key_material_params;
params.len = sizeof(key_material_params);
if (isTLS12) {
key_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256;
} else if (isTLS) {
key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
} else {
key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
}
/* CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE is defined to set ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, and
* DERIVE by DEFAULT */
symKey = PK11_Derive(pwSpec->master_secret, key_derive, ¶ms,
bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize);
if (!symKey) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* we really should use the actual mac'ing mechanism here, but we
* don't because these types are used to map keytype anyway and both
* mac's map to the same keytype.
*/
slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(symKey);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* slot is held until the key is freed */
pwSpec->client.write_mac_key =
PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_key == NULL ) {
goto loser; /* loser sets err */
}
pwSpec->server.write_mac_key =
PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_key == NULL ) {
goto loser; /* loser sets err */
}
if (!skipKeysAndIVs) {
pwSpec->client.write_key =
PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
if (pwSpec->client.write_key == NULL ) {
goto loser; /* loser sets err */
}
pwSpec->server.write_key =
PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
if (pwSpec->server.write_key == NULL ) {
goto loser; /* loser sets err */
}
}
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
return SECSuccess;
loser:
if (symKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes creates handshake hash contexts and hashes in
* buffered messages in ss->ssl3.hs.messages. */
static SECStatus
ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss)
{
SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: start handshake hashes", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown);
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone);
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
/* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
* then this will need to be updated. */
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256);
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone = (void (*)(void *, void *))SHA256_Clone;
ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single;
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->begin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx);
} else {
ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo;
MD5_Begin((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx);
SHA1_Begin((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx);
}
} else
#endif
{
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.md5 && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha);
/*
* note: We should probably lookup an SSL3 slot for these
* handshake hashes in hopes that we wind up with the same slots
* that the master secret will wind up in ...
*/
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
/* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
* then this will need to be updated. */
ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA256);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single;
if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Create a backup SHA-1 hash for a potential client auth
* signature.
*
* In TLS 1.2, ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes always uses the
* handshake hash function (SHA-256). If the server or the client
* does not support SHA-256 as a signature hash, we can either
* maintain a backup SHA-1 handshake hash or buffer all handshake
* messages.
*/
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
}
} else {
/* Both ss->ssl3.hs.md5 and ss->ssl3.hs.sha should be NULL or
* created successfully. */
ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5 == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) {
PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE);
ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL;
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo;
if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.md5) != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
}
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > 0) {
if (ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf,
ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len) !=
SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf);
ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL;
ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0;
ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd ));
ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_unknown;
ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0;
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj = NULL;
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone = NULL;
#endif
if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) {
PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5,PR_TRUE);
ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) {
PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha,PR_TRUE);
ss->ssl3.hs.sha = NULL;
}
return rv;
}
/*
* Handshake messages
*/
/* Called from ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes()
** ssl3_AppendHandshake()
** ssl3_StartHandshakeHash()
** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello()
** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage()
** Caller must hold the ssl3Handshake lock.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b,
unsigned int l)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
/* We need to buffer the handshake messages until we have established
* which handshake hash function to use. */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) {
return sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages, b, l);
}
PRINT_BUF(90, (NULL, "handshake hash input:", b, l));
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->update(ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, b, l);
} else {
MD5_Update((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx, b, l);
SHA1_Update((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, b, l);
}
return rv;
}
#endif
if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) {
rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, b, l);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
}
} else {
rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, b, l);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
}
return rv;
}
/**************************************************************************
* Append Handshake functions.
* All these functions set appropriate error codes.
* Most rely on ssl3_AppendHandshake to set the error code.
**************************************************************************/
SECStatus
ssl3_AppendHandshake(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, PRInt32 bytes)
{
unsigned char * src = (unsigned char *)void_src;
int room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len;
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); /* protects sendBuf. */
if (!bytes)
return SECSuccess;
if (ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space < MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH && room < bytes) {
rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf, PR_MAX(MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH,
PR_MIN(MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len + bytes)));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv; /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len;
}
PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "Append to Handshake", (unsigned char*)void_src, bytes));
rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, src, bytes);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes */
while (bytes > room) {
if (room > 0)
PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src,
room);
ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += room;
rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
}
bytes -= room;
src += room;
room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space;
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len == 0);
}
PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, bytes);
ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += bytes;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 num, PRInt32 lenSize)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint8 b[4];
PRUint8 * p = b;
switch (lenSize) {
case 4:
*p++ = (num >> 24) & 0xff;
case 3:
*p++ = (num >> 16) & 0xff;
case 2:
*p++ = (num >> 8) & 0xff;
case 1:
*p = num & 0xff;
}
SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: number:", SSL_GETPID()));
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &b[0], lenSize);
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
}
SECStatus
ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
sslSocket *ss, const SSL3Opaque *src, PRInt32 bytes, PRInt32 lenSize)
{
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert((bytes < (1<<8) && lenSize == 1) ||
(bytes < (1L<<16) && lenSize == 2) ||
(bytes < (1L<<24) && lenSize == 3));
SSL_TRC(60,("%d: append variable:", SSL_GETPID()));
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, lenSize);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
}
SSL_TRC(60, ("data:"));
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, src, bytes);
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
}
SECStatus
ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSL3HandshakeType t, PRUint32 length)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* If we already have a message in place, we need to enqueue it.
* This empties the buffer. This is a convenient place to call
* dtls_StageHandshakeMessage to mark the message boundary.
*/
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
}
SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: append handshake header: type %s",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(t)));
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, t, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
}
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
/* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the
* transmission code, if necessary */
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
}
ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++;
/* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
}
/* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
}
}
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
}
/* ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm appends the serialisation of
* |sigAndHash| to the current handshake message. */
SECStatus
ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(
sslSocket *ss, const SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm* sigAndHash)
{
unsigned char serialized[2];
serialized[0] = ssl3_OIDToTLSHashAlgorithm(sigAndHash->hashAlg);
if (serialized[0] == 0) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
return SECFailure;
}
serialized[1] = sigAndHash->sigAlg;
return ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, serialized, sizeof(serialized));
}
/**************************************************************************
* Consume Handshake functions.
*
* All data used in these functions is protected by two locks,
* the RecvBufLock and the SSL3HandshakeLock
**************************************************************************/
/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input
* stream "b" (which is *length bytes long). Copy them into buffer "v".
* Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes.
*
* If this function returns SECFailure, it has already sent an alert,
* and has set a generic error code. The caller should probably
* override the generic error code by setting another.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b,
PRUint32 *length)
{
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) {
return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
}
PORT_Memcpy(v, *b, bytes);
PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes));
*b += bytes;
*length -= bytes;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input
* stream "b" (which is *length bytes long), and interpret them as an
* integer in network byte order. Returns the received value.
* Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes.
*
* Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure.
* This value is indistinguishable from the equivalent received value.
* Only positive numbers are to be received this way.
* Thus, the largest value that may be sent this way is 0x7fffffff.
* On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set.
*/
PRInt32
ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b,
PRUint32 *length)
{
PRUint8 *buf = *b;
int i;
PRInt32 num = 0;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( bytes <= sizeof num);
if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) {
return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
}
PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes));
for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++)
num = (num << 8) + buf[i];
*b += bytes;
*length -= bytes;
return num;
}
/* Read in two values from the incoming decrypted byte stream "b", which is
* *length bytes long. The first value is a number whose size is "bytes"
* bytes long. The second value is a byte-string whose size is the value
* of the first number received. The latter byte-string, and its length,
* is returned in the SECItem i.
*
* Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure.
* On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set.
*
* RADICAL CHANGE for NSS 3.11. All callers of this function make copies
* of the data returned in the SECItem *i, so making a copy of it here
* is simply wasteful. So, This function now just sets SECItem *i to
* point to the values in the buffer **b.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, PRInt32 bytes,
SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length)
{
PRInt32 count;
PORT_Assert(bytes <= 3);
i->len = 0;
i->data = NULL;
count = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, b, length);
if (count < 0) { /* Can't test for SECSuccess here. */
return SECFailure;
}
if (count > 0) {
if ((PRUint32)count > *length) {
return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
}
i->data = *b;
i->len = count;
*b += count;
*length -= count;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* tlsHashOIDMap contains the mapping between TLS hash identifiers and the
* SECOidTag used internally by NSS. */
static const struct {
int tlsHash;
SECOidTag oid;
} tlsHashOIDMap[] = {
{ tls_hash_md5, SEC_OID_MD5 },
{ tls_hash_sha1, SEC_OID_SHA1 },
{ tls_hash_sha224, SEC_OID_SHA224 },
{ tls_hash_sha256, SEC_OID_SHA256 },
{ tls_hash_sha384, SEC_OID_SHA384 },
{ tls_hash_sha512, SEC_OID_SHA512 }
};
/* ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID converts a TLS hash identifier into an OID value.
* If the hash is not recognised, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is returned.
*
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
SECOidTag
ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(int hashFunc)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(tlsHashOIDMap); i++) {
if (hashFunc == tlsHashOIDMap[i].tlsHash) {
return tlsHashOIDMap[i].oid;
}
}
return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
}
/* ssl3_OIDToTLSHashAlgorithm converts an OID to a TLS hash algorithm
* identifier. If the hash is not recognised, zero is returned.
*
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
static int
ssl3_OIDToTLSHashAlgorithm(SECOidTag oid)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(tlsHashOIDMap); i++) {
if (oid == tlsHashOIDMap[i].oid) {
return tlsHashOIDMap[i].tlsHash;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType returns the TLS 1.2 signature algorithm
* identifier for a given KeyType. */
static SECStatus
ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(KeyType keyType,
TLSSignatureAlgorithm *out)
{
switch (keyType) {
case rsaKey:
*out = tls_sig_rsa;
return SECSuccess;
case dsaKey:
*out = tls_sig_dsa;
return SECSuccess;
case ecKey:
*out = tls_sig_ecdsa;
return SECSuccess;
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
}
/* ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForCertificate returns the TLS 1.2 signature
* algorithm identifier for the given certificate. */
static SECStatus
ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForCertificate(CERTCertificate *cert,
TLSSignatureAlgorithm *out)
{
SECKEYPublicKey *key;
KeyType keyType;
key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
if (key == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
keyType = key->keyType;
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key);
return ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(keyType, out);
}
/* ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency checks that the signature
* algorithm identifier in |sigAndHash| is consistent with the public key in
* |cert|. If so, SECSuccess is returned. Otherwise, PORT_SetError is called
* and SECFailure is returned. */
SECStatus
ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency(
const SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm *sigAndHash, CERTCertificate* cert)
{
SECStatus rv;
TLSSignatureAlgorithm sigAlg;
rv = ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForCertificate(cert, &sigAlg);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
if (sigAlg != sigAndHash->sigAlg) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm reads a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
* structure from |b| and puts the resulting value into |out|. |b| and |length|
* are updated accordingly.
*
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
SECStatus
ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(sslSocket *ss,
SSL3Opaque **b,
PRUint32 *length,
SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm *out)
{
unsigned char bytes[2];
SECStatus rv;
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, bytes, sizeof(bytes), b, length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
out->hashAlg = ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(bytes[0]);
if (out->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
return SECFailure;
}
out->sigAlg = bytes[1];
return SECSuccess;
}
/**************************************************************************
* end of Consume Handshake functions.
**************************************************************************/
/* Extract the hashes of handshake messages to this point.
* Called from ssl3_SendCertificateVerify
* ssl3_SendFinished
* ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage
*
* Caller must hold the SSL3HandshakeLock.
* Caller must hold a read or write lock on the Spec R/W lock.
* (There is presently no way to assert on a Read lock.)
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket * ss,
ssl3CipherSpec *spec, /* uses ->master_secret */
SSL3Hashes * hashes, /* output goes here. */
PRUint32 sender)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
unsigned int outLength;
SSL3Opaque md5_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
SSL3Opaque sha_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
hashes->hashAlg = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 &&
ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
/* compute them without PKCS11 */
PRUint64 sha_cx[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
if (!spec->msItem.data) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone(sha_cx, ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx);
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->end(sha_cx, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len,
sizeof(hashes->u.raw));
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA-256: result", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len));
/* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
* then this will need to be updated. */
hashes->hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
rv = SECSuccess;
} else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
/* compute them without PKCS11 */
PRUint64 md5_cx[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
PRUint64 sha_cx[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
#define md5cx ((MD5Context *)md5_cx)
#define shacx ((SHA1Context *)sha_cx)
if (!spec->msItem.data) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
return SECFailure;
}
MD5_Clone (md5cx, (MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx);
SHA1_Clone(shacx, (SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx);
if (!isTLS) {
/* compute hashes for SSL3. */
unsigned char s[4];
s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24);
s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16);
s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8);
s[3] = (unsigned char)sender;
if (sender != 0) {
MD5_Update(md5cx, s, 4);
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4));
}
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1,
mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size));
MD5_Update(md5cx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len);
MD5_Update(md5cx, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size);
MD5_End(md5cx, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength));
if (sender != 0) {
SHA1_Update(shacx, s, 4);
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4));
}
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1,
mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size));
SHA1_Update(shacx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len);
SHA1_Update(shacx, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size);
SHA1_End(shacx, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength));
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2,
mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size));
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH));
MD5_Begin(md5cx);
MD5_Update(md5cx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len);
MD5_Update(md5cx, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size);
MD5_Update(md5cx, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH);
}
MD5_End(md5cx, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
if (!isTLS) {
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2,
mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size));
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH));
SHA1_Begin(shacx);
SHA1_Update(shacx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len);
SHA1_Update(shacx, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size);
SHA1_Update(shacx, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH);
}
SHA1_End(shacx, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
rv = SECSuccess;
#undef md5cx
#undef shacx
} else
#endif
if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
/* compute hashes with PKCS11 */
PK11Context *h;
unsigned int stateLen;
unsigned char stackBuf[1024];
unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL;
if (!spec->master_secret) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
return SECFailure;
}
h = ss->ssl3.hs.sha;
stateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(h, stackBuf,
sizeof(stackBuf), &stateLen);
if (stateBuf == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
goto tls12_loser;
}
rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(h, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len,
sizeof(hashes->u.raw));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
goto tls12_loser;
}
/* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
* then this will need to be updated. */
hashes->hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
rv = SECSuccess;
tls12_loser:
if (stateBuf) {
if (PK11_RestoreContext(h, stateBuf, stateLen) != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
}
if (stateBuf != stackBuf) {
PORT_ZFree(stateBuf, stateLen);
}
}
} else {
/* compute hashes with PKCS11 */
PK11Context * md5;
PK11Context * sha = NULL;
unsigned char *md5StateBuf = NULL;
unsigned char *shaStateBuf = NULL;
unsigned int md5StateLen, shaStateLen;
unsigned char md5StackBuf[256];
unsigned char shaStackBuf[512];
if (!spec->master_secret) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
return SECFailure;
}
md5StateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StackBuf,
sizeof md5StackBuf, &md5StateLen);
if (md5StateBuf == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
md5 = ss->ssl3.hs.md5;
shaStateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStackBuf,
sizeof shaStackBuf, &shaStateLen);
if (shaStateBuf == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
sha = ss->ssl3.hs.sha;
if (!isTLS) {
/* compute hashes for SSL3. */
unsigned char s[4];
s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24);
s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16);
s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8);
s[3] = (unsigned char)sender;
if (sender != 0) {
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, s, 4);
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4));
}
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1,
mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size));
rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5,spec->master_secret);
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size);
rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength));
if (sender != 0) {
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, s, 4);
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4));
}
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1,
mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size));
rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret);
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size);
rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength));
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2,
mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size));
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH));
rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5);
rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret);
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size);
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH);
}
rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
if (!isTLS) {
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2,
mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size));
PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH));
rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha);
rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha,spec->master_secret);
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size);
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH);
}
rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
rv = SECSuccess;
loser:
if (md5StateBuf) {
if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StateBuf, md5StateLen)
!= SECSuccess)
{
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
}
if (md5StateBuf != md5StackBuf) {
PORT_ZFree(md5StateBuf, md5StateLen);
}
}
if (shaStateBuf) {
if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStateBuf, shaStateLen)
!= SECSuccess)
{
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
}
if (shaStateBuf != shaStackBuf) {
PORT_ZFree(shaStateBuf, shaStateLen);
}
}
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_ComputeBackupHandshakeHashes(sslSocket * ss,
SSL3Hashes * hashes) /* output goes here. */
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( !ss->sec.isServer );
PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single );
rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len,
sizeof(hashes->u.raw));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
hashes->hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1;
loser:
PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, PR_TRUE);
ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = NULL;
return rv;
}
/*
* SSL 2 based implementations pass in the initial outbound buffer
* so that the handshake hash can contain the included information.
*
* Called from ssl2_BeginClientHandshake() in sslcon.c
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_StartHandshakeHash(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char * buf, int length)
{
SECStatus rv;
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); /**************************************/
rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
}
rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done;
}
PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(
&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES],
&ss->sec.ci.clientChallenge,
SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES);
rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buf, length);
/* if it failed, ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes has set the error code. */
done:
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); /**************************************/
return rv;
}
/**************************************************************************
* end of Handshake Hash functions.
* Begin Send and Handle functions for handshakes.
**************************************************************************/
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(),
* ssl3_RedoHandshake()
* ssl2_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session)
* dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(with resending=PR_TRUE)
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool resending)
{
sslSessionID * sid;
ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec;
SECStatus rv;
int i;
int length;
int num_suites;
int actual_count = 0;
PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
PRBool requestingResume = PR_FALSE, fallbackSCSV = PR_FALSE;
PRInt32 total_exten_len = 0;
unsigned paddingExtensionLen;
unsigned numCompressionMethods;
PRInt32 flags;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
}
ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; /* Must be reset every handshake */
PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) || !resending);
SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE);
ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
/* We might be starting a session renegotiation in which case we should
* clear previous state.
*/
PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData));
rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
/*
* During a renegotiation, ss->clientHelloVersion will be used again to
* work around a Windows SChannel bug. Ensure that it is still enabled.
*/
if (ss->firstHsDone) {
if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->clientHelloVersion < ss->vrange.min ||
ss->clientHelloVersion > ss->vrange.max) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
return SECFailure;
}
}
/* We ignore ss->sec.ci.sid here, and use ssl_Lookup because Lookup
* handles expired entries and other details.
* XXX If we've been called from ssl2_BeginClientHandshake, then
* this lookup is duplicative and wasteful.
*/
sid = (ss->opt.noCache) ? NULL
: ssl_LookupSID(&ss->sec.ci.peer, ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url);
/* We can't resume based on a different token. If the sid exists,
* make sure the token that holds the master secret still exists ...
* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that holds
* the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been removed, etc.
*/
if (sid) {
PRBool sidOK = PR_TRUE;
if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) {
/* Session key was wrapped, which means it was using PKCS11, */
PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
if (sid->u.ssl3.masterValid && !ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID,
sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID);
}
if (slot == NULL) {
sidOK = PR_FALSE;
} else {
PK11SymKey *wrapKey = NULL;
if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot) ||
((wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot,
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex,
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries,
ss->pkcs11PinArg)) == NULL) ) {
sidOK = PR_FALSE;
}
if (wrapKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
slot = NULL;
}
}
/* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that
** holds the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been
** removed, etc.
*/
if (sidOK && !ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sid)) {
sidOK = PR_FALSE;
}
/* TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246) Appendix E says:
* Whenever a client already knows the highest protocol known to
* a server (for example, when resuming a session), it should
* initiate the connection in that native protocol.
* So we pass sid->version to ssl3_NegotiateVersion() here, except
* when renegotiating.
*
* Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA
* EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the
* client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the
* ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we
* continue to use the client_version used in the initial
* ClientHello when renegotiating.
*/
if (sidOK) {
if (ss->firstHsDone) {
/*
* The client_version of the initial ClientHello is still
* available in ss->clientHelloVersion. Ensure that
* sid->version is bounded within
* [ss->vrange.min, ss->clientHelloVersion], otherwise we
* can't use sid.
*/
if (sid->version >= ss->vrange.min &&
sid->version <= ss->clientHelloVersion) {
ss->version = ss->clientHelloVersion;
} else {
sidOK = PR_FALSE;
}
} else {
if (ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, sid->version,
PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) {
sidOK = PR_FALSE;
}
}
}
if (!sidOK) {
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_not_ok );
if (ss->sec.uncache)
(*ss->sec.uncache)(sid);
ssl_FreeSID(sid);
sid = NULL;
}
}
if (sid) {
requestingResume = PR_TRUE;
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_hits );
PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID,
sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength));
ss->ssl3.policy = sid->u.ssl3.policy;
} else {
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_misses );
/*
* Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA
* EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the
* client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the
* ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we
* continue to use the client_version used in the initial
* ClientHello when renegotiating.
*/
if (ss->firstHsDone) {
ss->version = ss->clientHelloVersion;
} else {
rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED,
PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv; /* error code was set */
}
sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE);
if (!sid) {
return SECFailure; /* memory error is set */
}
}
isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
/* SSL records are not being MACed. */
cwSpec->version = ss->version;
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) {
ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); /* decrement ref count, free if zero */
}
ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData;
/* shouldn't get here if SSL3 is disabled, but ... */
if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
PR_NOT_REACHED("No versions of SSL 3.0 or later are enabled");
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
return SECFailure;
}
/* how many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */
num_suites = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
if (!num_suites)
return SECFailure; /* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */
/* HACK for SCSV in SSL 3.0. On initial handshake, prepend SCSV,
* only if TLS is disabled.
*/
if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isTLS) {
/* Must set this before calling Hello Extension Senders,
* to suppress sending of empty RI extension.
*/
ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_TRUE;
}
/* When we attempt session resumption (only), we must lock the sid to
* prevent races with other resumption connections that receive a
* NewSessionTicket that will cause the ticket in the sid to be replaced.
* Once we've copied the session ticket into our ClientHello message, it
* is OK for the ticket to change, so we just need to make sure we hold
* the lock across the calls to ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders.
*/
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
NSSRWLock_LockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
}
if (isTLS || (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) {
PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; /* 2^16 - 1 */
PRInt32 extLen;
extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, NULL);
if (extLen < 0) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return SECFailure;
}
maxBytes -= extLen;
total_exten_len += extLen;
if (total_exten_len > 0)
total_exten_len += 2;
}
#if defined(NSS_ENABLE_ECC)
if (!total_exten_len || !isTLS) {
/* not sending the elliptic_curves and ec_point_formats extensions */
ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, NULL); /* disable all ECC suites */
}
#endif
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss);
}
if (!ssl3_HasGCMSupport()) {
ssl3_DisableGCMSuites(ss);
}
/* how many suites are permitted by policy and user preference? */
num_suites = count_cipher_suites(ss, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE);
if (!num_suites) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return SECFailure; /* count_cipher_suites has set error code. */
}
fallbackSCSV = ss->opt.enableFallbackSCSV && (!requestingResume ||
ss->version < sid->version);
/* make room for SCSV */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) {
++num_suites;
}
if (fallbackSCSV) {
++num_suites;
}
/* count compression methods */
numCompressionMethods = 0;
for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) {
if (compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i]))
numCompressionMethods++;
}
length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH +
1 + ((sid == NULL) ? 0 : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) +
2 + num_suites*sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) +
1 + numCompressionMethods + total_exten_len;
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
length += 1 + ss->ssl3.hs.cookieLen;
}
/* A padding extension may be included to ensure that the record containing
* the ClientHello doesn't have a length between 256 and 511 bytes
* (inclusive). Initial, ClientHello records with such lengths trigger bugs
* in F5 devices.
*
* This is not done for DTLS nor for renegotiation. */
if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && isTLS && !ss->firstHsDone) {
paddingExtensionLen = ssl3_CalculatePaddingExtensionLength(length);
total_exten_len += paddingExtensionLen;
length += paddingExtensionLen;
} else {
paddingExtensionLen = 0;
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_hello, length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
if (ss->firstHsDone) {
/* The client hello version must stay unchanged to work around
* the Windows SChannel bug described above. */
PORT_Assert(ss->version == ss->clientHelloVersion);
}
ss->clientHelloVersion = ss->version;
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
PRUint16 version;
version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion);
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, version, 2);
} else {
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
if (!resending) { /* Don't re-generate if we are in DTLS re-sending mode */
rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */
}
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
if (sid)
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1);
else
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie, ss->ssl3.hs.cookieLen, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, num_suites*sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite), 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) {
/* Add the actual SCSV */
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV,
sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
actual_count++;
}
if (fallbackSCSV) {
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV,
sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
actual_count++;
}
for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
if (config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &ss->vrange)) {
actual_count++;
if (actual_count > num_suites) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
/* set error card removal/insertion error */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, suite->cipher_suite,
sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
}
}
/* if cards were removed or inserted between count_cipher_suites and
* generating our list, detect the error here rather than send it off to
* the server.. */
if (actual_count != num_suites) {
/* Card removal/insertion error */
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, numCompressionMethods, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) {
if (!compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i]))
continue;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, compressions[i], 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
}
if (total_exten_len) {
PRUint32 maxBytes = total_exten_len - 2;
PRInt32 extLen;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, maxBytes, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, maxBytes, NULL);
if (extLen < 0) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return SECFailure;
}
maxBytes -= extLen;
extLen = ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension(ss, paddingExtensionLen, maxBytes);
if (extLen < 0) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
return SECFailure;
}
maxBytes -= extLen;
PORT_Assert(!maxBytes);
}
if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
}
if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) {
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_stateless_resumes);
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) {
/* Since we sent the SCSV, pretend we sent empty RI extension. */
TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn;
}
flags = 0;
if (!ss->firstHsDone && !IS_DTLS(ss)) {
flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION;
}
rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
}
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_hello;
return rv;
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
* ssl3 Hello Request.
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss)
{
sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_request handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello)
return SECSuccess;
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake || ss->sec.isServer) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) {
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
rv = SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_renegotiation);
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED);
return SECFailure;
}
if (sid) {
if (ss->sec.uncache)
ss->sec.uncache(sid);
ssl_FreeSID(sid);
ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
}
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
}
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, PR_FALSE);
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
return rv;
}
#define UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM 0x7fffffff
static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapMechanismList[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS] = {
CKM_DES3_ECB,
CKM_CAST5_ECB,
CKM_DES_ECB,
CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS,
CKM_IDEA_ECB,
CKM_CAST3_ECB,
CKM_CAST_ECB,
CKM_RC5_ECB,
CKM_RC2_ECB,
CKM_CDMF_ECB,
CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64,
CKM_AES_ECB,
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB,
CKM_SEED_ECB,
UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM
};
static int
ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
{
const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *pMech = wrapMechanismList;
while (mech != *pMech && *pMech != UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) {
++pMech;
}
return (*pMech == UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) ? -1
: (pMech - wrapMechanismList);
}
static PK11SymKey *
ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(
SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pWswk,
SECKEYPrivateKey * svrPrivKey,
SSL3KEAType exchKeyType,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech,
void * pwArg)
{
PK11SymKey * unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL;
SECItem wrappedKey;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
PK11SymKey * Ks;
SECKEYPublicKey pubWrapKey;
ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
/* found the wrapping key on disk. */
PORT_Assert(pWswk->symWrapMechanism == masterWrapMech);
PORT_Assert(pWswk->exchKeyType == exchKeyType);
if (pWswk->symWrapMechanism != masterWrapMech ||
pWswk->exchKeyType != exchKeyType) {
goto loser;
}
wrappedKey.type = siBuffer;
wrappedKey.data = pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
wrappedKey.len = pWswk->wrappedSymKeyLen;
PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
switch (exchKeyType) {
case kt_rsa:
unwrappedWrappingKey =
PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey,
masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0);
break;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
case kt_ecdh:
/*
* For kt_ecdh, we first create an EC public key based on
* data stored with the wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey. Next,
* we do an ECDH computation involving this public key and
* the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting
* shared secret is treated the same way as Fortezza's Ks, i.e.,
* it is used to recover the symmetric wrapping key.
*
* The data in wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is laid out as defined
* in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure.
*/
ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *) pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
PORT_Assert(ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen +
ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen <= MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN);
if (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen +
ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen > MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
pubWrapKey.keyType = ecKey;
pubWrapKey.u.ec.size = ecWrapped->size;
pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = ecWrapped->encodedParamLen;
pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = ecWrapped->var;
pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.len = ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.data = ecWrapped->var +
ecWrapped->encodedParamLen;
wrappedKey.len = ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen;
wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen +
ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
/* Derive Ks using ECDH */
Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, &pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL,
NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech,
CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (Ks == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
/* Use Ks to unwrap the wrapping key */
unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, masterWrapMech, NULL,
&wrappedKey, masterWrapMech,
CKA_UNWRAP, 0);
PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks);
break;
#endif
default:
/* Assert? */
SET_ERROR_CODE
goto loser;
}
loser:
return unwrappedWrappingKey;
}
/* Each process sharing the server session ID cache has its own array of
* SymKey pointers for the symmetric wrapping keys that are used to wrap
* the master secrets. There is one key for each KEA type. These Symkeys
* correspond to the wrapped SymKeys kept in the server session cache.
*/
typedef struct {
PK11SymKey * symWrapKey[kt_kea_size];
} ssl3SymWrapKey;
static PZLock * symWrapKeysLock = NULL;
static ssl3SymWrapKey symWrapKeys[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS];
SECStatus ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void)
{
if (symWrapKeysLock) {
PZ_DestroyLock(symWrapKeysLock);
symWrapKeysLock = NULL;
return SECSuccess;
}
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED);
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(void)
{
int i, j;
if (!symWrapKeysLock)
return SECSuccess; /* lock was never initialized */
PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock);
/* get rid of all symWrapKeys */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < kt_kea_size; ++j) {
PK11SymKey ** pSymWrapKey;
pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[i].symWrapKey[j];
if (*pSymWrapKey) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(*pSymWrapKey);
*pSymWrapKey = NULL;
}
}
}
PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock);
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void)
{
symWrapKeysLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther);
return symWrapKeysLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
}
/* Try to get wrapping key for mechanism from in-memory array.
* If that fails, look for one on disk.
* If that fails, generate a new one, put the new one on disk,
* Put the new key in the in-memory array.
*/
static PK11SymKey *
getWrappingKey( sslSocket * ss,
PK11SlotInfo * masterSecretSlot,
SSL3KEAType exchKeyType,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech,
void * pwArg)
{
SECKEYPrivateKey * svrPrivKey;
SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey = NULL;
PK11SymKey * unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL;
PK11SymKey ** pSymWrapKey;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
int length;
int symWrapMechIndex;
SECStatus rv;
SECItem wrappedKey;
SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey wswk;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
PK11SymKey * Ks = NULL;
SECKEYPublicKey *pubWrapKey = NULL;
SECKEYPrivateKey *privWrapKey = NULL;
ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
svrPrivKey = ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].SERVERKEY;
PORT_Assert(svrPrivKey != NULL);
if (!svrPrivKey) {
return NULL; /* why are we here?!? */
}
symWrapMechIndex = ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(masterWrapMech);
PORT_Assert(symWrapMechIndex >= 0);
if (symWrapMechIndex < 0)
return NULL; /* invalid masterWrapMech. */
pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[symWrapMechIndex].symWrapKey[exchKeyType];
ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks();
PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock);
unwrappedWrappingKey = *pSymWrapKey;
if (unwrappedWrappingKey != NULL) {
if (PK11_VerifyKeyOK(unwrappedWrappingKey)) {
unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
goto done;
}
/* slot series has changed, so this key is no good any more. */
PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
*pSymWrapKey = unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL;
}
/* Try to get wrapped SymWrapping key out of the (disk) cache. */
/* Following call fills in wswk on success. */
if (ssl_GetWrappingKey(symWrapMechIndex, exchKeyType, &wswk)) {
/* found the wrapped sym wrapping key on disk. */
unwrappedWrappingKey =
ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, exchKeyType,
masterWrapMech, pwArg);
if (unwrappedWrappingKey) {
goto install;
}
}
if (!masterSecretSlot) /* caller doesn't want to create a new one. */
goto loser;
length = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech);
/* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error.
* It's ambiguous.
*/
unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech, NULL,
length, pwArg);
if (!unwrappedWrappingKey) {
goto loser;
}
/* Prepare the buffer to receive the wrappedWrappingKey,
* the symmetric wrapping key wrapped using the server's pub key.
*/
PORT_Memset(&wswk, 0, sizeof wswk); /* eliminate UMRs. */
if (ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].serverKeyPair) {
svrPubKey = ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].serverKeyPair->pubKey;
}
if (svrPubKey == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
wrappedKey.type = siBuffer;
wrappedKey.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey);
wrappedKey.data = wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
if (wrappedKey.len > sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey)
goto loser;
/* wrap symmetric wrapping key in server's public key. */
switch (exchKeyType) {
case kt_rsa:
asymWrapMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(asymWrapMechanism, svrPubKey,
unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey);
break;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
case kt_ecdh:
/*
* We generate an ephemeral EC key pair. Perform an ECDH
* computation involving this ephemeral EC public key and
* the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting
* shared secret is treated in the same way as Fortezza's Ks,
* i.e., it is used to wrap the wrapping key. To facilitate
* unwrapping in ssl_UnwrapWrappingKey, we also store all
* relevant info about the ephemeral EC public key in
* wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey and lay it out as
* described in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure.
*/
PORT_Assert(svrPubKey->keyType == ecKey);
if (svrPubKey->keyType != ecKey) {
/* something is wrong in sslsecur.c if this isn't an ecKey */
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
goto ec_cleanup;
}
privWrapKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey(
&svrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, &pubWrapKey, NULL);
if ((privWrapKey == NULL) || (pubWrapKey == NULL)) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto ec_cleanup;
}
/* Set the key size in bits */
if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.size == 0) {
pubWrapKey->u.ec.size = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey);
}
PORT_Assert(pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len +
pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len < MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN);
if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len +
pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len >= MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
rv = SECFailure;
goto ec_cleanup;
}
/* Derive Ks using ECDH */
Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL,
NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech,
CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (Ks == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto ec_cleanup;
}
ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *) (wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
ecWrapped->size = pubWrapKey->u.ec.size;
ecWrapped->encodedParamLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len;
PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var, pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data,
pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len);
ecWrapped->pubValueLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen,
pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len);
wrappedKey.len = MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN -
(ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen);
wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen +
ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
/* wrap symmetricWrapping key with the local Ks */
rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(masterWrapMech, NULL, Ks,
unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto ec_cleanup;
}
/* Write down the length of wrapped key in the buffer
* wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey at the appropriate offset
*/
ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen = wrappedKey.len;
ec_cleanup:
if (privWrapKey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privWrapKey);
if (pubWrapKey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubWrapKey);
if (Ks) PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks);
asymWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech;
break;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
default:
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
PORT_Assert(asymWrapMechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM);
wswk.symWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech;
wswk.symWrapMechIndex = symWrapMechIndex;
wswk.asymWrapMechanism = asymWrapMechanism;
wswk.exchKeyType = exchKeyType;
wswk.wrappedSymKeyLen = wrappedKey.len;
/* put it on disk. */
/* If the wrapping key for this KEA type has already been set,
* then abandon the value we just computed and
* use the one we got from the disk.
*/
if (ssl_SetWrappingKey(&wswk)) {
/* somebody beat us to it. The original contents of our wswk
* has been replaced with the content on disk. Now, discard
* the key we just created and unwrap this new one.
*/
PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
unwrappedWrappingKey =
ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, exchKeyType,
masterWrapMech, pwArg);
}
install:
if (unwrappedWrappingKey) {
*pSymWrapKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
}
loser:
done:
PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock);
return unwrappedWrappingKey;
}
/* hexEncode hex encodes |length| bytes from |in| and writes it as |length*2|
* bytes to |out|. */
static void
hexEncode(char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int length)
{
static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef";
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
*(out++) = hextable[in[i] >> 4];
*(out++) = hextable[in[i] & 15];
}
}
/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */
/* Presently, this always uses PKCS11. There is no bypass for this. */
static SECStatus
sendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey)
{
PK11SymKey * pms = NULL;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
SECItem enc_pms = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
PRBool isTLS;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
/* Generate the pre-master secret ... */
ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, NULL);
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
if (pms == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
/* Get the wrapped (encrypted) pre-master secret, enc_pms */
enc_pms.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey);
enc_pms.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len);
if (enc_pms.data == NULL) {
goto loser; /* err set by PORT_Alloc */
}
/* wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */
rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, pms, &enc_pms);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
if (ssl_keylog_iob) {
SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms);
if (extractRV == SECSuccess) {
SECItem * keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms);
if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) {
#ifdef TRACE
if (ssl_trace >= 100) {
ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret",
keyData->data, keyData->len);
}
#endif
if (ssl_keylog_iob && enc_pms.len >= 8 && keyData->len == 48) {
/* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */
/* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the
* keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to
* fwrite. */
char buf[4 + 8*2 + 1 + 48*2 + 1];
strcpy(buf, "RSA ");
hexEncode(buf + 4, enc_pms.data, 8);
buf[20] = ' ';
hexEncode(buf + 21, keyData->data, 48);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob);
fflush(ssl_keylog_iob);
}
}
}
}
rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms);
PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL;
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange,
isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2 : enc_pms.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
if (isTLS) {
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len, 2);
} else {
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
rv = SECSuccess;
loser:
if (enc_pms.data != NULL) {
PORT_Free(enc_pms.data);
}
if (pms != NULL) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
}
return rv;
}
/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */
/* Presently, this always uses PKCS11. There is no bypass for this. */
static SECStatus
sendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey)
{
PK11SymKey * pms = NULL;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PRBool isTLS;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target;
SECKEYDHParams dhParam; /* DH parameters */
SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */
SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
/* Copy DH parameters from server key */
if (svrPubKey->keyType != dhKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
goto loser;
}
dhParam.prime.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data;
dhParam.prime.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len;
dhParam.base.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.data;
dhParam.base.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.len;
/* Generate ephemeral DH keypair */
privKey = SECKEY_CreateDHPrivateKey(&dhParam, &pubKey, NULL);
if (!privKey || !pubKey) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:",
pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len));
if (isTLS) target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
else target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
/* Determine the PMS */
pms = PK11_PubDerive(privKey, svrPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL,
CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL);
if (pms == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
privKey = NULL;
rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms);
PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL;
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange,
pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len + 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss,
pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len, 2);
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
pubKey = NULL;
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
}
rv = SECSuccess;
loser:
if(pms) PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
if(privKey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
if(pubKey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
return rv;
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECKEYPublicKey * serverKey = NULL;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PRBool isTLS;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_key_exchange handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
if (ss->sec.peerKey == NULL) {
serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert);
if (serverKey == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
} else {
serverKey = ss->sec.peerKey;
ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; /* we're done with it now */
}
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
/* enforce limits on kea key sizes. */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->is_limited) {
int keyLen = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(serverKey); /* bytes */
if (keyLen * BPB > ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->key_size_limit) {
if (isTLS)
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, export_restriction);
else
(void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
goto loser;
}
}
ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKey);
switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) {
case kt_rsa:
rv = sendRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
break;
case kt_dh:
rv = sendDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
break;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
case kt_ecdh:
rv = ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
break;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
default:
/* got an unknown or unsupported Key Exchange Algorithm. */
SEND_ALERT
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
break;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: DONE sending client_key_exchange",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
loser:
if (serverKey)
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey);
return rv; /* err code already set. */
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PRBool isTLS;
PRBool isTLS12;
SECItem buf = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SSL3Hashes hashes;
KeyType keyType;
unsigned int len;
SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm sigAndHash;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single &&
ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) {
rv = ssl3_ComputeBackupHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes);
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash);
} else {
rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, &hashes, 0);
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */
}
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
if (ss->ssl3.platformClientKey) {
#ifdef NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH
keyType = CERT_GetCertKeyType(
&ss->ssl3.clientCertificate->subjectPublicKeyInfo);
rv = ssl3_PlatformSignHashes(
&hashes, ss->ssl3.platformClientKey, &buf, isTLS, keyType);
ssl_FreePlatformKey(ss->ssl3.platformClientKey);
ss->ssl3.platformClientKey = (PlatformKey)NULL;
#endif /* NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH */
} else {
keyType = ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey->keyType;
rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey, &buf, isTLS);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
PK11SlotInfo * slot;
sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
/* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing.
** Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this.
** These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail.
*/
slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot);
sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot);
sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot);
sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE;
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
}
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */
}
len = buf.len + 2 + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0);
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_verify, len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
}
if (isTLS12) {
rv = ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(keyType,
&sigAndHash.sigAlg);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done;
}
sigAndHash.hashAlg = hashes.hashAlg;
rv = ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &sigAndHash);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
}
done:
if (buf.data)
PORT_Free(buf.data);
return rv;
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
* ssl3 ServerHello message.
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
{
sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
PRInt32 temp; /* allow for consume number failure */
PRBool suite_found = PR_FALSE;
int i;
int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
SECStatus rv;
SECItem sidBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
PRBool sid_match;
PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.initialized );
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) {
errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO;
desc = unexpected_message;
goto alert_loser;
}
/* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */
if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) {
CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain);
ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL;
}
if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
}
if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) {
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
}
#ifdef NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH
if (ss->ssl3.platformClientKey) {
ssl_FreePlatformKey(ss->ssl3.platformClientKey);
ss->ssl3.platformClientKey = (PlatformKey)NULL;
}
#endif /* NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH */
if (ss->ssl3.channelID != NULL) {
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.channelID);
ss->ssl3.channelID = NULL;
}
if (ss->ssl3.channelIDPub != NULL) {
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->ssl3.channelIDPub);
ss->ssl3.channelIDPub = NULL;
}
temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
if (temp < 0) {
goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
}
version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
/* RFC 4347 required that you verify that the server versions
* match (Section 4.2.1) in the HelloVerifyRequest and the
* ServerHello.
*
* RFC 6347 suggests (SHOULD) that servers always use 1.0
* in HelloVerifyRequest and allows the versions not to match,
* especially when 1.2 is being negotiated.
*
* Therefore we do not check for matching here.
*/
version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(version);
if (version == 0) { /* Insane version number */
goto alert_loser;
}
}
rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_FALSE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version
: handshake_failure;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
goto alert_loser;
}
isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
desc = internal_error;
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto alert_loser;
}
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(
ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
}
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
}
if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
if (isTLS)
desc = decode_error;
goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */
}
/* find selected cipher suite in our list. */
temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
if (temp < 0) {
goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
}
ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
if (temp == suite->cipher_suite) {
SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version};
if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange)) {
/* config_match already checks whether the cipher suite is
* acceptable for the version, but the check is repeated here
* in order to give a more precise error code. */
if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(temp, &vrange)) {
desc = handshake_failure;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION;
goto alert_loser;
}
break; /* failure */
}
suite_found = PR_TRUE;
break; /* success */
}
}
if (!suite_found) {
desc = handshake_failure;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
goto alert_loser;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp;
ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef((ssl3CipherSuite)temp);
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def);
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) {
PORT_SetError(errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
goto loser; /* we don't send alerts for our screw-ups. */
}
/* find selected compression method in our list. */
temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length);
if (temp < 0) {
goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
}
suite_found = PR_FALSE;
for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) {
if (temp == compressions[i]) {
if (!compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i])) {
break; /* failure */
}
suite_found = PR_TRUE;
break; /* success */
}
}
if (!suite_found) {
desc = handshake_failure;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP;
goto alert_loser;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.compression = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp;
/* Note that if !isTLS and the extra stuff is not extensions, we
* do NOT goto alert_loser.
* There are some old SSL 3.0 implementations that do send stuff
* after the end of the server hello, and we deliberately ignore
* such stuff in the interest of maximal interoperability (being
* "generous in what you accept").
* Update: Starting in NSS 3.12.6, we handle the renegotiation_info
* extension in SSL 3.0.
*/
if (length != 0) {
SECItem extensions;
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensions, 2, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) {
if (isTLS)
goto alert_loser;
} else {
rv = ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &extensions.data,
&extensions.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto alert_loser;
}
}
if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation ||
(ss->firstHsDone && (ss->peerRequestedProtection ||
ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN))) &&
!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
desc = handshake_failure;
errCode = ss->firstHsDone ? SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED
: SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
goto alert_loser;
}
/* Any errors after this point are not "malformed" errors. */
desc = handshake_failure;
/* we need to call ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec here so we can check the
* key exchange algorithm. */
rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto alert_loser; /* error code is set. */
}
/* We may or may not have sent a session id, we may get one back or
* not and if so it may match the one we sent.
* Attempt to restore the master secret to see if this is so...
* Don't consider failure to find a matching SID an error.
*/
sid_match = (PRBool)(sidBytes.len > 0 &&
sidBytes.len == sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength &&
!PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len));
if (sid_match &&
sid->version == ss->version &&
sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite == ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) do {
ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped master secret. */
ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm;
ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits;
ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType;
ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits;
/* 3 cases here:
* a) key is wrapped (implies using PKCS11)
* b) key is unwrapped, but we're still using PKCS11
* c) key is unwrapped, and we're bypassing PKCS11.
*/
if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) {
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
PK11SymKey * wrapKey; /* wrapping key */
CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0;
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
/* we cannot restart a non-bypass session in a
** bypass socket.
*/
break;
}
#endif
/* unwrap master secret with PKCS11 */
slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID,
sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID);
if (slot == NULL) {
break; /* not considered an error. */
}
if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) {
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
break; /* not considered an error. */
}
wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex,
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries,
ss->pkcs11PinArg);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if (wrapKey == NULL) {
break; /* not considered an error. */
}
if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */
keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
}
wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
pwSpec->master_secret =
PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags);
errCode = PORT_GetError();
PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
break; /* errorCode set just after call to UnwrapSymKey. */
}
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
} else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
/* MS is not wrapped */
wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, wrappedMS.data, wrappedMS.len);
pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret;
pwSpec->msItem.len = wrappedMS.len;
#endif
} else {
/* We CAN restart a bypass session in a non-bypass socket. */
/* need to import the raw master secret to session object */
PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
pwSpec->master_secret =
PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT,
&wrappedMS, NULL);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
break;
}
}
/* Got a Match */
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_hits );
/* If we sent a session ticket, then this is a stateless resume. */
if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello)
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_stateless_resumes );
if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn))
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket;
else
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE;
/* copy the peer cert from the SID */
if (sid->peerCert != NULL) {
ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert);
ssl3_CopyPeerCertsFromSID(ss, sid);
}
/* NULL value for PMS signifies re-use of the old MS */
rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto alert_loser; /* err code was set */
}
goto winner;
} while (0);
if (sid_match)
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_not_ok );
else
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_misses );
/* throw the old one away */
sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_FALSE;
if (ss->sec.uncache)
(*ss->sec.uncache)(sid);
ssl_FreeSID(sid);
/* get a new sid */
ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE);
if (sid == NULL) {
goto alert_loser; /* memory error is set. */
}
sid->version = ss->version;
sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len;
PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len);
/* Copy Signed Certificate Timestamps, if any. */
if (ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.data) {
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps,
&ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE;
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_cert;
winner:
/* Clean up the temporary pointer to the handshake buffer. */
ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.data = NULL;
ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0;
/* If we will need a ChannelID key then we make the callback now. This
* allows the handshake to be restarted cleanly if the callback returns
* SECWouldBlock. */
if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_channel_id_xtn)) {
rv = ss->getChannelID(ss->getChannelIDArg, ss->fd,
&ss->ssl3.channelIDPub, &ss->ssl3.channelID);
if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(ss);
return rv;
}
if (rv != SECSuccess ||
ss->ssl3.channelIDPub == NULL ||
ss->ssl3.channelID == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_GET_CHANNEL_ID_FAILED);
desc = internal_error;
goto alert_loser;
}
}
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
loser:
/* Clean up the temporary pointer to the handshake buffer. */
ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.data = NULL;
ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0;
errCode = ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
return SECFailure;
}
/* ssl3_BigIntGreaterThanOne returns true iff |mpint|, taken as an unsigned,
* big-endian integer is > 1 */
static PRBool
ssl3_BigIntGreaterThanOne(const SECItem* mpint) {
unsigned char firstNonZeroByte = 0;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < mpint->len; i++) {
if (mpint->data[i]) {
firstNonZeroByte = mpint->data[i];
break;
}
}
if (firstNonZeroByte == 0)
return PR_FALSE;
if (firstNonZeroByte > 1)
return PR_TRUE;
/* firstNonZeroByte == 1, therefore mpint > 1 iff the first non-zero byte
* is followed by another byte. */
return (i < mpint->len - 1);
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
* ssl3 ServerKeyExchange message.
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
{
PLArenaPool * arena = NULL;
SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL;
PRBool isTLS, isTLS12;
SECStatus rv;
int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH;
SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
SSL3Hashes hashes;
SECItem signature = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm sigAndHash;
sigAndHash.hashAlg = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_key_exchange handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key &&
ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert) {
errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH;
desc = unexpected_message;
goto alert_loser;
}
if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) {
errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH;
desc = unexpected_message;
goto alert_loser;
}
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) {
case kt_rsa: {
SECItem modulus = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SECItem exponent = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &modulus, 2, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed. */
}
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &exponent, 2, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed. */
}
if (isTLS12) {
rv = ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &b, &length,
&sigAndHash);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */
}
rv = ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency(
&sigAndHash, ss->sec.peerCert);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed. */
}
if (length != 0) {
if (isTLS)
desc = decode_error;
goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */
}
/* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */
/* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */
desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure;
/*
* check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy
*/
rv = ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(sigAndHash.hashAlg, modulus, exponent,
&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random,
&hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode =
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto alert_loser;
}
rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(&hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signature,
isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode =
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto alert_loser;
}
/*
* we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer
* ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate
* pkcs11 slots and ID's.
*/
arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (arena == NULL) {
goto no_memory;
}
peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey);
if (peerKey == NULL) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
goto no_memory;
}
peerKey->arena = arena;
peerKey->keyType = rsaKey;
peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.rsa.modulus, &modulus) ||
SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.rsa.publicExponent, &exponent))
{
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
goto no_memory;
}
ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey;
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request;
return SECSuccess;
}
case kt_dh: {
SECItem dh_p = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SECItem dh_g = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SECItem dh_Ys = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_p, 2, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed. */
}
if (dh_p.len < 512/8) {
errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY;
goto alert_loser;
}
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed. */
}
if (dh_g.len > dh_p.len || !ssl3_BigIntGreaterThanOne(&dh_g))
goto alert_loser;
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_Ys, 2, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed. */
}
if (dh_Ys.len > dh_p.len || !ssl3_BigIntGreaterThanOne(&dh_Ys))
goto alert_loser;
if (isTLS12) {
rv = ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &b, &length,
&sigAndHash);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */
}
rv = ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency(
&sigAndHash, ss->sec.peerCert);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed. */
}
if (length != 0) {
if (isTLS)
desc = decode_error;
goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */
}
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dh_p.data, dh_p.len));
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dh_g.data, dh_g.len));
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH Ys", dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len));
/* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */
/* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */
desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure;
/*
* check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy
*/
rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(sigAndHash.hashAlg, dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys,
&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random,
&hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode =
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto alert_loser;
}
rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(&hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signature,
isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode =
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto alert_loser;
}
/*
* we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer
* ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate
* pkcs11 slots and ID's.
*/
arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (arena == NULL) {
goto no_memory;
}
ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey);
if (peerKey == NULL) {
goto no_memory;
}
peerKey->arena = arena;
peerKey->keyType = dhKey;
peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, &dh_p) ||
SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, &dh_g) ||
SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, &dh_Ys))
{
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
goto no_memory;
}
ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey;
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request;
return SECSuccess;
}
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
case kt_ecdh:
rv = ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
return rv;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
default:
desc = handshake_failure;
errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
break; /* goto alert_loser; */
}
alert_loser:
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
loser:
PORT_SetError( errCode );
return SECFailure;
no_memory: /* no-memory error has already been set. */
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/*
* Returns the TLS signature algorithm for the client authentication key and
* whether it is an RSA or DSA key that may be able to sign only SHA-1 hashes.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_ExtractClientKeyInfo(sslSocket *ss,
TLSSignatureAlgorithm *sigAlg,
PRBool *preferSha1)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
SECKEYPublicKey *pubk;
pubk = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
if (pubk == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto done;
}
rv = ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(pubk->keyType, sigAlg);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done;
}
#if defined(NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH) && defined(_WIN32)
/* If the key is in CAPI, assume conservatively that the CAPI service
* provider may be unable to sign SHA-256 hashes.
*/
if (ss->ssl3.platformClientKey->dwKeySpec != CERT_NCRYPT_KEY_SPEC) {
/* CAPI only supports RSA and DSA signatures, so we don't need to
* check the key type. */
*preferSha1 = PR_TRUE;
goto done;
}
#endif /* NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH && _WIN32 */
/* If the key is a 1024-bit RSA or DSA key, assume conservatively that
* it may be unable to sign SHA-256 hashes. This is the case for older
* Estonian ID cards that have 1024-bit RSA keys. In FIPS 186-2 and
* older, DSA key size is at most 1024 bits and the hash function must
* be SHA-1.
*/
if (pubk->keyType == rsaKey || pubk->keyType == dsaKey) {
*preferSha1 = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(pubk) <= 128;
} else {
*preferSha1 = PR_FALSE;
}
done:
if (pubk)
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubk);
return rv;
}
/* Destroys the backup handshake hash context if we don't need it. Note that
* this function selects the hash algorithm for client authentication
* signatures; ssl3_SendCertificateVerify uses the presence of the backup hash
* to determine whether to use SHA-1 or SHA-256. */
static void
ssl3_DestroyBackupHandshakeHashIfNotNeeded(sslSocket *ss,
const SECItem *algorithms)
{
SECStatus rv;
TLSSignatureAlgorithm sigAlg;
PRBool preferSha1;
PRBool supportsSha1 = PR_FALSE;
PRBool supportsSha256 = PR_FALSE;
PRBool needBackupHash = PR_FALSE;
unsigned int i;
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
/* Backup handshake hash is not supported in PKCS #11 bypass mode. */
if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash);
return;
}
#endif
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash);
/* Determine the key's signature algorithm and whether it prefers SHA-1. */
rv = ssl3_ExtractClientKeyInfo(ss, &sigAlg, &preferSha1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto done;
}
/* Determine the server's hash support for that signature algorithm. */
for (i = 0; i < algorithms->len; i += 2) {
if (algorithms->data[i+1] == sigAlg) {
if (algorithms->data[i] == tls_hash_sha1) {
supportsSha1 = PR_TRUE;
} else if (algorithms->data[i] == tls_hash_sha256) {
supportsSha256 = PR_TRUE;
}
}
}
/* If either the server does not support SHA-256 or the client key prefers
* SHA-1, leave the backup hash. */
if (supportsSha1 && (preferSha1 || !supportsSha256)) {
needBackupHash = PR_TRUE;
}
done:
if (!needBackupHash) {
PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, PR_TRUE);
ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = NULL;
}
}
typedef struct dnameNode {
struct dnameNode *next;
SECItem name;
} dnameNode;
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
* ssl3 Certificate Request message.
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
{
PLArenaPool * arena = NULL;
dnameNode * node;
PRInt32 remaining;
PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
PRBool isTLS12 = PR_FALSE;
int i;
int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST;
int nnames = 0;
SECStatus rv;
SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
SECItem cert_types = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SECItem algorithms = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
CERTDistNames ca_list;
#ifdef NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH
CERTCertList * platform_cert_list = NULL;
CERTCertListNode * certNode = NULL;
#endif /* NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH */
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_request handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_request &&
ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key) {
desc = unexpected_message;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST;
goto alert_loser;
}
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL);
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL);
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL);
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.platformClientKey == (PlatformKey)NULL);
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_types, 1, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
PORT_Assert(!ss->requestedCertTypes);
ss->requestedCertTypes = &cert_types;
if (isTLS12) {
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &algorithms, 2, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
/* An empty or odd-length value is invalid.
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
* supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
*/
if (algorithms.len == 0 || (algorithms.len & 1) != 0)
goto alert_loser;
}
arena = ca_list.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (arena == NULL)
goto no_mem;
remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
if (remaining < 0)
goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
if ((PRUint32)remaining > length)
goto alert_loser;
ca_list.head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode);
if (node == NULL)
goto no_mem;
while (remaining > 0) {
PRInt32 len;
if (remaining < 2)
goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
node->name.len = len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
if (len <= 0)
goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
remaining -= 2;
if (remaining < len)
goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
node->name.data = b;
b += len;
length -= len;
remaining -= len;
nnames++;
if (remaining <= 0)
break; /* success */
node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode);
node = node->next;
if (node == NULL)
goto no_mem;
}
ca_list.nnames = nnames;
ca_list.names = PORT_ArenaNewArray(arena, SECItem, nnames);
if (nnames > 0 && ca_list.names == NULL)
goto no_mem;
for(i = 0, node = (dnameNode*)ca_list.head;
i < nnames;
i++, node = node->next) {
ca_list.names[i] = node->name;
}
if (length != 0)
goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
desc = no_certificate;
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_hello_done;
#ifdef NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH
if (ss->getPlatformClientAuthData != NULL) {
/* XXX Should pass cert_types and algorithms in this call!! */
rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getPlatformClientAuthData)(
ss->getPlatformClientAuthDataArg,
ss->fd, &ca_list,
&platform_cert_list,
(void**)&ss->ssl3.platformClientKey,
&ss->ssl3.clientCertificate,
&ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
} else
#endif
if (ss->getClientAuthData != NULL) {
/* XXX Should pass cert_types and algorithms in this call!! */
rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg,
ss->fd, &ca_list,
&ss->ssl3.clientCertificate,
&ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
} else {
rv = SECFailure; /* force it to send a no_certificate alert */
}
switch (rv) {
case SECWouldBlock: /* getClientAuthData has put up a dialog box. */
ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(ss);
break; /* not an error */
case SECSuccess:
#ifdef NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH
if (!platform_cert_list || CERT_LIST_EMPTY(platform_cert_list) ||
!ss->ssl3.platformClientKey) {
if (platform_cert_list) {
CERT_DestroyCertList(platform_cert_list);
platform_cert_list = NULL;
}
if (ss->ssl3.platformClientKey) {
ssl_FreePlatformKey(ss->ssl3.platformClientKey);
ss->ssl3.platformClientKey = (PlatformKey)NULL;
}
/* Fall through to NSS client auth check */
} else {
certNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(platform_cert_list);
ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = CERT_DupCertificate(certNode->cert);
/* Setting ssl3.clientCertChain non-NULL will cause
* ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate.
* Note: clientCertChain should include the EE cert as
* clientCertificate is ignored during the actual sending
*/
ss->ssl3.clientCertChain =
hack_NewCertificateListFromCertList(platform_cert_list);
CERT_DestroyCertList(platform_cert_list);
platform_cert_list = NULL;
if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL) {
if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
}
if (ss->ssl3.platformClientKey) {
ssl_FreePlatformKey(ss->ssl3.platformClientKey);
ss->ssl3.platformClientKey = (PlatformKey)NULL;
}
goto send_no_certificate;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
ssl3_DestroyBackupHandshakeHashIfNotNeeded(ss, &algorithms);
}
break; /* not an error */
}
#endif /* NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH */
/* check what the callback function returned */
if ((!ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) || (!ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey)) {
/* we are missing either the key or cert */
if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) {
/* got a cert, but no key - free it */
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
}
if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey) {
/* got a key, but no cert - free it */
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
}
goto send_no_certificate;
}
/* Setting ssl3.clientCertChain non-NULL will cause
* ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate.
*/
ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = CERT_CertChainFromCert(
ss->ssl3.clientCertificate,
certUsageSSLClient, PR_FALSE);
if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
goto send_no_certificate;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
ssl3_DestroyBackupHandshakeHashIfNotNeeded(ss, &algorithms);
}
break; /* not an error */
case SECFailure:
default:
send_no_certificate:
if (isTLS) {
ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE;
} else {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate);
}
rv = SECSuccess;
break;
}
goto done;
no_mem:
rv = SECFailure;
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
goto done;
alert_loser:
if (isTLS && desc == illegal_parameter)
desc = decode_error;
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
loser:
PORT_SetError(errCode);
rv = SECFailure;
done:
ss->requestedCertTypes = NULL;
if (arena != NULL)
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
#ifdef NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH
if (platform_cert_list)
CERT_DestroyCertList(platform_cert_list);
#endif
return rv;
}
/*
* attempt to restart the handshake after asynchronously handling
* a request for the client's certificate.
*
* inputs:
* cert Client cert chosen by application.
* Note: ssl takes this reference, and does not bump the
* reference count. The caller should drop its reference
* without calling CERT_DestroyCert after calling this function.
*
* key Private key associated with cert. This function takes
* ownership of the private key, so the caller should drop its
* reference without destroying the private key after this
* function returns.
*
* certChain DER-encoded certs, client cert and its signers.
* Note: ssl takes this reference, and does not copy the chain.
* The caller should drop its reference without destroying the
* chain. SSL will free the chain when it is done with it.
*
* Return value: XXX
*
* XXX This code only works on the initial handshake on a connection, XXX
* It does not work on a subsequent handshake (redo).
*
* Caller holds 1stHandshakeLock.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq(sslSocket * ss,
CERTCertificate * cert,
SECKEYPrivateKey * key,
CERTCertificateList *certChain)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
/* XXX This code only works on the initial handshake on a connection,
** XXX It does not work on a subsequent handshake (redo).
*/
if (ss->handshake != 0) {
ss->handshake = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = cert;
ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = key;
ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = certChain;
if (!cert || !key || !certChain) {
/* we are missing the key, cert, or cert chain */
if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
}
if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey) {
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
}
if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) {
CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain);
ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL;
}
if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE;
} else {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate);
}
}
} else {
if (cert) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
}
if (key) {
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(key);
}
if (certChain) {
CERT_DestroyCertificateList(certChain);
}
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss)
{
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending );
PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart );
if (!ss->canFalseStartCallback) {
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
} else {
PRBool maybeFalseStart;
SECStatus rv;
/* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to
* do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is
* sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage.
* Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
maybeFalseStart = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10;
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
if (!maybeFalseStart) {
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
} else {
rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd,
ss->canFalseStartCallbackData,
&ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE" : "FALSE"));
} else {
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError())));
}
return rv;
}
}
ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
return SECSuccess;
}
PRBool
ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
{
PRBool result;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
switch (ss->ssl3.hs.ws) {
case wait_new_session_ticket:
result = PR_TRUE;
break;
case wait_change_cipher:
result = !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn);
break;
default:
result = PR_FALSE;
break;
}
return result;
}
static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
* ssl3 Server Hello Done message.
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello_done handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
if (ws != wait_hello_done &&
ws != wait_server_cert &&
ws != wait_server_key &&
ws != wait_cert_request) {
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(ss);
return rv;
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone and ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete.
*
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRBool sendClientCert;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert &&
ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL &&
(ss->ssl3.platformClientKey ||
ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL);
if (!sendClientCert &&
ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single &&
ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) {
/* Don't need the backup handshake hash. */
PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, PR_TRUE);
ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = NULL;
}
/* We must wait for the server's certificate to be authenticated before
* sending the client certificate in order to disclosing the client
* certificate to an attacker that does not have a valid cert for the
* domain we are connecting to.
*
* XXX: We should do the same for the NPN extension, but for that we
* need an option to give the application the ability to leak the NPN
* information to get better performance.
*
* During the initial handshake on a connection, we never send/receive
* application data until we have authenticated the server's certificate;
* i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake before using the cipher
* specs agreed upon for that handshake. During a renegotiation, we may
* continue sending and receiving application data during the handshake
* interleaved with the handshake records. If we were to send the client's
* second round for a renegotiation before the server's certificate was
* authenticated, then the application data sent/received after this point
* would be using cipher spec that hadn't been authenticated. By waiting
* until the server's certificate has been authenticated during
* renegotiations, we ensure that renegotiations have the same property
* as initial handshakes; i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake
* before using the cipher specs agreed upon for that handshake for
* application data.
*/
if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget");
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending &&
(sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone)) {
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because"
" certificate authentication is still pending.",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound;
return SECWouldBlock;
}
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/
if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) {
ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE;
rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss);
/* Don't send verify */
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* error code is set. */
}
} else if (sendClientCert) {
rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* error code is set. */
}
}
rv = ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err is set. */
}
if (sendClientCert) {
rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err is set. */
}
}
rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err code was set. */
}
/* This must be done after we've set ss->ssl3.cwSpec in
* ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs because SSL_GetChannelInfo uses information
* from cwSpec. This must be done before we call ssl3_CheckFalseStart
* because the false start callback (if any) may need the information from
* the functions that depend on this being set.
*/
ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
/* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this
* point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker.
*/
rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err code was set. */
}
}
rv = ssl3_SendEncryptedExtensions(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err code was set. */
}
if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) {
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
/* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are
* false starting before we try to flush the client second
* round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully
* call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished,
* which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that
* no application develops a reliance on such flushing being
* done before its false start callback is called.
*/
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
} else {
/* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished
* message are racing each other. If the certificate
* authentication wins, then we will try to false start in
* ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete.
*/
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because"
" certificate authentication is still pending.",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
}
}
}
rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err code was set. */
}
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_channel_id_xtn)) {
/* If we are negotiating ChannelID on a full handshake then we record
* the handshake hashes in |sid| at this point. They will be needed in
* the event that we resume this session and use ChannelID on the
* resumption handshake. */
SSL3Hashes hashes;
SECItem *originalHandshakeHash =
&ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.originalHandshakeHash;
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == never_cached);
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
PORT_Assert(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, &hashes, 0);
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
PORT_Assert(originalHandshakeHash->len == 0);
originalHandshakeHash->data = PORT_Alloc(hashes.len);
if (!originalHandshakeHash->data)
return SECFailure;
originalHandshakeHash->len = hashes.len;
memcpy(originalHandshakeHash->data, hashes.u.raw, hashes.len);
}
if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn))
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket;
else
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss));
return SECSuccess;
loser:
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
return rv;
}
/*
* Routines used by servers
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send hello_request handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, hello_request, 0);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake */
}
rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
}
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_hello;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Called from:
* ssl3_HandleClientHello()
*/
static SECComparison
ssl3_ServerNameCompare(const SECItem *name1, const SECItem *name2)
{
if (!name1 != !name2) {
return SECLessThan;
}
if (!name1) {
return SECEqual;
}
if (name1->type != name2->type) {
return SECLessThan;
}
return SECITEM_CompareItem(name1, name2);
}
/* Sets memory error when returning NULL.
* Called from:
* ssl3_SendClientHello()
* ssl3_HandleServerHello()
* ssl3_HandleClientHello()
* ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello()
*/
sslSessionID *
ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server)
{
sslSessionID *sid;
sid = PORT_ZNew(sslSessionID);
if (sid == NULL)
return sid;
if (is_server) {
const SECItem * srvName;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/
srvName = &ss->ssl3.prSpec->srvVirtName;
if (srvName->len && srvName->data) {
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.srvName, srvName);
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_Free(sid);
return NULL;
}
}
sid->peerID = (ss->peerID == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID);
sid->urlSvrName = (ss->url == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->url);
sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer;
sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port;
sid->references = 1;
sid->cached = never_cached;
sid->version = ss->version;
sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE;
sid->u.ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED;
sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteKey = NULL;
sid->u.ssl3.serverWriteKey = NULL;
if (is_server) {
SECStatus rv;
int pid = SSL_GETPID();
sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES;
sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[0] = (pid >> 8) & 0xff;
sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[1] = pid & 0xff;
rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID + 2,
SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES -2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_FreeSID(sid);
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
}
return sid;
}
/* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello, ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello */
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss)
{
const ssl3KEADef *kea_def;
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err code is set. */
}
rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code is set. */
}
rv = ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code is set. */
}
/* We have to do this after the call to ssl3_SendServerHello,
* because kea_def is set up by ssl3_SendServerHello().
*/
kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey = PR_FALSE;
if (kea_def->is_limited && kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa) {
/* see if we can legally use the key in the cert. */
int keyLen; /* bytes */
keyLen = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(
ss->serverCerts[kea_def->exchKeyType].SERVERKEY);
if (keyLen > 0 &&
keyLen * BPB <= kea_def->key_size_limit ) {
/* XXX AND cert is not signing only!! */
/* just fall through and use it. */
} else if (ss->stepDownKeyPair != NULL) {
ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey = PR_TRUE;
rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err code was set. */
}
} else {
#ifndef HACKED_EXPORT_SERVER
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
return rv;
#endif
}
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
} else if ((kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) ||
(kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa)) {
rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err code was set. */
}
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
}
if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) {
rv = ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err code is set. */
}
}
rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err code is set. */
}
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->opt.requestCertificate) ? wait_client_cert
: wait_client_key;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* An empty TLS Renegotiation Info (RI) extension */
static const PRUint8 emptyRIext[5] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00};
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
* ssl3 Client Hello message.
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
{
sslSessionID * sid = NULL;
PRInt32 tmp;
unsigned int i;
int j;
SECStatus rv;
int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
SSL3AlertLevel level = alert_fatal;
SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
SECItem sidBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SECItem cookieBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SECItem suites = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SECItem comps = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
PRBool haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
PRBool haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_hello handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.initialized );
/* Get peer name of client */
rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code is set. */
}
/* Clearing the handshake pointers so that ssl_Do1stHandshake won't
* call ssl2_HandleMessage.
*
* The issue here is that TLS ordinarily starts out in
* ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord() because of the backward-compatibility
* code paths. That function zeroes these next pointers. But with DTLS,
* we don't even try to do the v2 ClientHello so we skip that function
* and need to reset these values here.
*/
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
ss->nextHandshake = 0;
ss->securityHandshake = 0;
}
/* We might be starting session renegotiation in which case we should
* clear previous state.
*/
PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData));
ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE;
if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) &&
(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) {
desc = unexpected_message;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO;
goto alert_loser;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake &&
ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) {
desc = no_renegotiation;
level = alert_warning;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
goto alert_loser;
}
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
}
tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
if (tmp < 0)
goto loser; /* malformed, alert already sent */
/* Translate the version */
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
ss->clientHelloVersion = version =
dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion((SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp);
} else {
ss->clientHelloVersion = version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp;
}
rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version
: handshake_failure;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
goto alert_loser;
}
rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
desc = internal_error;
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto alert_loser;
}
/* grab the client random data. */
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(
ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed */
}
/* grab the client's SID, if present. */
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed */
}
/* grab the client's cookie, if present. */
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cookieBytes, 1, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed */
}
}
/* grab the list of cipher suites. */
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &suites, 2, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed */
}
/* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a
* TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */
if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) {
for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
if (suite_i != TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV)
continue;
desc = inappropriate_fallback;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT;
goto alert_loser;
}
}
/* grab the list of compression methods. */
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &comps, 1, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed */
}
desc = handshake_failure;
/* Handle TLS hello extensions for SSL3 & TLS. We do not know if
* we are restarting a previous session until extensions have been
* parsed, since we might have received a SessionTicket extension.
* Note: we allow extensions even when negotiating SSL3 for the sake
* of interoperability (and backwards compatibility).
*/
if (length) {
/* Get length of hello extensions */
PRInt32 extension_length;
extension_length = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
if (extension_length < 0) {
goto loser; /* alert already sent */
}
if (extension_length != length) {
ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* send alert */
goto loser;
}
rv = ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed */
}
}
if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
/* If we didn't receive an RI extension, look for the SCSV,
* and if found, treat it just like an empty RI extension
* by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension.
*/
for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) {
SSL3Opaque * b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext;
PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext;
(void)ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2);
break;
}
}
}
if (ss->firstHsDone &&
(ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN ||
ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL) &&
!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
desc = no_renegotiation;
level = alert_warning;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
goto alert_loser;
}
if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation ||
(ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) &&
!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
desc = handshake_failure;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
goto alert_loser;
}
/* We do stateful resumes only if either of the following
* conditions are satisfied: (1) the client does not support the
* session ticket extension, or (2) the client support the session
* ticket extension, but sent an empty ticket.
*/
if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) ||
ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket) {
if (sidBytes.len > 0 && !ss->opt.noCache) {
SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0],
ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1],
ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2],
ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3]));
if (ssl_sid_lookup) {
sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(&ss->sec.ci.peer, sidBytes.data,
sidBytes.len, ss->dbHandle);
} else {
errCode = SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED;
goto loser;
}
}
} else if (ss->statelessResume) {
/* Fill in the client's session ID if doing a stateless resume.
* (When doing stateless resumes, server echos client's SessionID.)
*/
sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
PORT_Assert(sid != NULL); /* Should have already been filled in.*/
if (sidBytes.len > 0 && sidBytes.len <= SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len;
PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data,
sidBytes.len);
sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len;
} else {
sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = 0;
}
ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
}
/* We only send a session ticket extension if the client supports
* the extension and we are unable to do either a stateful or
* stateless resume.
*
* TODO: send a session ticket if performing a stateful
* resumption. (As per RFC4507, a server may issue a session
* ticket while doing a (stateless or stateful) session resume,
* but OpenSSL-0.9.8g does not accept session tickets while
* resuming.)
*/
if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && sid == NULL) {
ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss,
ssl_session_ticket_xtn, ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn);
}
if (sid != NULL) {
/* We've found a session cache entry for this client.
* Now, if we're going to require a client-auth cert,
* and we don't already have this client's cert in the session cache,
* and this is the first handshake on this connection (not a redo),
* then drop this old cache entry and start a new session.
*/
if ((sid->peerCert == NULL) && ss->opt.requestCertificate &&
((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) ||
(ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR) ||
((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE)
&& !ss->firstHsDone))) {
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok );
if (ss->sec.uncache)
ss->sec.uncache(sid);
ssl_FreeSID(sid);
sid = NULL;
}
}
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
/* Disable any ECC cipher suites for which we have no cert. */
ssl3_FilterECCipherSuitesByServerCerts(ss);
#endif
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss);
}
if (!ssl3_HasGCMSupport()) {
ssl3_DisableGCMSuites(ss);
}
#ifdef PARANOID
/* Look for a matching cipher suite. */
j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */
errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */
goto alert_loser;
}
#endif
/* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the
** same cipher suite and compression method we picked before.
** This is not a loop, despite appearances.
*/
if (sid) do {
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
#ifdef PARANOID
SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version};
#endif
/* Check that the cached compression method is still enabled. */
if (!compressionEnabled(ss, sid->u.ssl3.compression))
break;
/* Check that the cached compression method is in the client's list */
for (i = 0; i < comps.len; i++) {
if (comps.data[i] == sid->u.ssl3.compression)
break;
}
if (i == comps.len)
break;
suite = ss->cipherSuites;
/* Find the entry for the cipher suite used in the cached session. */
for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) {
if (suite->cipher_suite == sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)
break;
}
PORT_Assert(j > 0);
if (j <= 0)
break;
#ifdef PARANOID
/* Double check that the cached cipher suite is still enabled,
* implemented, and allowed by policy. Might have been disabled.
* The product policy won't change during the process lifetime.
* Implemented ("isPresent") shouldn't change for servers.
*/
if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange))
break;
#else
if (!suite->enabled)
break;
#endif
/* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's list */
for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite;
ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def =
ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite);
/* Use the cached compression method. */
ss->ssl3.hs.compression = sid->u.ssl3.compression;
goto compression_found;
}
}
} while (0);
/* START A NEW SESSION */
#ifndef PARANOID
/* Look for a matching cipher suite. */
j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */
errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */
goto alert_loser;
}
#endif
/* Select a cipher suite.
**
** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in
** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello().
**
** If TLS 1.0 is enabled, we could handle the case where the client
** offered TLS 1.1 but offered only export cipher suites by choosing TLS
** 1.0 and selecting one of those export cipher suites. However, a secure
** TLS 1.1 client should not have export cipher suites enabled at all,
** and a TLS 1.1 client should definitely not be offering *only* export
** cipher suites. Therefore, we refuse to negotiate export cipher suites
** with any client that indicates support for TLS 1.1 or higher when we
** (the server) have TLS 1.1 support enabled.
*/
for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) {
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j];
SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version};
if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange)) {
continue;
}
for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite;
ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def =
ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite);
goto suite_found;
}
}
}
errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
goto alert_loser;
suite_found:
/* Select a compression algorithm. */
for (i = 0; i < comps.len; i++) {
if (!compressionEnabled(ss, comps.data[i]))
continue;
for (j = 0; j < compressionMethodsCount; j++) {
if (comps.data[i] == compressions[j]) {
ss->ssl3.hs.compression =
(SSLCompressionMethod)compressions[j];
goto compression_found;
}
}
}
errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP;
/* null compression must be supported */
goto alert_loser;
compression_found:
suites.data = NULL;
comps.data = NULL;
ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData;
/* If there are any failures while processing the old sid,
* we don't consider them to be errors. Instead, We just behave
* as if the client had sent us no sid to begin with, and make a new one.
*/
if (sid != NULL) do {
ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec;
SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped key */
if (sid->version != ss->version ||
sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite ||
sid->u.ssl3.compression != ss->ssl3.hs.compression) {
break; /* not an error */
}
if (ss->sec.ci.sid) {
if (ss->sec.uncache)
ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != sid); /* should be impossible, but ... */
if (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid) {
ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
}
ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
}
/* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */
ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); haveSpecWriteLock = PR_TRUE;
pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) {
PK11SymKey * wrapKey; /* wrapping key */
CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0;
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
/* we cannot restart a non-bypass session in a
** bypass socket.
*/
break;
}
#endif
wrapKey = getWrappingKey(ss, NULL, sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType,
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
ss->pkcs11PinArg);
if (!wrapKey) {
/* we have a SID cache entry, but no wrapping key for it??? */
break;
}
if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */
keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
}
wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
/* unwrap the master secret. */
pwSpec->master_secret =
PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags);
PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
break; /* not an error */
}
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
} else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, wrappedMS.data, wrappedMS.len);
pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret;
pwSpec->msItem.len = wrappedMS.len;
#endif
} else {
/* We CAN restart a bypass session in a non-bypass socket. */
/* need to import the raw master secret to session object */
PK11SlotInfo * slot;
wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
pwSpec->master_secret =
PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, &wrappedMS,
NULL);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
break; /* not an error */
}
}
ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
if (sid->peerCert != NULL) {
ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert);
ssl3_CopyPeerCertsFromSID(ss, sid);
}
/*
* Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session.
*
* XXX make sure compression still matches
*/
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits );
if (ss->statelessResume)
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_stateless_resumes );
ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE;
ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm;
ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits;
ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType;
ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits;
/* server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent,
** but they do remember the kea type we originally used, so we
** can locate it again, provided that the current ssl socket
** has had its server certs configured the same as the previous one.
*/
ss->sec.localCert =
CERT_DupCertificate(ss->serverCerts[sid->keaType].serverCert);
/* Copy cached name in to pending spec */
if (sid != NULL &&
sid->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len && sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) {
/* Set server name from sid */
SECItem *sidName = &sid->u.ssl3.srvName;
SECItem *pwsName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName;
if (pwsName->data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
}
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, sidName);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
desc = internal_error;
goto alert_loser;
}
}
/* Clean up sni name array */
if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn) &&
ss->xtnData.sniNameArr) {
PORT_Free(ss->xtnData.sniNameArr);
ss->xtnData.sniNameArr = NULL;
ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize = 0;
}
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); haveXmitBufLock = PR_TRUE;
rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto loser;
}
if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
}
/* NULL value for PMS signifies re-use of the old MS */
rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto loser;
}
rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto loser;
}
rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0);
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto loser;
}
if (haveXmitBufLock) {
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE;
}
return SECSuccess;
} while (0);
if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
}
if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok );
if (ss->sec.uncache)
ss->sec.uncache(sid);
ssl_FreeSID(sid);
sid = NULL;
}
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses );
if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) {
int ret = 0;
if (ss->sniSocketConfig) do { /* not a loop */
ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
/* If extension is negotiated, the len of names should > 0. */
if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) {
/* Calling client callback to reconfigure the socket. */
ret = (SECStatus)(*ss->sniSocketConfig)(ss->fd,
ss->xtnData.sniNameArr,
ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize,
ss->sniSocketConfigArg);
}
if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) {
/* Application does not know the name or was not able to
* properly reconfigure the socket. */
errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
desc = unrecognized_name;
break;
} else if (ret == SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED) {
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
SECItem * cwsName, *pwsName;
ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
pwsName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName;
cwsName = &ss->ssl3.cwSpec->srvVirtName;
#ifndef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS
/* not allow name change on the 2d HS */
if (ss->firstHsDone) {
if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(pwsName, cwsName)) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/
errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
desc = handshake_failure;
ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
break;
}
}
#endif
if (pwsName->data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
}
if (cwsName->data) {
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, cwsName);
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************/
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
desc = internal_error;
ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
break;
}
} else if (ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) {
/* Application has configured new socket info. Lets check it
* and save the name. */
SECStatus rv;
SECItem * name = &ss->xtnData.sniNameArr[ret];
int configedCiphers;
SECItem * pwsName;
/* get rid of the old name and save the newly picked. */
/* This code is protected by ssl3HandshakeLock. */
ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
#ifndef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS
/* not allow name change on the 2d HS */
if (ss->firstHsDone) {
SECItem *cwsName = &ss->ssl3.cwSpec->srvVirtName;
if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(name, cwsName)) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/
errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
desc = handshake_failure;
ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
break;
}
}
#endif
pwsName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName;
if (pwsName->data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
}
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, name);
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /***************************/
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
desc = internal_error;
ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
break;
}
configedCiphers = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
if (configedCiphers <= 0) {
/* no ciphers are working/supported */
errCode = PORT_GetError();
desc = handshake_failure;
ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
break;
}
/* Need to tell the client that application has picked
* the name from the offered list and reconfigured the socket.
*/
ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn,
ssl3_SendServerNameXtn);
} else {
/* Callback returned index outside of the boundary. */
PORT_Assert(ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize);
errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
desc = internal_error;
ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
break;
}
} while (0);
/* Free sniNameArr. The data that each SECItem in the array
* points into is the data from the input buffer "b". It will
* not be available outside the scope of this or it's child
* functions.*/
if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArr) {
PORT_Free(ss->xtnData.sniNameArr);
ss->xtnData.sniNameArr = NULL;
ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize = 0;
}
if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) {
/* desc and errCode should be set. */
goto alert_loser;
}
}
#ifndef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS
else if (ss->firstHsDone) {
/* Check that we don't have the name is current spec
* if this extension was not negotiated on the 2d hs. */
PRBool passed = PR_TRUE;
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*******************************/
if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->srvVirtName.data) {
passed = PR_FALSE;
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/
if (!passed) {
errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
desc = handshake_failure;
goto alert_loser;
}
}
#endif
sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE);
if (sid == NULL) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto loser; /* memory error is set. */
}
ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE;
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss);
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto loser;
}
if (haveXmitBufLock) {
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE;
}
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
}
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, level, desc);
/* FALLTHRU */
loser:
if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
}
if (haveXmitBufLock) {
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE;
}
PORT_SetError(errCode);
return SECFailure;
}
/*
* ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello is used when a V2 formatted hello comes
* in asking to use the V3 handshake.
* Called from ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage() in sslcon.c
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length)
{
sslSessionID * sid = NULL;
unsigned char * suites;
unsigned char * random;
SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
SECStatus rv;
int i;
int j;
int sid_length;
int suite_length;
int rand_length;
int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle v2 client_hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData));
rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
}
rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
return rv;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) {
desc = unexpected_message;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO;
goto loser; /* alert_loser */
}
version = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2];
suite_length = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4];
sid_length = (buffer[5] << 8) | buffer[6];
rand_length = (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8];
ss->clientHelloVersion = version;
rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* send back which ever alert client will understand. */
desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version : handshake_failure;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
goto alert_loser;
}
rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
desc = internal_error;
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto alert_loser;
}
/* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */
if (length !=
SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + suite_length + sid_length + rand_length) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bad v2 client hello message, len=%d should=%d",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, length,
SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + suite_length + sid_length +
rand_length));
goto loser; /* malformed */ /* alert_loser */
}
suites = buffer + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES;
random = suites + suite_length + sid_length;
if (rand_length < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES ||
rand_length > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES) {
goto loser; /* malformed */ /* alert_loser */
}
PORT_Assert(SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(
&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length],
random, rand_length);
PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[0],
SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH));
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
/* Disable any ECC cipher suites for which we have no cert. */
ssl3_FilterECCipherSuitesByServerCerts(ss);
#endif
i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
if (i <= 0) {
errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */
goto alert_loser;
}
/* Select a cipher suite.
**
** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in
** ssl3_HandleClientHello().
**
** See the comments about export cipher suites in ssl3_HandleClientHello().
*/
for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) {
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j];
SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version};
if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange)) {
continue;
}
for (i = 0; i+2 < suite_length; i += 3) {
PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16)|(suites[i+1] << 8)|suites[i+2];
if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite;
ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def =
ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite);
goto suite_found;
}
}
}
errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
goto alert_loser;
suite_found:
/* Look for the SCSV, and if found, treat it just like an empty RI
* extension by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension.
*/
for (i = 0; i+2 < suite_length; i += 3) {
PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i+1] << 8) | suites[i+2];
if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) {
SSL3Opaque * b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext;
PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext;
(void)ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2);
break;
}
}
if (ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation &&
!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
desc = handshake_failure;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
goto alert_loser;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_null;
ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData;
/* we don't even search for a cache hit here. It's just a miss. */
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses );
sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE);
if (sid == NULL) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto loser; /* memory error is set. */
}
ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
/* do not worry about memory leak of sid since it now belongs to ci */
/* We have to update the handshake hashes before we can send stuff */
rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buffer, length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto loser;
}
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss);
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto loser;
}
/* XXX_1 The call stack to here is:
* ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage -> here.
* ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage returns whatever we return here.
* ssl_Do1stHandshake will continue looping if it gets back either
* SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock.
* SECSuccess is preferable here. See XXX_1 in sslgathr.c.
*/
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
loser:
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
PORT_SetError(errCode);
return SECFailure;
}
/* The negotiated version number has been already placed in ss->version.
**
** Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello (resuming session),
** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleClientHello (new session),
** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello (new session)
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss)
{
sslSessionID *sid;
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535;
PRUint32 length;
PRInt32 extensions_len = 0;
SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
return SECFailure;
}
} else {
PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0));
if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0)) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
return SECFailure;
}
}
sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
extensions_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes,
&ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0]);
if (extensions_len > 0)
extensions_len += 2; /* Add sizeof total extension length */
length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 1 +
((sid == NULL) ? 0: sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) +
sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) + 1 + extensions_len;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello, length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version);
} else {
version = ss->version;
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, version, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(
ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
if (sid)
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1);
else
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
if (extensions_len) {
PRInt32 sent_len;
extensions_len -= 2;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extensions_len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */
sent_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, extensions_len,
&ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0]);
PORT_Assert(sent_len == extensions_len);
if (sent_len != extensions_len) {
if (sent_len >= 0)
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
}
rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm selects a hash algorithm to use when signing
* elements of the handshake. (The negotiated cipher suite determines the
* signature algorithm.) Prior to TLS 1.2, the MD5/SHA1 combination is always
* used. With TLS 1.2, a client may advertise its support for signature and
* hash combinations. */
static SECStatus
ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm(sslSocket *ss,
SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm* out)
{
TLSSignatureAlgorithm sigAlg;
unsigned int i, j;
/* hashPreference expresses our preferences for hash algorithms, most
* preferable first. */
static const PRUint8 hashPreference[] = {
tls_hash_sha256,
tls_hash_sha384,
tls_hash_sha512,
tls_hash_sha1,
};
switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea) {
case kea_rsa:
case kea_rsa_export:
case kea_rsa_export_1024:
case kea_dh_rsa:
case kea_dh_rsa_export:
case kea_dhe_rsa:
case kea_dhe_rsa_export:
case kea_rsa_fips:
case kea_ecdh_rsa:
case kea_ecdhe_rsa:
sigAlg = tls_sig_rsa;
break;
case kea_dh_dss:
case kea_dh_dss_export:
case kea_dhe_dss:
case kea_dhe_dss_export:
sigAlg = tls_sig_dsa;
break;
case kea_ecdh_ecdsa:
case kea_ecdhe_ecdsa:
sigAlg = tls_sig_ecdsa;
break;
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
return SECFailure;
}
out->sigAlg = sigAlg;
if (ss->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
/* SEC_OID_UNKNOWN means the MD5/SHA1 combo hash used in TLS 1.1 and
* prior. */
out->hashAlg = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
return SECSuccess;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash == 0) {
/* If the client didn't provide any signature_algorithms extension then
* we can assume that they support SHA-1:
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
out->hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1;
return SECSuccess;
}
for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(hashPreference); i++) {
for (j = 0; j < ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash; j++) {
const SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm* sh =
&ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash[j];
if (sh->sigAlg == sigAlg && sh->hashAlg == hashPreference[i]) {
out->hashAlg = sh->hashAlg;
return SECSuccess;
}
}
}
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
return SECFailure;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss)
{
const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
int length;
PRBool isTLS;
SECItem signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SSL3Hashes hashes;
SECKEYPublicKey * sdPub; /* public key for step-down */
SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm sigAndHash;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_key_exchange handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
if (ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm(ss, &sigAndHash) != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) {
case kt_rsa:
/* Perform SSL Step-Down here. */
sdPub = ss->stepDownKeyPair->pubKey;
PORT_Assert(sdPub != NULL);
if (!sdPub) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(sigAndHash.hashAlg,
sdPub->u.rsa.modulus,
sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent,
&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random,
&hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY,
&signed_hash, isTLS);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */
}
if (signed_hash.data == NULL) {
/* how can this happen and rv == SECSuccess ?? */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
length = 2 + sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.len +
2 + sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.len +
2 + signed_hash.len;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.data,
sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
ss, sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.data,
sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
rv = ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &sigAndHash);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data,
signed_hash.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
PORT_Free(signed_hash.data);
return SECSuccess;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
case kt_ecdh: {
rv = ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, &sigAndHash);
return rv;
}
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
case kt_dh:
case kt_null:
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
break;
}
loser:
if (signed_hash.data != NULL)
PORT_Free(signed_hash.data);
return SECFailure;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss)
{
PRBool isTLS12;
SECItem * name;
CERTDistNames *ca_list;
const PRUint8 *certTypes;
const PRUint8 *sigAlgs;
SECItem * names = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
int length;
int i;
int calen = 0;
int nnames = 0;
int certTypesLength;
int sigAlgsLength;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
/* ssl3.ca_list is initialized to NULL, and never changed. */
ca_list = ss->ssl3.ca_list;
if (!ca_list) {
ca_list = ssl3_server_ca_list;
}
if (ca_list != NULL) {
names = ca_list->names;
nnames = ca_list->nnames;
}
for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) {
calen += 2 + name->len;
}
certTypes = certificate_types;
certTypesLength = sizeof certificate_types;
sigAlgs = supported_signature_algorithms;
sigAlgsLength = sizeof supported_signature_algorithms;
length = 1 + certTypesLength + 2 + calen;
if (isTLS12) {
length += 2 + sigAlgsLength;
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_request, length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certTypes, certTypesLength, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
if (isTLS12) {
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sigAlgs, sigAlgsLength, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) {
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
}
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello_done handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello_done, 0);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
* ssl3 Certificate Verify message
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
SSL3Hashes *hashes)
{
SECItem signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SECStatus rv;
int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY;
SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure;
PRBool isTLS, isTLS12;
SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm sigAndHash;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_verify || ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) {
desc = unexpected_message;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY;
goto alert_loser;
}
if (isTLS12) {
rv = ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &b, &length,
&sigAndHash);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */
}
rv = ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency(
&sigAndHash, ss->sec.peerCert);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
desc = decrypt_error;
goto alert_loser;
}
/* We only support CertificateVerify messages that use the handshake
* hash. */
if (sigAndHash.hashAlg != hashes->hashAlg) {
errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM;
desc = decrypt_error;
goto alert_loser;
}
}
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed. */
}
/* XXX verify that the key & kea match */
rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signed_hash,
isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure;
goto alert_loser;
}
signed_hash.data = NULL;
if (length != 0) {
desc = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter;
goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
}
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
loser:
PORT_SetError(errCode);
return SECFailure;
}
/* find a slot that is able to generate a PMS and wrap it with RSA.
* Then generate and return the PMS.
* If the serverKeySlot parameter is non-null, this function will use
* that slot to do the job, otherwise it will find a slot.
*
* Called from ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11() (above)
* sendRSAClientKeyExchange() (above)
* ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange() (below)
* Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock, the SSL3HandshakeLock
*/
static PK11SymKey *
ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
PK11SlotInfo * serverKeySlot)
{
PK11SymKey * pms = NULL;
PK11SlotInfo * slot = serverKeySlot;
void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
SECItem param;
CK_VERSION version;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism_array[3];
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
if (slot == NULL) {
SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
/* The specReadLock would suffice here, but we cannot assert on
** read locks. Also, all the callers who call with a non-null
** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock.
*/
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
calg = spec->cipher_def->calg;
PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg);
/* First get an appropriate slot. */
mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN;
mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
mechanism_array[2] = alg2Mech[calg].cmech;
slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 3, pwArg);
if (slot == NULL) {
/* can't find a slot with all three, find a slot with the minimum */
slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg);
if (slot == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND);
return pms; /* which is NULL */
}
}
}
/* Generate the pre-master secret ... */
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
SSL3ProtocolVersion temp;
temp = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion);
version.major = MSB(temp);
version.minor = LSB(temp);
} else {
version.major = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion);
version.minor = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion);
}
param.data = (unsigned char *)&version;
param.len = sizeof version;
pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, ¶m, 0, pwArg);
if (!serverKeySlot)
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if (pms == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
}
return pms;
}
/* Note: The Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 necessitates that we NEVER
* return any indication of failure of the Client Key Exchange message,
* where that failure is caused by the content of the client's message.
* This function must not return SECFailure for any reason that is directly
* or indirectly caused by the content of the client's encrypted PMS.
* We must not send an alert and also not drop the connection.
* Instead, we generate a random PMS. This will cause a failure
* in the processing the finished message, which is exactly where
* the failure must occur.
*
* Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss,
SSL3Opaque *b,
PRUint32 length,
SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey)
{
PK11SymKey * pms;
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
unsigned char * cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random;
unsigned char * sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random;
ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
unsigned int outLen = 0;
#endif
PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
SECStatus rv;
SECItem enc_pms;
unsigned char rsaPmsBuf[SSL3_RSA_PMS_LENGTH];
SECItem pmsItem = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec );
enc_pms.data = b;
enc_pms.len = length;
pmsItem.data = rsaPmsBuf;
pmsItem.len = sizeof rsaPmsBuf;
if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */
PRInt32 kLen;
kLen = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &enc_pms.data, &enc_pms.len);
if (kLen < 0) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if ((unsigned)kLen < enc_pms.len) {
enc_pms.len = kLen;
}
isTLS = PR_TRUE;
} else {
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->tls_keygen != 0);
}
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
/* TRIPLE BYPASS, get PMS directly from RSA decryption.
* Use PK11_PrivDecryptPKCS1 to decrypt the PMS to a buffer,
* then, check for version rollback attack, then
* do the equivalent of ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret, placing the MS in
* pwSpec->msItem. Finally call ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec with
* ss and NULL, so that it will use the MS we've already derived here.
*/
rv = PK11_PrivDecryptPKCS1(serverKey, rsaPmsBuf, &outLen,
sizeof rsaPmsBuf, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* triple bypass failed. Let's try for a double bypass. */
goto double_bypass;
} else if (ss->opt.detectRollBack) {
SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version =
(rsaPmsBuf[0] << 8) | rsaPmsBuf[1];
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
client_version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(client_version);
}
if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) {
/* Version roll-back detected. ensure failure. */
rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(rsaPmsBuf, sizeof rsaPmsBuf);
}
}
/* have PMS, build MS without PKCS11 */
rv = ssl3_MasterKeyDeriveBypass(pwSpec, cr, sr, &pmsItem, isTLS,
PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret;
pwSpec->msItem.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
PK11_GenerateRandom(pwSpec->msItem.data, pwSpec->msItem.len);
}
rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL);
} else
#endif
{
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
double_bypass:
#endif
/*
* unwrap pms out of the incoming buffer
* Note: CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE is NOT the mechanism used to do
* the unwrap. Rather, it is the mechanism with which the
* unwrapped pms will be used.
*/
pms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKey, &enc_pms,
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0);
if (pms != NULL) {
PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "decrypted premaster secret:",
PK11_GetKeyData(pms)->data,
PK11_GetKeyData(pms)->len));
} else {
/* unwrap failed. Generate a bogus PMS and carry on. */
PK11SlotInfo * slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(serverKey);
ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, slot);
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
}
if (pms == NULL) {
/* last gasp. */
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */
rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms);
PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
SEND_ALERT
return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
* ssl3 ClientKeyExchange message from the remote client
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
{
SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
const ssl3KEADef *kea_def;
ssl3KeyPair *serverKeyPair = NULL;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
SECKEYPublicKey *serverPubKey = NULL;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_key_exchange handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_key) {
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH);
return SECFailure;
}
kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
if (ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey) {
PORT_Assert(kea_def->is_limited /* XXX OR cert is signing only */
&& kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa
&& ss->stepDownKeyPair != NULL);
if (!kea_def->is_limited ||
kea_def->exchKeyType != kt_rsa ||
ss->stepDownKeyPair == NULL) {
/* shouldn't happen, don't use step down if it does */
goto skip;
}
serverKeyPair = ss->stepDownKeyPair;
ss->sec.keaKeyBits = EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH * BPB;
} else
skip:
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
/* XXX Using SSLKEAType to index server certifiates
* does not work for (EC)DHE ciphers. Until we have
* an indexing mechanism general enough for all key
* exchange algorithms, we'll need to deal with each
* one seprately.
*/
if ((kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) ||
(kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa)) {
if (ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair != NULL) {
serverKeyPair = ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair;
if (serverKeyPair->pubKey) {
ss->sec.keaKeyBits =
SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKeyPair->pubKey);
}
}
} else
#endif
{
sslServerCerts * sc = ss->serverCerts + kea_def->exchKeyType;
serverKeyPair = sc->serverKeyPair;
ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sc->serverKeyBits;
}
if (serverKeyPair) {
serverKey = serverKeyPair->privKey;
}
if (serverKey == NULL) {
SEND_ALERT
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->sec.keaType = kea_def->exchKeyType;
switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) {
case kt_rsa:
rv = ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKey);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
SEND_ALERT
return SECFailure; /* error code set */
}
break;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
case kt_ecdh:
/* XXX We really ought to be able to store multiple
* EC certs (a requirement if we wish to support both
* ECDH-RSA and ECDH-ECDSA key exchanges concurrently).
* When we make that change, we'll need an index other
* than kt_ecdh to pick the right EC certificate.
*/
if (serverKeyPair) {
serverPubKey = serverKeyPair->pubKey;
}
if (serverPubKey == NULL) {
/* XXX Is this the right error code? */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length,
serverPubKey, serverKey);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure; /* error code set */
}
break;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
default:
(void) ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = ss->sec.peerCert ? wait_cert_verify : wait_change_cipher;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* This is TLS's equivalent of sending a no_certificate alert. */
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, 3);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3);
}
return rv; /* error, if any, set by functions called above. */
}
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
{
SECStatus rv;
SECItem ticketData;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle session_ticket handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data);
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_new_session_ticket) {
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
return SECFailure;
}
/* RFC5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid
* until it has verified the server's Finished message." See the comment in
* ssl3_FinishHandshake for more details.
*/
ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time();
if (length < 4) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint =
(PRUint32)ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &b, &length);
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticketData, 2, &b, &length);
if (length != 0 || rv != SECSuccess) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
return SECFailure; /* malformed */
}
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket,
&ticketData);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_TRUE;
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
return SECSuccess;
}
#ifdef NISCC_TEST
static PRInt32 connNum = 0;
static SECStatus
get_fake_cert(SECItem *pCertItem, int *pIndex)
{
PRFileDesc *cf;
char * testdir;
char * startat;
char * stopat;
const char *extension;
int fileNum;
PRInt32 numBytes = 0;
PRStatus prStatus;
PRFileInfo info;
char cfn[100];
pCertItem->data = 0;
if ((testdir = PR_GetEnv("NISCC_TEST")) == NULL) {
return SECSuccess;
}
*pIndex = (NULL != strstr(testdir, "root"));
extension = (strstr(testdir, "simple") ? "" : ".der");
fileNum = PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&connNum) - 1;
if ((startat = PR_GetEnv("START_AT")) != NULL) {
fileNum += atoi(startat);
}
if ((stopat = PR_GetEnv("STOP_AT")) != NULL &&
fileNum >= atoi(stopat)) {
*pIndex = -1;
return SECSuccess;
}
sprintf(cfn, "%s/%08d%s", testdir, fileNum, extension);
cf = PR_Open(cfn, PR_RDONLY, 0);
if (!cf) {
goto loser;
}
prStatus = PR_GetOpenFileInfo(cf, &info);
if (prStatus != PR_SUCCESS) {
PR_Close(cf);
goto loser;
}
pCertItem = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, pCertItem, info.size);
if (pCertItem) {
numBytes = PR_Read(cf, pCertItem->data, info.size);
}
PR_Close(cf);
if (numBytes != info.size) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(pCertItem, PR_FALSE);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO);
goto loser;
}
fprintf(stderr, "using %s\n", cfn);
return SECSuccess;
loser:
fprintf(stderr, "failed to use %s\n", cfn);
*pIndex = -1;
return SECFailure;
}
#endif
/*
* Used by both client and server.
* Called from HandleServerHelloDone and from SendServerHelloSequence.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
CERTCertificateList *certChain;
int len = 0;
int i;
SSL3KEAType certIndex;
#ifdef NISCC_TEST
SECItem fakeCert;
int ndex = -1;
#endif
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
if (ss->sec.localCert)
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert);
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
sslServerCerts * sc = NULL;
/* XXX SSLKEAType isn't really a good choice for
* indexing certificates (it breaks when we deal
* with (EC)DHE-* cipher suites. This hack ensures
* the RSA cert is picked for (EC)DHE-RSA.
* Revisit this when we add server side support
* for ECDHE-ECDSA or client-side authentication
* using EC certificates.
*/
if ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) ||
(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa)) {
certIndex = kt_rsa;
} else {
certIndex = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
}
sc = ss->serverCerts + certIndex;
certChain = sc->serverCertChain;
ss->sec.authKeyBits = sc->serverKeyBits;
ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType;
ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sc->serverCert);
} else {
certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain;
ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
}
#ifdef NISCC_TEST
rv = get_fake_cert(&fakeCert, &ndex);
#endif
if (certChain) {
for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) {
#ifdef NISCC_TEST
if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) {
len += fakeCert.len + 3;
} else {
len += certChain->certs[i].len + 3;
}
#else
len += certChain->certs[i].len + 3;
#endif
}
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, len + 3);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len, 3);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
if (certChain) {
for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) {
#ifdef NISCC_TEST
if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) {
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, fakeCert.data,
fakeCert.len, 3);
SECITEM_FreeItem(&fakeCert, PR_FALSE);
} else {
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data,
certChain->certs[i].len, 3);
}
#else
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data,
certChain->certs[i].len, 3);
#endif
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
}
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Used by server only.
* single-stapling, send only a single cert status
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
int len = 0;
SECItemArray *statusToSend = NULL;
SSL3KEAType certIndex;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate status handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->sec.isServer);
if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn))
return SECSuccess;
/* Use certStatus based on the cert being used. */
if ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) ||
(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa)) {
certIndex = kt_rsa;
} else {
certIndex = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
}
if (ss->certStatusArray[certIndex] && ss->certStatusArray[certIndex]->len) {
statusToSend = ss->certStatusArray[certIndex];
}
if (!statusToSend)
return SECSuccess;
/* Use the array's first item only (single stapling) */
len = 1 + statusToSend->items[0].len + 3;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_status, len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss,
statusToSend->items[0].data,
statusToSend->items[0].len,
3);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
return SECSuccess;
}
/* This is used to delete the CA certificates in the peer certificate chain
* from the cert database after they've been validated.
*/
static void
ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss)
{
PLArenaPool * arena = ss->ssl3.peerCertArena;
ssl3CertNode *certs = (ssl3CertNode *)ss->ssl3.peerCertChain;
for (; certs; certs = certs->next) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(certs->cert);
}
if (arena) PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = NULL;
ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = NULL;
}
static void
ssl3_CopyPeerCertsFromSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid)
{
PLArenaPool *arena;
ssl3CertNode *lastCert = NULL;
ssl3CertNode *certs = NULL;
int i;
if (!sid->peerCertChain[0])
return;
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.peerCertArena);
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.peerCertChain);
ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PEER_CERT_CHAIN_SIZE && sid->peerCertChain[i]; i++) {
ssl3CertNode *c = PORT_ArenaNew(arena, ssl3CertNode);
c->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCertChain[i]);
c->next = NULL;
if (lastCert) {
lastCert->next = c;
} else {
certs = c;
}
lastCert = c;
}
ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = certs;
}
static void
ssl3_CopyPeerCertsToSID(ssl3CertNode *certs, sslSessionID *sid)
{
int i = 0;
ssl3CertNode *c = certs;
for (; i < MAX_PEER_CERT_CHAIN_SIZE && c; i++, c = c->next) {
PORT_Assert(!sid->peerCertChain[i]);
sid->peerCertChain[i] = CERT_DupCertificate(c->cert);
}
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
* ssl3 CertificateStatus message.
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
* This is always called before ssl3_HandleCertificate, even if the Certificate
* message is sent first.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
{
PRInt32 status, len;
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_certificate_status) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_STATUS);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
/* Consume the CertificateStatusType enum */
status = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length);
if (status != 1 /* ocsp */) {
goto format_loser;
}
len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
if (len != length) {
goto format_loser;
}
#define MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */
if (length > MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN)
goto format_loser;
#undef MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN
/* Array size 1, because we currently implement single-stapling only */
SECITEM_AllocArray(NULL, &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, 1);
if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items)
return SECFailure;
ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data = PORT_Alloc(length);
if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data) {
SECITEM_FreeArray(&ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, PR_FALSE);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data, b, length);
ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len = length;
ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].type = siBuffer;
return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss);
format_loser:
return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
* ssl3 Certificate message.
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
{
ssl3CertNode * c;
ssl3CertNode * lastCert = NULL;
PRInt32 remaining = 0;
PRInt32 size;
SECStatus rv;
PRBool isServer = (PRBool)(!!ss->sec.isServer);
PRBool isTLS;
SSL3AlertDescription desc;
int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE;
SECItem certItem;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert) &&
(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_cert)) {
desc = unexpected_message;
errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE;
goto alert_loser;
}
if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) {
if (ss->sec.peerKey) {
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey);
ss->sec.peerKey = NULL;
}
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert);
ss->sec.peerCert = NULL;
}
ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
/* It is reported that some TLS client sends a Certificate message
** with a zero-length message body. We'll treat that case like a
** normal no_certificates message to maximize interoperability.
*/
if (length) {
remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
if (remaining < 0)
goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
if ((PRUint32)remaining > length)
goto decode_loser;
}
if (!remaining) {
if (!(isTLS && isServer)) {
desc = bad_certificate;
goto alert_loser;
}
/* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */
/* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */
rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto loser;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
return SECSuccess;
}
ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena == NULL) {
goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */
}
/* First get the peer cert. */
remaining -= 3;
if (remaining < 0)
goto decode_loser;
size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
if (size <= 0)
goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
if (remaining < size)
goto decode_loser;
certItem.data = b;
certItem.len = size;
b += size;
length -= size;
remaining -= size;
ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL,
PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) {
/* We should report an alert if the cert was bad, but not if the
* problem was just some local problem, like memory error.
*/
goto ambiguous_err;
}
/* Now get all of the CA certs. */
while (remaining > 0) {
remaining -= 3;
if (remaining < 0)
goto decode_loser;
size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
if (size <= 0)
goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
if (remaining < size)
goto decode_loser;
certItem.data = b;
certItem.len = size;
b += size;
length -= size;
remaining -= size;
c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena, ssl3CertNode);
if (c == NULL) {
goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */
}
c->cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL,
PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
if (c->cert == NULL) {
goto ambiguous_err;
}
c->next = NULL;
if (lastCert) {
lastCert->next = c;
} else {
ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c;
}
lastCert = c;
}
if (remaining != 0)
goto decode_loser;
SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert);
if (!isServer && ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) {
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_certificate_status;
rv = SECSuccess;
} else {
rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */
}
return rv;
ambiguous_err:
errCode = PORT_GetError();
switch (errCode) {
case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR:
case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE:
case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
if (isTLS) {
desc = internal_error;
goto alert_loser;
}
goto loser;
}
ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode);
goto loser;
decode_loser:
desc = isTLS ? decode_error : bad_certificate;
alert_loser:
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
loser:
(void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
return SECFailure;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRBool isServer = (PRBool)(!!ss->sec.isServer);
int errCode;
ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE;
/*
* Ask caller-supplied callback function to validate cert chain.
*/
rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg, ss->fd,
PR_TRUE, isServer);
if (rv) {
errCode = PORT_GetError();
if (rv != SECWouldBlock) {
if (ss->handleBadCert) {
rv = (*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd);
}
}
if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
errCode = SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS;
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE;
rv = SECSuccess;
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode);
goto loser;
}
}
ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert);
ssl3_CopyPeerCertsToSID(ss->ssl3.peerCertChain, ss->sec.ci.sid);
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
CERTCertificate *cert = ss->sec.peerCert;
/* set the server authentication and key exchange types and sizes
** from the value in the cert. If the key exchange key is different,
** it will get fixed when we handle the server key exchange message.
*/
SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType;
ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
if (pubKey) {
ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits =
SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey);
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
if (ss->sec.keaType == kt_ecdh) {
/* Get authKeyBits from signing key.
* XXX The code below uses a quick approximation of
* key size based on cert->signatureWrap.signature.data
* (which contains the DER encoded signature). The field
* cert->signatureWrap.signature.len contains the
* length of the encoded signature in bits.
*/
if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdh_ecdsa) {
ss->sec.authKeyBits =
cert->signatureWrap.signature.data[3]*8;
if (cert->signatureWrap.signature.data[4] == 0x00)
ss->sec.authKeyBits -= 8;
/*
* XXX: if cert is not signed by ecdsa we should
* destroy pubKey and goto bad_cert
*/
} else if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdh_rsa) {
ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->signatureWrap.signature.len;
/*
* XXX: if cert is not signed by rsa we should
* destroy pubKey and goto bad_cert
*/
}
}
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
pubKey = NULL;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; /* disallow server_key_exchange */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->is_limited ||
/* XXX OR server cert is signing only. */
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa ||
ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa ||
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_dh) {
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key; /* allow server_key_exchange */
}
} else {
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
}
PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
return rv;
loser:
(void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
return SECFailure;
}
static SECStatus ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus
ssl3_AlwaysFail(sslSocket * ss)
{
PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Caller must hold 1stHandshakeLock.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error)
{
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS);
return SECFailure;
}
ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR);
rv = SECFailure;
goto done;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE;
if (error != 0) {
ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail;
ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, error);
rv = SECSuccess;
} else if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) {
sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget;
ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL;
if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) {
SSL_TRC(3,("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race"
" with peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
}
rv = target(ss);
/* Even if we blocked here, we have accomplished enough to claim
* success. Any remaining work will be taken care of by subsequent
* calls to SSL_ForceHandshake/PR_Send/PR_Read/etc.
*/
if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
rv = SECSuccess;
}
} else {
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with"
" peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming);
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake);
if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
!ss->firstHsDone &&
!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss)) {
/* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because
* certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still
* haven't received any of the server's second round yet.
*/
rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
} else {
rv = SECSuccess;
}
}
done:
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
PRBool isServer,
const SSL3Hashes * hashes,
TLSFinished * tlsFinished)
{
const char * label;
unsigned int len;
SECStatus rv;
label = isServer ? "server finished" : "client finished";
len = 15;
rv = ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(spec, label, len, hashes->u.raw,
hashes->len, tlsFinished->verify_data,
sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data);
return rv;
}
/* The calling function must acquire and release the appropriate
* lock (e.g., ssl_GetSpecReadLock / ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock for
* ss->ssl3.crSpec).
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, const char *label,
unsigned int labelLen, const unsigned char *val, unsigned int valLen,
unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
if (spec->master_secret && !spec->bypassCiphers) {
SECItem param = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL;
PK11Context *prf_context;
unsigned int retLen;
if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
mech = CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256;
}
prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN,
spec->master_secret, ¶m);
if (!prf_context)
return SECFailure;
rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context);
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (unsigned char *) label, labelLen);
rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, val, valLen);
rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, out, &retLen, outLen);
PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == outLen);
PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE);
} else {
/* bypass PKCS11 */
#ifdef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
PORT_Assert(spec->master_secret);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
#else
SECItem inData = { siBuffer, };
SECItem outData = { siBuffer, };
PRBool isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
inData.data = (unsigned char *) val;
inData.len = valLen;
outData.data = out;
outData.len = outLen;
if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
rv = TLS_P_hash(HASH_AlgSHA256, &spec->msItem, label, &inData,
&outData, isFIPS);
} else {
rv = TLS_PRF(&spec->msItem, label, &inData, &outData, isFIPS);
}
PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outData.len == outLen);
#endif
}
return rv;
}
/* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound
* ssl3_HandleFinished
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
int padding_len;
static const unsigned char padding[32] = {0};
if (ss->ssl3.nextProto.len == 0 ||
ss->ssl3.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) {
return SECSuccess;
}
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
padding_len = 32 - ((ss->ssl3.nextProto.len + 2) % 32);
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, next_proto, ss->ssl3.nextProto.len +
2 + padding_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshakeHeader */
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->ssl3.nextProto.data,
ss->ssl3.nextProto.len, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
}
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, padding, padding_len, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
}
return rv;
}
/* called from ssl3_SendFinished
*
* This function is simply a debugging aid and therefore does not return a
* SECStatus. */
static void
ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
SECItem *keyData;
char buf[14 /* "CLIENT_RANDOM " */ +
SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH*2 /* client_random */ +
1 /* " " */ +
48*2 /* master secret */ +
1 /* new line */];
unsigned int j;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
if (!ssl_keylog_iob)
return;
rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return;
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
/* keyData does not need to be freed. */
keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret);
if (!keyData || !keyData->data || keyData->len != 48) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
return;
}
/* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */
/* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the
* keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to
* fwrite. */
memcpy(buf, "CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14);
j = 14;
hexEncode(buf + j, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
j += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH*2;
buf[j++] = ' ';
hexEncode(buf + j, keyData->data, 48);
j += 48*2;
buf[j++] = '\n';
PORT_Assert(j == sizeof(buf));
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
if (fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob) != 1)
return;
fflush(ssl_keylog_iob);
return;
}
/* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound
* ssl3_HandleFinished
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss)
{
static const char CHANNEL_ID_MAGIC[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
static const char CHANNEL_ID_RESUMPTION_MAGIC[] = "Resumption";
/* This is the ASN.1 prefix for a P-256 public key. Specifically it's:
* SEQUENCE
* SEQUENCE
* OID id-ecPublicKey
* OID prime256v1
* BIT STRING, length 66, 0 trailing bits: 0x04
*
* The 0x04 in the BIT STRING is the prefix for an uncompressed, X9.62
* public key. Following that are the two field elements as 32-byte,
* big-endian numbers, as required by the Channel ID. */
static const unsigned char P256_SPKI_PREFIX[] = {
0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86,
0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a,
0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03,
0x42, 0x00, 0x04
};
/* ChannelIDs are always 128 bytes long: 64 bytes of P-256 public key and 64
* bytes of ECDSA signature. */
static const int CHANNEL_ID_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH = 64;
static const int CHANNEL_ID_LENGTH = 128;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
SECItem *spki = NULL;
SSL3Hashes hashes;
const unsigned char *pub_bytes;
unsigned char signed_data[sizeof(CHANNEL_ID_MAGIC) +
sizeof(CHANNEL_ID_RESUMPTION_MAGIC) +
sizeof(SSL3Hashes)*2];
size_t signed_data_len;
unsigned char digest[SHA256_LENGTH];
SECItem digest_item;
unsigned char signature[64];
SECItem signature_item;
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
if (ss->ssl3.channelID == NULL)
return SECSuccess;
PORT_Assert(ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_channel_id_xtn));
if (SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(ss->ssl3.channelID) != ecKey ||
PK11_SignatureLen(ss->ssl3.channelID) != sizeof(signature)) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INVALID_CHANNEL_ID_KEY);
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, &hashes, 0);
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, encrypted_extensions,
2 + 2 + CHANNEL_ID_LENGTH);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser; /* error code set by AppendHandshakeHeader */
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_channel_id_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, CHANNEL_ID_LENGTH, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
spki = SECKEY_EncodeDERSubjectPublicKeyInfo(ss->ssl3.channelIDPub);
if (spki->len != sizeof(P256_SPKI_PREFIX) + CHANNEL_ID_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH ||
memcmp(spki->data, P256_SPKI_PREFIX, sizeof(P256_SPKI_PREFIX)) != 0) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INVALID_CHANNEL_ID_KEY);
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
pub_bytes = spki->data + sizeof(P256_SPKI_PREFIX);
signed_data_len = 0;
memcpy(signed_data + signed_data_len, CHANNEL_ID_MAGIC,
sizeof(CHANNEL_ID_MAGIC));
signed_data_len += sizeof(CHANNEL_ID_MAGIC);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming) {
SECItem *originalHandshakeHash =
&ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.originalHandshakeHash;
PORT_Assert(originalHandshakeHash->len > 0);
memcpy(signed_data + signed_data_len, CHANNEL_ID_RESUMPTION_MAGIC,
sizeof(CHANNEL_ID_RESUMPTION_MAGIC));
signed_data_len += sizeof(CHANNEL_ID_RESUMPTION_MAGIC);
memcpy(signed_data + signed_data_len, originalHandshakeHash->data,
originalHandshakeHash->len);
signed_data_len += originalHandshakeHash->len;
}
memcpy(signed_data + signed_data_len, hashes.u.raw, hashes.len);
signed_data_len += hashes.len;
rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA256, digest, signed_data, signed_data_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
digest_item.data = digest;
digest_item.len = sizeof(digest);
signature_item.data = signature;
signature_item.len = sizeof(signature);
rv = PK11_Sign(ss->ssl3.channelID, &signature_item, &digest_item);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, pub_bytes, CHANNEL_ID_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, signature, sizeof(signature));
loser:
if (spki)
SECITEM_FreeItem(spki, PR_TRUE);
if (ss->ssl3.channelID) {
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.channelID);
ss->ssl3.channelID = NULL;
}
if (ss->ssl3.channelIDPub) {
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->ssl3.channelIDPub);
ss->ssl3.channelIDPub = NULL;
}
return rv;
}
/* ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterChannelIDReq is called to restart a handshake
* after a ChannelID callback returned SECWouldBlock. At this point we have
* processed the server's ServerHello but not yet any further messages. We will
* always get a message from the server after a ServerHello so either they are
* waiting in the buffer or we'll get network I/O. */
SECStatus
ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterChannelIDReq(sslSocket *ss,
SECKEYPublicKey *channelIDPub,
SECKEYPrivateKey *channelID)
{
if (ss->handshake == 0) {
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(channelIDPub);
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(channelID);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (channelIDPub == NULL ||
channelID == NULL) {
if (channelIDPub)
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(channelIDPub);
if (channelID)
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(channelID);
PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->ssl3.channelID)
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.channelID);
if (ss->ssl3.channelIDPub)
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->ssl3.channelIDPub);
ss->handshake = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
ss->ssl3.channelID = channelID;
ss->ssl3.channelIDPub = channelIDPub;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound
* ssl3_HandleClientHello
* ssl3_HandleFinished
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
{
ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec;
PRBool isTLS;
PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
SECStatus rv;
SSL3Sender sender = isServer ? sender_server : sender_client;
SSL3Hashes hashes;
TLSFinished tlsFinished;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
isTLS = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, cwSpec, &hashes, sender);
if (isTLS && rv == SECSuccess) {
rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished);
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto fail; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */
}
if (isTLS) {
if (isServer)
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished;
else
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished;
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof tlsFinished);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
} else {
if (isServer)
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s;
else
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s;
PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s);
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s;
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof hashes.u.s);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes.u.s, sizeof hashes.u.s);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
}
rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto fail; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
}
ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss);
return SECSuccess;
fail:
return rv;
}
/* wrap the master secret, and put it into the SID.
* Caller holds the Spec read lock.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid,
ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSL3KEAType effectiveExchKeyType)
{
PK11SymKey * wrappingKey = NULL;
PK11SlotInfo * symKeySlot;
void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(spec->master_secret);
if (!isServer) {
int wrapKeyIndex;
int incarnation;
/* these next few functions are mere accessors and don't fail. */
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = wrapKeyIndex =
PK11_GetCurrentWrapIndex(symKeySlot);
PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex == 0); /* array has only one entry! */
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = incarnation =
PK11_GetSlotSeries(symKeySlot);
sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(symKeySlot);
sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(symKeySlot);
sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE;
/* Get the default wrapping key, for wrapping the master secret before
* placing it in the SID cache entry. */
wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex,
CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation,
pwArg);
if (wrappingKey) {
mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */
} else {
int keyLength;
/* if the wrappingKey doesn't exist, attempt to create it.
* Note: we intentionally ignore errors here. If we cannot
* generate a wrapping key, it is not fatal to this SSL connection,
* but we will not be able to restart this session.
*/
mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot);
keyLength = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(symKeySlot, mechanism);
/* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error.
* It's ambiguous.
*/
wrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(symKeySlot, mechanism, NULL,
keyLength, pwArg);
if (wrappingKey) {
PK11_SetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, wrappingKey);
}
}
} else {
/* server socket using session cache. */
mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot);
if (mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
wrappingKey =
getWrappingKey(ss, symKeySlot, effectiveExchKeyType,
mechanism, pwArg);
if (wrappingKey) {
mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */
}
}
}
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = mechanism;
PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot);
if (wrappingKey) {
SECItem wmsItem;
wmsItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
wmsItem.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey,
spec->master_secret, &wmsItem);
/* rv is examined below. */
sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = wmsItem.len;
PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey);
}
return rv;
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
* ssl3 Finished message from the peer.
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
const SSL3Hashes *hashes)
{
sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
PRBool isTLS;
SSL3KEAType effectiveExchKeyType;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle finished handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_finished) {
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED);
return SECFailure;
}
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
if (isTLS) {
TLSFinished tlsFinished;
if (length != sizeof tlsFinished) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer,
hashes, &tlsFinished);
if (!isServer)
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished;
else
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished;
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished;
if (rv != SECSuccess ||
0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&tlsFinished, b, length)) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decrypt_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
return SECFailure;
}
} else {
if (length != sizeof(SSL3Finished)) {
(void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!isServer)
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes->u.s;
else
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes->u.s;
PORT_Assert(hashes->len == sizeof hashes->u.s);
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes->u.s;
if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&hashes->u.s, b, length)) {
(void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
return SECFailure;
}
}
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/
if ((isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming) ||
(!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming)) {
PRInt32 flags = 0;
/* Send a NewSessionTicket message if the client sent us
* either an empty session ticket, or one that did not verify.
* (Note that if either of these conditions was met, then the
* server has sent a SessionTicket extension in the
* ServerHello message.)
*/
if (isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn)) {
/* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "In the case of a full handshake, the
* server MUST verify the client's Finished message before sending
* the ticket." Presumably, this also means that the client's
* certificate, if any, must be verified beforehand too.
*/
rv = ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto xmit_loser;
}
}
rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */
}
/* If this thread is in SSL_SecureSend (trying to write some data)
** then set the ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER flag, so that the
** last two handshake messages (change cipher spec and finished)
** will be sent in the same send/write call as the application data.
*/
if (ss->writerThread == PR_GetCurrentThread()) {
flags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER;
}
if (!isServer) {
if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto xmit_loser; /* err code was set. */
}
}
rv = ssl3_SendEncryptedExtensions(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto xmit_loser; /* err code was set. */
}
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT;
}
rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, flags);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */
}
}
xmit_loser:
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) {
effectiveExchKeyType = kt_rsa;
} else {
effectiveExchKeyType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
}
if (sid->cached == never_cached && !ss->opt.noCache && ss->sec.cache) {
/* fill in the sid */
sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite;
sid->u.ssl3.compression = ss->ssl3.hs.compression;
sid->u.ssl3.policy = ss->ssl3.policy;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
sid->u.ssl3.negotiatedECCurves = ss->ssl3.hs.negotiatedECCurves;
#endif
sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType = effectiveExchKeyType;
sid->version = ss->version;
sid->authAlgorithm = ss->sec.authAlgorithm;
sid->authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
sid->keaType = ss->sec.keaType;
sid->keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits;
sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time();
sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + ssl3_sid_timeout;
sid->localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert);
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/
/* Copy the master secret (wrapped or unwrapped) into the sid */
if (ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data) {
sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len =
ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len;
memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data, ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len);
sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE;
sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_FALSE;
rv = SECSuccess;
} else {
rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid,
ss->ssl3.crSpec,
effectiveExchKeyType);
sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_TRUE;
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/
/* If the wrap failed, we don't cache the sid.
* The connection continues normally however.
*/
ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = rv == SECSuccess;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_HandleFinished: unexpected restartTarget");
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_FinishHandshake;
return SECWouldBlock;
}
rv = ssl3_FinishHandshake(ss);
return rv;
}
/* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs
* to have type sslRestartTarget.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket * ss)
{
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL );
/* The first handshake is now completed. */
ss->handshake = NULL;
/* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid
* until it has verified the server's Finished message." When the server
* sends a NewSessionTicket in a resumption handshake, we must wait until
* the handshake is finished (we have verified the server's Finished
* AND the server's certificate) before we update the ticket in the sid.
*
* This must be done before we call (*ss->sec.cache)(ss->sec.ci.sid)
* because CacheSID requires the session ticket to already be set, and also
* because of the lazy lock creation scheme used by CacheSID and
* ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket.
*/
if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket) {
PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket);
/* The sid took over the ticket data */
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data);
ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID && ss->sec.isServer) {
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == never_cached);
(*ss->sec.cache)(ss->sec.ci.sid);
ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = PR_FALSE;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; /* False Start phase is complete */
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = idle_handshake;
ssl_FinishHandshake(ss);
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshake() when it has gathered a complete ssl3
* hanshake message.
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
SSL3HandshakeType type = ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type;
SSL3Hashes hashes; /* computed hashes are put here. */
PRUint8 hdr[4];
PRUint8 dtlsData[8];
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
/*
* We have to compute the hashes before we update them with the
* current message.
*/
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
if((type == finished) || (type == certificate_verify)) {
SSL3Sender sender = (SSL3Sender)0;
ssl3CipherSpec *rSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec;
if (type == finished) {
sender = ss->sec.isServer ? sender_client : sender_server;
rSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
}
rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, rSpec, &hashes, sender);
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* error code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes*/
}
SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(),
ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type)));
hdr[0] = (PRUint8)ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type;
hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16);
hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8);
hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length );
/* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == client_hello) {
rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
}
/* We should not include hello_request and hello_verify_request messages
* in the handshake hashes */
if ((ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_request) &&
(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_verify_request)) {
rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char*) hdr, 4);
if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* err code already set. */
/* Extra data to simulate a complete DTLS handshake fragment */
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
/* Sequence number */
dtlsData[0] = MSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq);
dtlsData[1] = LSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq);
/* Fragment offset */
dtlsData[2] = 0;
dtlsData[3] = 0;
dtlsData[4] = 0;
/* Fragment length */
dtlsData[5] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16);
dtlsData[6] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8);
dtlsData[7] = (PRUint8)(length );
rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char*) dtlsData,
sizeof(dtlsData));
if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* err code already set. */
}
/* The message body */
rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, b, length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* err code already set. */
}
PORT_SetError(0); /* each message starts with no error. */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_certificate_status &&
ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != certificate_status) {
/* If we negotiated the certificate_status extension then we deferred
* certificate validation until we get the CertificateStatus messsage.
* But the CertificateStatus message is optional. If the server did
* not send it then we need to validate the certificate now. If the
* server does send the CertificateStatus message then we will
* authenticate the certificate in ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus.
*/
rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */
PORT_Assert(rv != SECWouldBlock);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
}
switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) {
case hello_request:
if (length != 0) {
(void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss);
break;
case client_hello:
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length);
break;
case server_hello:
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_HandleServerHello(ss, b, length);
break;
case hello_verify_request:
if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(ss, b, length);
break;
case certificate:
rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length);
break;
case certificate_status:
rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length);
break;
case server_key_exchange:
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
break;
case certificate_request:
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length);
break;
case server_hello_done:
if (length != 0) {
(void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss);
break;
case certificate_verify:
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, &hashes);
break;
case client_key_exchange:
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
break;
case new_session_ticket:
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length);
break;
case finished:
rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length, &hashes);
break;
default:
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE);
rv = SECFailure;
}
if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (rv != SECFailure)) {
/* Increment the expected sequence number */
ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq++;
}
return rv;
}
/* Called only from ssl3_HandleRecord, for each (deciphered) ssl3 record.
* origBuf is the decrypted ssl record content.
* Caller must hold the handshake and RecvBuf locks.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf)
{
/*
* There may be a partial handshake message already in the handshake
* state. The incoming buffer may contain another portion, or a
* complete message or several messages followed by another portion.
*
* Each message is made contiguous before being passed to the actual
* message parser.
*/
sslBuffer *buf = &ss->ssl3.hs.msgState; /* do not lose the original buffer pointer */
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
if (buf->buf == NULL) {
*buf = *origBuf;
}
while (buf->len > 0) {
if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) {
PRUint8 t;
t = *(buf->buf++);
buf->len--;
if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes++ == 0)
ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSL3HandshakeType)t;
else
ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len << 8) + t;
if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4)
continue;
#define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) {
(void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
return SECFailure;
}
#undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN
/* If msg_len is zero, be sure we fall through,
** even if buf->len is zero.
*/
if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > 0)
continue;
}
/*
* Header has been gathered and there is at least one byte of new
* data available for this message. If it can be done right out
* of the original buffer, then use it from there.
*/
if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == 0 && buf->len >= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) {
/* handle it from input buffer */
rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf->buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
if (rv == SECFailure) {
/* This test wants to fall through on either
* SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock.
* ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set the error code.
*/
return rv;
}
buf->buf += ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len;
buf->len -= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len;
ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0;
ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0;
if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */
return rv;
}
} else {
/* must be copied to msg_body and dealt with from there */
unsigned int bytes;
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len < ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
bytes = PR_MIN(buf->len, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len);
/* Grow the buffer if needed */
rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len,
buf->buf, bytes);
ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len += bytes;
buf->buf += bytes;
buf->len -= bytes;
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len <= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
/* if we have a whole message, do it */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) {
rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(
ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
if (rv == SECFailure) {
/* This test wants to fall through on either
* SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock.
* ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set error code.
*/
return rv;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len = 0;
ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0;
ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0;
if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */
return rv;
}
} else {
PORT_Assert(buf->len == 0);
break;
}
}
} /* end loop */
origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */
buf->buf = NULL; /* not a leak. */
return SECSuccess;
}
/* These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
* bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
* However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
* them with something else for odd compilers. */
#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
/* SECStatusToMask returns, in constant time, a mask value of all ones if
* rv == SECSuccess. Otherwise it returns zero. */
static unsigned int
SECStatusToMask(SECStatus rv)
{
unsigned int good;
/* rv ^ SECSuccess is zero iff rv == SECSuccess. Subtracting one results
* in the MSB being set to one iff it was zero before. */
good = rv ^ SECSuccess;
good--;
return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
}
/* ssl_ConstantTimeGE returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
static unsigned char
ssl_ConstantTimeGE(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
a -= b;
return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
}
/* ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
static unsigned char
ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
{
unsigned int c = a ^ b;
c--;
return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
}
static SECStatus
ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext,
unsigned int blockSize,
unsigned int macSize)
{
unsigned int paddingLength, good, t;
const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
* time. */
if (overhead > plaintext->len) {
return SECFailure;
}
paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1];
/* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */
t = plaintext->len;
t -= paddingLength+overhead;
/* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
/* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
t = blockSize - (paddingLength+1);
good &= DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength+1);
return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure);
}
static SECStatus
ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize)
{
unsigned int paddingLength, good, t, toCheck, i;
const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
* time. */
if (overhead > plaintext->len) {
return SECFailure;
}
paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1];
t = plaintext->len;
t -= paddingLength+overhead;
/* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
/* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and then
* that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length byte.
* Thus, with the length byte included, there are paddingLength+1 bytes of
* padding.
*
* We can't check just |paddingLength+1| bytes because that leaks
* decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
* amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
* public information so we can use it.) */
toCheck = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
if (toCheck > plaintext->len-1) {
toCheck = plaintext->len-1;
}
for (i = 0; i < toCheck; i++) {
unsigned int t = paddingLength - i;
/* If i <= paddingLength then the MSB of t is zero and mask is
* 0xff. Otherwise, mask is 0. */
unsigned char mask = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
unsigned char b = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1-i];
/* The final |paddingLength+1| bytes should all have the value
* |paddingLength|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
good &= ~(mask&(paddingLength ^ b));
}
/* If any of the final |paddingLength+1| bytes had the wrong value,
* one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
* AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
* bits. */
good &= good >> 4;
good &= good >> 2;
good &= good >> 1;
good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength+1);
return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure);
}
/* On entry:
* originalLength >= macSize
* macSize <= MAX_MAC_LENGTH
* plaintext->len >= macSize
*/
static void
ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext,
unsigned int originalLength,
SSL3Opaque* out,
unsigned int macSize)
{
unsigned char rotatedMac[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
/* macEnd is the index of |plaintext->buf| just after the end of the
* MAC. */
unsigned macEnd = plaintext->len;
unsigned macStart = macEnd - macSize;
/* scanStart contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
* the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
unsigned scanStart = 0;
unsigned i, j, divSpoiler;
unsigned char rotateOffset;
if (originalLength > macSize + 255 + 1)
scanStart = originalLength - (macSize + 255 + 1);
/* divSpoiler contains a multiple of macSize that is used to cause the
* modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
* based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
*
* The aim of right-shifting macSize is so that the compiler doesn't
* figure out that it can remove divSpoiler as that would require it
* to prove that macSize is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */
divSpoiler = macSize >> 1;
divSpoiler <<= (sizeof(divSpoiler)-1)*8;
rotateOffset = (divSpoiler + macStart - scanStart) % macSize;
memset(rotatedMac, 0, macSize);
for (i = scanStart; i < originalLength;) {
for (j = 0; j < macSize && i < originalLength; i++, j++) {
unsigned char macStarted = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macStart);
unsigned char macEnded = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macEnd);
unsigned char b = 0;
b = plaintext->buf[i];
rotatedMac[j] |= b & macStarted & ~macEnded;
}
}
/* Now rotate the MAC. If we knew that the MAC fit into a CPU cache line
* we could line-align |rotatedMac| and rotate in place. */
memset(out, 0, macSize);
for (i = 0; i < macSize; i++) {
unsigned char offset =
(divSpoiler + macSize - rotateOffset + i) % macSize;
for (j = 0; j < macSize; j++) {
out[j] |= rotatedMac[i] & ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(j, offset);
}
}
}
/* if cText is non-null, then decipher, check MAC, and decompress the
* SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf)
* into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf
* is lost. Then handle databuf according to its SSL record type,
* unless it's an application record.
*
* If cText is NULL, then the ciphertext has previously been deciphered and
* checked, and is already sitting in databuf. It is processed as an SSL
* Handshake message.
*
* DOES NOT process the decrypted/decompressed application data.
* On return, databuf contains the decrypted/decompressed record.
*
* Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake
* ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq
*
* Caller must hold the RecvBufLock.
*
* This function aquires and releases the SSL3Handshake Lock, holding the
* lock around any calls to functions that handle records other than
* Application Data records.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
{
const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def;
ssl3CipherSpec * crSpec;
SECStatus rv;
unsigned int hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1;
PRBool isTLS;
SSL3ContentType rType;
SSL3Opaque hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
SSL3Opaque givenHashBuf[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
SSL3Opaque *givenHash;
sslBuffer *plaintext;
sslBuffer temp_buf;
PRUint64 dtls_seq_num;
unsigned int ivLen = 0;
unsigned int originalLen = 0;
unsigned int good;
unsigned int minLength;
unsigned char header[13];
unsigned int headerLen;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
if (!ss->ssl3.initialized) {
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
}
}
/* check for Token Presence */
if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
return SECFailure;
}
/* cText is NULL when we're called from ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterXXX().
* This implies that databuf holds a previously deciphered SSL Handshake
* message.
*/
if (cText == NULL) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, resuming handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
rType = content_handshake;
goto process_it;
}
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/
crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
cipher_def = crSpec->cipher_def;
/*
* DTLS relevance checks:
* Note that this code currently ignores all out-of-epoch packets,
* which means we lose some in the case of rehandshake +
* loss/reordering. Since DTLS is explicitly unreliable, this
* seems like a good tradeoff for implementation effort and is
* consistent with the guidance of RFC 6347 Sections 4.1 and 4.2.4.1
*/
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
DTLSEpoch epoch = (cText->seq_num.high >> 16) & 0xffff;
if (crSpec->epoch != epoch) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, received packet "
"from irrelevant epoch %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, epoch));
/* Silently drop the packet */
databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */
return SECSuccess;
}
dtls_seq_num = (((PRUint64)(cText->seq_num.high & 0xffff)) << 32) |
((PRUint64)cText->seq_num.low);
if (dtls_RecordGetRecvd(&crSpec->recvdRecords, dtls_seq_num) != 0) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, rejecting "
"potentially replayed packet", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* Silently drop the packet */
databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */
return SECSuccess;
}
}
good = ~0U;
minLength = crSpec->mac_size;
if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
/* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */
minLength++;
if (crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
/* With >= TLS 1.1, CBC records have an explicit IV. */
minLength += cipher_def->iv_size;
}
} else if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
minLength = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size + cipher_def->tag_size;
}
/* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total
* length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */
if (cText->buf->len < minLength) {
goto decrypt_loser;
}
if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
/* Consume the per-record explicit IV. RFC 4346 Section 6.2.3.2 states
* "The receiver decrypts the entire GenericBlockCipher structure and
* then discards the first cipher block corresponding to the IV
* component." Instead, we decrypt the first cipher block and then
* discard it before decrypting the rest.
*/
SSL3Opaque iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH];
int decoded;
ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size;
if (ivLen < 8 || ivLen > sizeof(iv)) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "IV (ciphertext):", cText->buf->buf, ivLen));
/* The decryption result is garbage, but since we just throw away
* the block it doesn't matter. The decryption of the next block
* depends only on the ciphertext of the IV block.
*/
rv = crSpec->decode(crSpec->decodeContext, iv, &decoded,
sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen);
good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
}
/* If we will be decompressing the buffer we need to decrypt somewhere
* other than into databuf */
if (crSpec->decompressor) {
temp_buf.buf = NULL;
temp_buf.space = 0;
plaintext = &temp_buf;
} else {
plaintext = databuf;
}
plaintext->len = 0; /* filled in by decode call below. */
if (plaintext->space < MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) {
rv = sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048));
/* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
/* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */
return SECFailure;
}
}
PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf + ivLen,
cText->buf->len - ivLen));
isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
if (isTLS && cText->buf->len - ivLen > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)) {
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
return SECFailure;
}
rType = cText->type;
if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
/* XXX For many AEAD ciphers, the plaintext is shorter than the
* ciphertext by a fixed byte count, but it is not true in general.
* Each AEAD cipher should provide a function that returns the
* plaintext length for a given ciphertext. */
unsigned int decryptedLen =
cText->buf->len - cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size -
cipher_def->tag_size;
headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num,
rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen);
PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header));
rv = crSpec->aead(
ss->sec.isServer ? &crSpec->client : &crSpec->server,
PR_TRUE, /* do decrypt */
plaintext->buf, /* out */
(int*) &plaintext->len, /* outlen */
plaintext->space, /* maxout */
cText->buf->buf, /* in */
cText->buf->len, /* inlen */
header, headerLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
good = 0;
}
} else {
if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) {
goto decrypt_loser;
}
/* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */
rv = crSpec->decode(
crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len,
plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto decrypt_loser;
}
PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len));
originalLen = plaintext->len;
/* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */
if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size;
const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size;
if (!isTLS) {
good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(
plaintext, blockSize, macSize));
} else {
good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(
plaintext, macSize));
}
}
/* compute the MAC */
headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num,
rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss),
plaintext->len - crSpec->mac_size);
PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header));
if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen,
plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, originalLen,
hash, &hashBytes);
ssl_CBCExtractMAC(plaintext, originalLen, givenHashBuf,
crSpec->mac_size);
givenHash = givenHashBuf;
/* plaintext->len will always have enough space to remove the MAC
* because in ssl_Remove{SSLv3|TLS}CBCPadding we only adjust
* plaintext->len if the result has enough space for the MAC and we
* tested the unadjusted size against minLength, above. */
plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size;
} else {
/* This is safe because we checked the minLength above. */
plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size;
rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen,
plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes);
/* We can read the MAC directly from the record because its location
* is public when a stream cipher is used. */
givenHash = plaintext->buf + plaintext->len;
}
good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
if (hashBytes != (unsigned)crSpec->mac_size ||
NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, crSpec->mac_size) != 0) {
/* We're allowed to leak whether or not the MAC check was correct */
good = 0;
}
}
if (good == 0) {
decrypt_loser:
/* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);
/* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
return SECFailure;
} else {
/* Silently drop the packet */
databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */
return SECSuccess;
}
}
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(&crSpec->read_seq_num);
} else {
dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&crSpec->recvdRecords, dtls_seq_num);
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************************/
/*
* The decrypted data is now in plaintext.
*/
/* possibly decompress the record. If we aren't using compression then
* plaintext == databuf and so the uncompressed data is already in
* databuf. */
if (crSpec->decompressor) {
if (databuf->space < plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION) {
rv = sslBuffer_Grow(
databuf, plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION));
/* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
/* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */
PORT_Free(plaintext->buf);
return SECFailure;
}
}
rv = crSpec->decompressor(crSpec->decompressContext,
databuf->buf,
(int*) &databuf->len,
databuf->space,
plaintext->buf,
plaintext->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
int err = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal,
isTLS ? decompression_failure : bad_record_mac);
/* There appears to be a bug with (at least) Apache + OpenSSL where
* resumed SSLv3 connections don't actually use compression. See
* comments 93-95 of
* https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=275744
*
* So, if we get a decompression error, and the record appears to
* be already uncompressed, then we return a more specific error
* code to hopefully save somebody some debugging time in the
* future.
*/
if (plaintext->len >= 4) {
unsigned int len = ((unsigned int) plaintext->buf[1] << 16) |
((unsigned int) plaintext->buf[2] << 8) |
(unsigned int) plaintext->buf[3];
if (len == plaintext->len - 4) {
/* This appears to be uncompressed already */
err = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_UNCOMPRESSED_RECORD;
}
}
PORT_Free(plaintext->buf);
PORT_SetError(err);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Free(plaintext->buf);
}
/*
** Having completed the decompression, check the length again.
*/
if (isTLS && databuf->len > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024)) {
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Application data records are processed by the caller of this
** function, not by this function.
*/
if (rType == content_application_data) {
if (ss->firstHsDone)
return SECSuccess;
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA);
return SECFailure;
}
/* It's a record that must be handled by ssl itself, not the application.
*/
process_it:
/* XXX Get the xmit lock here. Odds are very high that we'll be xmiting
* data ang getting the xmit lock here prevents deadlocks.
*/
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
/* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if
** they return SECFailure or SECWouldBlock.
*/
switch (rType) {
case content_change_cipher_spec:
rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf);
break;
case content_alert:
rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf);
break;
case content_handshake:
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf);
} else {
rv = dtls_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf);
}
break;
/*
case content_application_data is handled before this switch
*/
default:
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type));
/* XXX Send an alert ??? */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE);
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
return rv;
}
/*
* Initialization functions
*/
/* Called from ssl3_InitState, immediately below. */
/* Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock. */
static void
ssl3_InitCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
{
spec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_null];
PORT_Assert(spec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher_null);
spec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac_null];
PORT_Assert(spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null);
spec->encode = Null_Cipher;
spec->decode = Null_Cipher;
spec->destroy = NULL;
spec->compressor = NULL;
spec->decompressor = NULL;
spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL;
spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL;
spec->mac_size = 0;
spec->master_secret = NULL;
spec->bypassCiphers = PR_FALSE;
spec->msItem.data = NULL;
spec->msItem.len = 0;
spec->client.write_key = NULL;
spec->client.write_mac_key = NULL;
spec->client.write_mac_context = NULL;
spec->server.write_key = NULL;
spec->server.write_mac_key = NULL;
spec->server.write_mac_context = NULL;
spec->write_seq_num.high = 0;
spec->write_seq_num.low = 0;
spec->read_seq_num.high = 0;
spec->read_seq_num.low = 0;
spec->epoch = 0;
dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords);
spec->version = ss->vrange.max;
}
/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord
** ssl3_StartHandshakeHash() <- ssl2_BeginClientHandshake()
** ssl3_SendClientHello()
** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello()
** ssl3_HandleRecord()
**
** This function should perhaps acquire and release the SpecWriteLock.
**
**
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss)
{
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
if (ss->ssl3.initialized)
return SECSuccess; /* Function should be idempotent */
ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED;
ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
ss->ssl3.crSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[0];
ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[1];
ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE;
ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec);
ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec);
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : wait_server_hello;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
ss->ssl3.hs.negotiatedECCurves = ssl3_GetSupportedECCurveMask(ss);
#endif
ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData));
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0;
ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0;
ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = INITIAL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_MS;
ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0;
ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1;
PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
dtls_SetMTU(ss, 0); /* Set the MTU to the highest plateau */
}
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf && !ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space);
ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL;
ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0;
ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket, 0,
sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket));
ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Returns a reference counted object that contains a key pair.
* Or NULL on failure. Initial ref count is 1.
* Uses the keys in the pair as input.
*/
ssl3KeyPair *
ssl3_NewKeyPair( SECKEYPrivateKey * privKey, SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey)
{
ssl3KeyPair * pair;
if (!privKey || !pubKey) {
PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
pair = PORT_ZNew(ssl3KeyPair);
if (!pair)
return NULL; /* error code is set. */
pair->refCount = 1;
pair->privKey = privKey;
pair->pubKey = pubKey;
return pair; /* success */
}
ssl3KeyPair *
ssl3_GetKeyPairRef(ssl3KeyPair * keyPair)
{
PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&keyPair->refCount);
return keyPair;
}
void
ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ssl3KeyPair * keyPair)
{
PRInt32 newCount = PR_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(&keyPair->refCount);
if (!newCount) {
if (keyPair->privKey)
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(keyPair->privKey);
if (keyPair->pubKey)
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey( keyPair->pubKey);
PORT_Free(keyPair);
}
}
/*
* Creates the public and private RSA keys for SSL Step down.
* Called from SSL_ConfigSecureServer in sslsecur.c
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_CreateRSAStepDownKeys(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
SECKEYPrivateKey * privKey; /* RSA step down key */
SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey; /* RSA step down key */
if (ss->stepDownKeyPair)
ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ss->stepDownKeyPair);
ss->stepDownKeyPair = NULL;
#ifndef HACKED_EXPORT_SERVER
/* Sigh, should have a get key strength call for private keys */
if (PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY) >
EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH) {
/* need to ask for the key size in bits */
privKey = SECKEY_CreateRSAPrivateKey(EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH * BPB,
&pubKey, NULL);
if (!privKey || !pubKey ||
!(ss->stepDownKeyPair = ssl3_NewKeyPair(privKey, pubKey))) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
rv = SECFailure;
}
}
#endif
return rv;
}
/* record the export policy for this cipher suite */
SECStatus
ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, int policy)
{
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
if (suite == NULL) {
return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
}
suite->policy = policy;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_GetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 *oPolicy)
{
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
PRInt32 policy;
SECStatus rv;
suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
if (suite) {
policy = suite->policy;
rv = SECSuccess;
} else {
policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */
}
*oPolicy = policy;
return rv;
}
/* record the user preference for this suite */
SECStatus
ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled)
{
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
if (suite == NULL) {
return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
}
suite->enabled = enabled;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* return the user preference for this suite */
SECStatus
ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled)
{
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
PRBool pref;
SECStatus rv;
suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
if (suite) {
pref = suite->enabled;
rv = SECSuccess;
} else {
pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */
}
*enabled = pref;
return rv;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled)
{
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites);
if (suite == NULL) {
return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
}
suite->enabled = enabled;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_CipherPrefGet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled)
{
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
PRBool pref;
SECStatus rv;
suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites);
if (suite) {
pref = suite->enabled;
rv = SECSuccess;
} else {
pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */
}
*enabled = pref;
return rv;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_CipherOrderSet(sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSuite *ciphers, unsigned int len)
{
/* |i| iterates over |ciphers| while |done| and |j| iterate over
* |ss->cipherSuites|. */
unsigned int i, done;
for (i = done = 0; i < len; i++) {
PRUint16 id = ciphers[i];
unsigned int existingIndex, j;
PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
for (j = done; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) {
if (ss->cipherSuites[j].cipher_suite == id) {
existingIndex = j;
found = PR_TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
continue;
}
if (existingIndex != done) {
const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg temp = ss->cipherSuites[done];
ss->cipherSuites[done] = ss->cipherSuites[existingIndex];
ss->cipherSuites[existingIndex] = temp;
}
done++;
}
/* Disable all cipher suites that weren't included. */
for (; done < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; done++) {
ss->cipherSuites[done].enabled = 0;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* copy global default policy into socket. */
void
ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss)
{
PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, cipherSuites, sizeof cipherSuites);
}
SECStatus
ssl3_GetTLSUniqueChannelBinding(sslSocket *ss,
unsigned char *out,
unsigned int *outLen,
unsigned int outLenMax) {
PRBool isTLS;
int index = 0;
unsigned int len;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
*outLen = 0;
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
/* The tls-unique channel binding is the first Finished structure in the
* handshake. In the case of a resumption, that's the server's Finished.
* Otherwise, it's the client's Finished. */
len = ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes;
/* Sending or receiving a Finished message will set finishedBytes to a
* non-zero value. */
if (len == 0) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED);
goto loser;
}
/* If we are in the middle of a renegotiation then the channel binding
* value is poorly defined and depends on the direction that it will be
* used on. Therefore we simply return an error in this case. */
if (ss->firstHsDone && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED);
goto loser;
}
/* If resuming, then we want the second Finished value in the array, which
* is the server's */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming)
index = 1;
*outLen = len;
if (outLenMax < len) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
goto loser;
}
if (isTLS) {
memcpy(out, &ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[index], len);
} else {
memcpy(out, &ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[index], len);
}
rv = SECSuccess;
loser:
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
return rv;
}
/* ssl3_config_match_init must have already been called by
* the caller of this function.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *cs, int *size)
{
int i, count = 0;
PORT_Assert(ss != 0);
if (!ss) {
PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
return SECFailure;
}
if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
*size = 0;
return SECSuccess;
}
if (cs == NULL) {
*size = count_cipher_suites(ss, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE);
return SECSuccess;
}
/* ssl3_config_match_init was called by the caller of this function. */
for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
if (config_match(suite, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, &ss->vrange)) {
if (cs != NULL) {
*cs++ = 0x00;
*cs++ = (suite->cipher_suite >> 8) & 0xFF;
*cs++ = suite->cipher_suite & 0xFF;
}
count++;
}
}
*size = count;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
** If ssl3 socket has completed the first handshake, and is in idle state,
** then start a new handshake.
** If flushCache is true, the SID cache will be flushed first, forcing a
** "Full" handshake (not a session restart handshake), to be done.
**
** called from SSL_RedoHandshake(), which already holds the handshake locks.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache)
{
sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
if (!ss->firstHsDone ||
((ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) &&
ss->ssl3.initialized &&
(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake))) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED);
return SECFailure;
}
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
}
if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED);
return SECFailure;
}
if (sid && flushCache) {
if (ss->sec.uncache)
ss->sec.uncache(sid); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */
ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* dec ref count and free if zero. */
ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
}
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/
/* start off a new handshake. */
rv = (ss->sec.isServer) ? ssl3_SendHelloRequest(ss)
: ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, PR_FALSE);
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/
return rv;
}
/* Called from ssl_DestroySocketContents() in sslsock.c */
void
ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss)
{
if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL)
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL)
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
#ifdef NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH
if (ss->ssl3.platformClientKey)
ssl_FreePlatformKey(ss->ssl3.platformClientKey);
#endif /* NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH */
if (ss->ssl3.channelID)
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.channelID);
if (ss->ssl3.channelIDPub)
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->ssl3.channelIDPub);
if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena != NULL)
ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) {
CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain);
ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL;
}
/* clean up handshake */
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_combo) {
SHA1_DestroyContext((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, PR_FALSE);
MD5_DestroyContext((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx, PR_FALSE);
} else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->destroy(ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, PR_FALSE);
}
}
#endif
if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) {
PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5,PR_TRUE);
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) {
PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha,PR_TRUE);
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash) {
PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash);
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf) {
PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf);
ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL;
ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0;
ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0;
}
/* free the SSL3Buffer (msg_body) */
PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf);
SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE);
/* free up the CipherSpecs */
ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[0], PR_TRUE/*freeSrvName*/);
ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[1], PR_TRUE/*freeSrvName*/);
/* Destroy the DTLS data */
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf) {
PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf);
}
}
ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_FALSE;
SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE);
}
/* End of ssl3con.c */