/* $NetBSD: oakley.c,v 1.22 2011/03/17 14:42:58 vanhu Exp $ */
/* Id: oakley.c,v 1.32 2006/05/26 12:19:46 manubsd Exp */
/*
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "config.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h> /* XXX for subjectaltname */
#include <netinet/in.h> /* XXX for subjectaltname */
#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
# include <sys/time.h>
# include <time.h>
#else
# if HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
# else
# include <time.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
#include <resolv.h>
#endif
#include "var.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "vmbuf.h"
#include "str2val.h"
#include "plog.h"
#include "debug.h"
#include "isakmp_var.h"
#include "isakmp.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
#include "isakmp_xauth.h"
#include "isakmp_cfg.h"
#endif
#include "oakley.h"
#include "admin.h"
#include "privsep.h"
#include "localconf.h"
#include "remoteconf.h"
#include "policy.h"
#include "handler.h"
#include "ipsec_doi.h"
#include "algorithm.h"
#include "dhgroup.h"
#include "sainfo.h"
#include "proposal.h"
#include "crypto_openssl.h"
#include "dnssec.h"
#include "sockmisc.h"
#include "strnames.h"
#include "gcmalloc.h"
#include "rsalist.h"
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI
#include "gssapi.h"
#endif
#define OUTBOUND_SA 0
#define INBOUND_SA 1
#define INITDHVAL(a, s, d, t) \
do { \
vchar_t buf; \
buf.v = str2val((s), 16, &buf.l); \
memset(&a, 0, sizeof(struct dhgroup)); \
a.type = (t); \
a.prime = vdup(&buf); \
a.gen1 = 2; \
a.gen2 = 0; \
racoon_free(buf.v); \
} while(0);
struct dhgroup dh_modp768;
struct dhgroup dh_modp1024;
struct dhgroup dh_modp1536;
struct dhgroup dh_modp2048;
struct dhgroup dh_modp3072;
struct dhgroup dh_modp4096;
struct dhgroup dh_modp6144;
struct dhgroup dh_modp8192;
static int oakley_check_dh_pub __P((vchar_t *, vchar_t **));
static int oakley_compute_keymat_x __P((struct ph2handle *, int, int));
static int oakley_check_certid __P((struct ph1handle *iph1));
static int check_typeofcertname __P((int, int));
static int oakley_padlen __P((int, int));
static int get_plainrsa_fromlocal __P((struct ph1handle *, int));
int oakley_get_certtype(cert)
vchar_t *cert;
{
if (cert == NULL)
return ISAKMP_CERT_NONE;
return cert->v[0];
}
static vchar_t *
dump_isakmp_payload(gen)
struct isakmp_gen *gen;
{
vchar_t p;
if (ntohs(gen->len) <= sizeof(*gen)) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Len is too small !!.\n");
return NULL;
}
p.v = (caddr_t) (gen + 1);
p.l = ntohs(gen->len) - sizeof(*gen);
return vdup(&p);
}
static vchar_t *
dump_x509(cert)
X509 *cert;
{
vchar_t *pl;
u_char *bp;
int len;
len = i2d_X509(cert, NULL);
pl = vmalloc(len + 1);
if (pl == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Failed to copy CERT from packet.\n");
return NULL;
}
pl->v[0] = ISAKMP_CERT_X509SIGN;
bp = (u_char *) &pl->v[1];
i2d_X509(cert, &bp);
return pl;
}
int
oakley_get_defaultlifetime()
{
return OAKLEY_ATTR_SA_LD_SEC_DEFAULT;
}
int
oakley_dhinit()
{
/* set DH MODP */
INITDHVAL(dh_modp768, OAKLEY_PRIME_MODP768,
OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_DESC_MODP768, OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_MODP);
INITDHVAL(dh_modp1024, OAKLEY_PRIME_MODP1024,
OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_DESC_MODP1024, OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_MODP);
INITDHVAL(dh_modp1536, OAKLEY_PRIME_MODP1536,
OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_DESC_MODP1536, OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_MODP);
INITDHVAL(dh_modp2048, OAKLEY_PRIME_MODP2048,
OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_DESC_MODP2048, OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_MODP);
INITDHVAL(dh_modp3072, OAKLEY_PRIME_MODP3072,
OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_DESC_MODP3072, OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_MODP);
INITDHVAL(dh_modp4096, OAKLEY_PRIME_MODP4096,
OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_DESC_MODP4096, OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_MODP);
INITDHVAL(dh_modp6144, OAKLEY_PRIME_MODP6144,
OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_DESC_MODP6144, OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_MODP);
INITDHVAL(dh_modp8192, OAKLEY_PRIME_MODP8192,
OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_DESC_MODP8192, OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_MODP);
return 0;
}
void
oakley_dhgrp_free(dhgrp)
struct dhgroup *dhgrp;
{
if (dhgrp->prime)
vfree(dhgrp->prime);
if (dhgrp->curve_a)
vfree(dhgrp->curve_a);
if (dhgrp->curve_b)
vfree(dhgrp->curve_b);
if (dhgrp->order)
vfree(dhgrp->order);
racoon_free(dhgrp);
}
/*
* RFC2409 5
* The length of the Diffie-Hellman public value MUST be equal to the
* length of the prime modulus over which the exponentiation was
* performed, prepending zero bits to the value if necessary.
*/
static int
oakley_check_dh_pub(prime, pub0)
vchar_t *prime, **pub0;
{
vchar_t *tmp;
vchar_t *pub = *pub0;
if (prime->l == pub->l)
return 0;
if (prime->l < pub->l) {
/* what should i do ? */
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid public information was generated.\n");
return -1;
}
/* prime->l > pub->l */
tmp = vmalloc(prime->l);
if (tmp == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get DH buffer.\n");
return -1;
}
memcpy(tmp->v + prime->l - pub->l, pub->v, pub->l);
vfree(*pub0);
*pub0 = tmp;
return 0;
}
/*
* compute sharing secret of DH
* IN: *dh, *pub, *priv, *pub_p
* OUT: **gxy
*/
int
oakley_dh_compute(dh, pub, priv, pub_p, gxy)
const struct dhgroup *dh;
vchar_t *pub, *priv, *pub_p, **gxy;
{
#ifdef ENABLE_STATS
struct timeval start, end;
#endif
if ((*gxy = vmalloc(dh->prime->l)) == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get DH buffer.\n");
return -1;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_STATS
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
#endif
switch (dh->type) {
case OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_MODP:
if (eay_dh_compute(dh->prime, dh->gen1, pub, priv, pub_p, gxy) < 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to compute dh value.\n");
return -1;
}
break;
case OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_ECP:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_EC2N:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"dh type %d isn't supported.\n", dh->type);
return -1;
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid dh type %d.\n", dh->type);
return -1;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_STATS
gettimeofday(&end, NULL);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%s(%s%zu): %8.6f", __func__,
s_attr_isakmp_group(dh->type), dh->prime->l << 3,
timedelta(&start, &end));
#endif
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "compute DH's shared.\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, (*gxy)->v, (*gxy)->l);
return 0;
}
/*
* generate values of DH
* IN: *dh
* OUT: **pub, **priv
*/
int
oakley_dh_generate(dh, pub, priv)
const struct dhgroup *dh;
vchar_t **pub, **priv;
{
#ifdef ENABLE_STATS
struct timeval start, end;
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
#endif
switch (dh->type) {
case OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_MODP:
if (eay_dh_generate(dh->prime, dh->gen1, dh->gen2, pub, priv) < 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to compute dh value.\n");
return -1;
}
break;
case OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_ECP:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_GRP_TYPE_EC2N:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"dh type %d isn't supported.\n", dh->type);
return -1;
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid dh type %d.\n", dh->type);
return -1;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_STATS
gettimeofday(&end, NULL);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%s(%s%zu): %8.6f", __func__,
s_attr_isakmp_group(dh->type), dh->prime->l << 3,
timedelta(&start, &end));
#endif
if (oakley_check_dh_pub(dh->prime, pub) != 0)
return -1;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "compute DH's private.\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, (*priv)->v, (*priv)->l);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "compute DH's public.\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, (*pub)->v, (*pub)->l);
return 0;
}
/*
* copy pre-defined dhgroup values.
*/
int
oakley_setdhgroup(group, dhgrp)
int group;
struct dhgroup **dhgrp;
{
struct dhgroup *g;
*dhgrp = NULL; /* just make sure, initialize */
g = alg_oakley_dhdef_group(group);
if (g == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid DH parameter grp=%d.\n", group);
return -1;
}
if (!g->type || !g->prime || !g->gen1) {
/* unsuported */
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"unsupported DH parameters grp=%d.\n", group);
return -1;
}
*dhgrp = racoon_calloc(1, sizeof(struct dhgroup));
if (*dhgrp == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get DH buffer.\n");
return 0;
}
/* set defined dh vlaues */
memcpy(*dhgrp, g, sizeof(*g));
(*dhgrp)->prime = vdup(g->prime);
return 0;
}
/*
* PRF
*
* NOTE: we do not support prf with different input/output bitwidth,
* so we do not implement RFC2409 Appendix B (DOORAK-MAC example) in
* oakley_compute_keymat(). If you add support for such prf function,
* modify oakley_compute_keymat() accordingly.
*/
vchar_t *
oakley_prf(key, buf, iph1)
vchar_t *key, *buf;
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
vchar_t *res = NULL;
int type;
if (iph1->approval == NULL) {
/*
* it's before negotiating hash algorithm.
* We use md5 as default.
*/
type = OAKLEY_ATTR_HASH_ALG_MD5;
} else
type = iph1->approval->hashtype;
res = alg_oakley_hmacdef_one(type, key, buf);
if (res == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid hmac algorithm %d.\n", type);
return NULL;
}
return res;
}
/*
* hash
*/
vchar_t *
oakley_hash(buf, iph1)
vchar_t *buf;
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
vchar_t *res = NULL;
int type;
if (iph1->approval == NULL) {
/*
* it's before negotiating hash algorithm.
* We use md5 as default.
*/
type = OAKLEY_ATTR_HASH_ALG_MD5;
} else
type = iph1->approval->hashtype;
res = alg_oakley_hashdef_one(type, buf);
if (res == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid hash algorithm %d.\n", type);
return NULL;
}
return res;
}
/*
* compute KEYMAT
* see seciton 5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode in isakmp-oakley-05.
*/
int
oakley_compute_keymat(iph2, side)
struct ph2handle *iph2;
int side;
{
int error = -1;
/* compute sharing secret of DH when PFS */
if (iph2->approval->pfs_group && iph2->dhpub_p) {
if (oakley_dh_compute(iph2->pfsgrp, iph2->dhpub,
iph2->dhpriv, iph2->dhpub_p, &iph2->dhgxy) < 0)
goto end;
}
/* compute keymat */
if (oakley_compute_keymat_x(iph2, side, INBOUND_SA) < 0
|| oakley_compute_keymat_x(iph2, side, OUTBOUND_SA) < 0)
goto end;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "KEYMAT computed.\n");
error = 0;
end:
return error;
}
/*
* compute KEYMAT.
* KEYMAT = prf(SKEYID_d, protocol | SPI | Ni_b | Nr_b).
* If PFS is desired and KE payloads were exchanged,
* KEYMAT = prf(SKEYID_d, g(qm)^xy | protocol | SPI | Ni_b | Nr_b)
*
* NOTE: we do not support prf with different input/output bitwidth,
* so we do not implement RFC2409 Appendix B (DOORAK-MAC example).
*/
static int
oakley_compute_keymat_x(iph2, side, sa_dir)
struct ph2handle *iph2;
int side;
int sa_dir;
{
vchar_t *buf = NULL, *res = NULL, *bp;
char *p;
int len;
int error = -1;
int pfs = 0;
int dupkeymat; /* generate K[1-dupkeymat] */
struct saproto *pr;
struct satrns *tr;
int encklen, authklen, l;
pfs = ((iph2->approval->pfs_group && iph2->dhgxy) ? 1 : 0);
len = pfs ? iph2->dhgxy->l : 0;
len += (1
+ sizeof(u_int32_t) /* XXX SPI size */
+ iph2->nonce->l
+ iph2->nonce_p->l);
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get keymat buffer.\n");
goto end;
}
for (pr = iph2->approval->head; pr != NULL; pr = pr->next) {
p = buf->v;
/* if PFS */
if (pfs) {
memcpy(p, iph2->dhgxy->v, iph2->dhgxy->l);
p += iph2->dhgxy->l;
}
p[0] = pr->proto_id;
p += 1;
memcpy(p, (sa_dir == INBOUND_SA ? &pr->spi : &pr->spi_p),
sizeof(pr->spi));
p += sizeof(pr->spi);
bp = (side == INITIATOR ? iph2->nonce : iph2->nonce_p);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
bp = (side == INITIATOR ? iph2->nonce_p : iph2->nonce);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
/* compute IV */
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "KEYMAT compute with\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
/* res = K1 */
res = oakley_prf(iph2->ph1->skeyid_d, buf, iph2->ph1);
if (res == NULL)
goto end;
/* compute key length needed */
encklen = authklen = 0;
switch (pr->proto_id) {
case IPSECDOI_PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
for (tr = pr->head; tr; tr = tr->next) {
l = alg_ipsec_encdef_keylen(tr->trns_id,
tr->encklen);
if (l > encklen)
encklen = l;
l = alg_ipsec_hmacdef_hashlen(tr->authtype);
if (l > authklen)
authklen = l;
}
break;
case IPSECDOI_PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
for (tr = pr->head; tr; tr = tr->next) {
l = alg_ipsec_hmacdef_hashlen(tr->trns_id);
if (l > authklen)
authklen = l;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "encklen=%d authklen=%d\n",
encklen, authklen);
dupkeymat = (encklen + authklen) / 8 / res->l;
dupkeymat += 2; /* safety mergin */
if (dupkeymat < 3)
dupkeymat = 3;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"generating %zu bits of key (dupkeymat=%d)\n",
dupkeymat * 8 * res->l, dupkeymat);
if (0 < --dupkeymat) {
vchar_t *prev = res; /* K(n-1) */
vchar_t *seed = NULL; /* seed for Kn */
size_t l;
/*
* generating long key (isakmp-oakley-08 5.5)
* KEYMAT = K1 | K2 | K3 | ...
* where
* src = [ g(qm)^xy | ] protocol | SPI | Ni_b | Nr_b
* K1 = prf(SKEYID_d, src)
* K2 = prf(SKEYID_d, K1 | src)
* K3 = prf(SKEYID_d, K2 | src)
* Kn = prf(SKEYID_d, K(n-1) | src)
*/
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"generating K1...K%d for KEYMAT.\n",
dupkeymat + 1);
seed = vmalloc(prev->l + buf->l);
if (seed == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get keymat buffer.\n");
if (prev && prev != res)
vfree(prev);
goto end;
}
while (dupkeymat--) {
vchar_t *this = NULL; /* Kn */
int update_prev;
memcpy(seed->v, prev->v, prev->l);
memcpy(seed->v + prev->l, buf->v, buf->l);
this = oakley_prf(iph2->ph1->skeyid_d, seed,
iph2->ph1);
if (!this) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"oakley_prf memory overflow\n");
if (prev && prev != res)
vfree(prev);
vfree(this);
vfree(seed);
goto end;
}
update_prev = (prev && prev == res) ? 1 : 0;
l = res->l;
res = vrealloc(res, l + this->l);
if (update_prev)
prev = res;
if (res == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get keymat buffer.\n");
if (prev && prev != res)
vfree(prev);
vfree(this);
vfree(seed);
goto end;
}
memcpy(res->v + l, this->v, this->l);
if (prev && prev != res)
vfree(prev);
prev = this;
this = NULL;
}
if (prev && prev != res)
vfree(prev);
vfree(seed);
}
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, res->v, res->l);
if (sa_dir == INBOUND_SA)
pr->keymat = res;
else
pr->keymat_p = res;
res = NULL;
}
error = 0;
end:
if (error) {
for (pr = iph2->approval->head; pr != NULL; pr = pr->next) {
if (pr->keymat) {
vfree(pr->keymat);
pr->keymat = NULL;
}
if (pr->keymat_p) {
vfree(pr->keymat_p);
pr->keymat_p = NULL;
}
}
}
if (buf != NULL)
vfree(buf);
if (res)
vfree(res);
return error;
}
#if notyet
/*
* NOTE: Must terminate by NULL.
*/
vchar_t *
oakley_compute_hashx(struct ph1handle *iph1, ...)
{
vchar_t *buf, *res;
vchar_t *s;
caddr_t p;
int len;
va_list ap;
/* get buffer length */
va_start(ap, iph1);
len = 0;
while ((s = va_arg(ap, vchar_t *)) != NULL) {
len += s->l
}
va_end(ap);
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get hash buffer\n");
return NULL;
}
/* set buffer */
va_start(ap, iph1);
p = buf->v;
while ((s = va_arg(ap, char *)) != NULL) {
memcpy(p, s->v, s->l);
p += s->l;
}
va_end(ap);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH with: \n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
/* compute HASH */
res = oakley_prf(iph1->skeyid_a, buf, iph1);
vfree(buf);
if (res == NULL)
return NULL;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, res->v, res->l);
return res;
}
#endif
/*
* compute HASH(3) prf(SKEYID_a, 0 | M-ID | Ni_b | Nr_b)
* see seciton 5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode in isakmp-oakley-05.
*/
vchar_t *
oakley_compute_hash3(iph1, msgid, body)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
u_int32_t msgid;
vchar_t *body;
{
vchar_t *buf = 0, *res = 0;
int len;
int error = -1;
/* create buffer */
len = 1 + sizeof(u_int32_t) + body->l;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get hash buffer\n");
goto end;
}
buf->v[0] = 0;
memcpy(buf->v + 1, (char *)&msgid, sizeof(msgid));
memcpy(buf->v + 1 + sizeof(u_int32_t), body->v, body->l);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH with: \n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
/* compute HASH */
res = oakley_prf(iph1->skeyid_a, buf, iph1);
if (res == NULL)
goto end;
error = 0;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, res->v, res->l);
end:
if (buf != NULL)
vfree(buf);
return res;
}
/*
* compute HASH type of prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | buffer)
* e.g.
* for quick mode HASH(1):
* prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | SA | Ni [ | KE ] [ | IDci | IDcr ])
* for quick mode HASH(2):
* prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | Ni_b | SA | Nr [ | KE ] [ | IDci | IDcr ])
* for Informational exchange:
* prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | N/D)
*/
vchar_t *
oakley_compute_hash1(iph1, msgid, body)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
u_int32_t msgid;
vchar_t *body;
{
vchar_t *buf = NULL, *res = NULL;
char *p;
int len;
int error = -1;
/* create buffer */
len = sizeof(u_int32_t) + body->l;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get hash buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
memcpy(buf->v, (char *)&msgid, sizeof(msgid));
p += sizeof(u_int32_t);
memcpy(p, body->v, body->l);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH with:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
/* compute HASH */
res = oakley_prf(iph1->skeyid_a, buf, iph1);
if (res == NULL)
goto end;
error = 0;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, res->v, res->l);
end:
if (buf != NULL)
vfree(buf);
return res;
}
/*
* compute phase1 HASH
* main/aggressive
* I-digest = prf(SKEYID, g^i | g^r | CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | ID_i1_b)
* R-digest = prf(SKEYID, g^r | g^i | CKY-R | CKY-I | SAi_b | ID_r1_b)
* for gssapi, also include all GSS tokens, and call gss_wrap on the result
*/
vchar_t *
oakley_ph1hash_common(iph1, sw)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
int sw;
{
vchar_t *buf = NULL, *res = NULL, *bp;
char *p, *bp2;
int len, bl;
int error = -1;
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI
vchar_t *gsstokens = NULL;
#endif
/* create buffer */
len = iph1->dhpub->l
+ iph1->dhpub_p->l
+ sizeof(cookie_t) * 2
+ iph1->sa->l
+ (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->id->l : iph1->id_p->l);
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI
if (iph1->approval->authmethod == OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_GSSAPI_KRB) {
if (iph1->gi_i != NULL && iph1->gi_r != NULL) {
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->gi_i : iph1->gi_r);
len += bp->l;
}
if (sw == GENERATE)
gssapi_get_itokens(iph1, &gsstokens);
else
gssapi_get_rtokens(iph1, &gsstokens);
if (gsstokens == NULL)
return NULL;
len += gsstokens->l;
}
#endif
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get hash buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->dhpub : iph1->dhpub_p);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->dhpub_p : iph1->dhpub);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
if (iph1->side == INITIATOR)
bp2 = (sw == GENERATE ?
(char *)&iph1->index.i_ck : (char *)&iph1->index.r_ck);
else
bp2 = (sw == GENERATE ?
(char *)&iph1->index.r_ck : (char *)&iph1->index.i_ck);
bl = sizeof(cookie_t);
memcpy(p, bp2, bl);
p += bl;
if (iph1->side == INITIATOR)
bp2 = (sw == GENERATE ?
(char *)&iph1->index.r_ck : (char *)&iph1->index.i_ck);
else
bp2 = (sw == GENERATE ?
(char *)&iph1->index.i_ck : (char *)&iph1->index.r_ck);
bl = sizeof(cookie_t);
memcpy(p, bp2, bl);
p += bl;
bp = iph1->sa;
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->id : iph1->id_p);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI
if (iph1->approval->authmethod == OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_GSSAPI_KRB) {
if (iph1->gi_i != NULL && iph1->gi_r != NULL) {
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->gi_i : iph1->gi_r);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
}
memcpy(p, gsstokens->v, gsstokens->l);
p += gsstokens->l;
}
#endif
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH with:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
/* compute HASH */
res = oakley_prf(iph1->skeyid, buf, iph1);
if (res == NULL)
goto end;
error = 0;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH (%s) computed:\n",
iph1->side == INITIATOR ? "init" : "resp");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, res->v, res->l);
end:
if (buf != NULL)
vfree(buf);
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI
if (gsstokens != NULL)
vfree(gsstokens);
#endif
return res;
}
/*
* compute HASH_I on base mode.
* base:psk,rsa
* HASH_I = prf(SKEYID, g^xi | CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | IDii_b)
* base:sig
* HASH_I = prf(hash(Ni_b | Nr_b), g^xi | CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | IDii_b)
*/
vchar_t *
oakley_ph1hash_base_i(iph1, sw)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
int sw;
{
vchar_t *buf = NULL, *res = NULL, *bp;
vchar_t *hashkey = NULL;
vchar_t *hash = NULL; /* for signature mode */
char *p;
int len;
int error = -1;
/* sanity check */
if (iph1->etype != ISAKMP_ETYPE_BASE) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid etype for this hash function\n");
return NULL;
}
switch (iph1->approval->authmethod) {
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_PSKEY:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_RSAENC:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_RSAREV:
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAENC_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAENC_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAREV_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAREV_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_PSKEY_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_PSKEY_R:
#endif
if (iph1->skeyid == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL, "no SKEYID found.\n");
return NULL;
}
hashkey = iph1->skeyid;
break;
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_DSSSIG:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_RSASIG:
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_GSSAPI_KRB:
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_RSA_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_RSA_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_DSS_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_DSS_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSASIG_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSASIG_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_DSSSIG_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_DSSSIG_R:
#endif
/* make hash for seed */
len = iph1->nonce->l + iph1->nonce_p->l;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get hash buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->nonce_p : iph1->nonce);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->nonce : iph1->nonce_p);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
hash = oakley_hash(buf, iph1);
if (hash == NULL)
goto end;
vfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
hashkey = hash;
break;
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"not supported authentication method %d\n",
iph1->approval->authmethod);
return NULL;
}
len = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->dhpub->l : iph1->dhpub_p->l)
+ sizeof(cookie_t) * 2
+ iph1->sa->l
+ (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->id->l : iph1->id_p->l);
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get hash buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->dhpub : iph1->dhpub_p);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
memcpy(p, &iph1->index.i_ck, sizeof(cookie_t));
p += sizeof(cookie_t);
memcpy(p, &iph1->index.r_ck, sizeof(cookie_t));
p += sizeof(cookie_t);
memcpy(p, iph1->sa->v, iph1->sa->l);
p += iph1->sa->l;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->id : iph1->id_p);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH_I with:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
/* compute HASH */
res = oakley_prf(hashkey, buf, iph1);
if (res == NULL)
goto end;
error = 0;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH_I computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, res->v, res->l);
end:
if (hash != NULL)
vfree(hash);
if (buf != NULL)
vfree(buf);
return res;
}
/*
* compute HASH_R on base mode for signature method.
* base:
* HASH_R = prf(hash(Ni_b | Nr_b), g^xi | g^xr | CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | IDii_b)
*/
vchar_t *
oakley_ph1hash_base_r(iph1, sw)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
int sw;
{
vchar_t *buf = NULL, *res = NULL, *bp;
vchar_t *hash = NULL;
char *p;
int len;
int error = -1;
/* sanity check */
if (iph1->etype != ISAKMP_ETYPE_BASE) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid etype for this hash function\n");
return NULL;
}
switch (iph1->approval->authmethod) {
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_DSSSIG:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_RSASIG:
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_RSA_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_RSA_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_DSS_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_DSS_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSASIG_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSASIG_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_DSSSIG_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_DSSSIG_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_PSKEY_I:
#endif
break;
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"not supported authentication method %d\n",
iph1->approval->authmethod);
return NULL;
break;
}
/* make hash for seed */
len = iph1->nonce->l + iph1->nonce_p->l;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get hash buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->nonce_p : iph1->nonce);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->nonce : iph1->nonce_p);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
hash = oakley_hash(buf, iph1);
if (hash == NULL)
goto end;
vfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
/* make really hash */
len = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->dhpub_p->l : iph1->dhpub->l)
+ (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->dhpub->l : iph1->dhpub_p->l)
+ sizeof(cookie_t) * 2
+ iph1->sa->l
+ (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->id_p->l : iph1->id->l);
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get hash buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->dhpub_p : iph1->dhpub);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->dhpub : iph1->dhpub_p);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
memcpy(p, &iph1->index.i_ck, sizeof(cookie_t));
p += sizeof(cookie_t);
memcpy(p, &iph1->index.r_ck, sizeof(cookie_t));
p += sizeof(cookie_t);
memcpy(p, iph1->sa->v, iph1->sa->l);
p += iph1->sa->l;
bp = (sw == GENERATE ? iph1->id_p : iph1->id);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH_R with:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
/* compute HASH */
res = oakley_prf(hash, buf, iph1);
if (res == NULL)
goto end;
error = 0;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH_R computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, res->v, res->l);
end:
if (buf != NULL)
vfree(buf);
if (hash)
vfree(hash);
return res;
}
/*
* compute each authentication method in phase 1.
* OUT:
* 0: OK
* -1: error
* other: error to be reply with notification.
* the value is notification type.
*/
int
oakley_validate_auth(iph1)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
vchar_t *my_hash = NULL;
int result;
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI
vchar_t *gsshash = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_STATS
struct timeval start, end;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_STATS
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
#endif
switch (iph1->approval->authmethod) {
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_PSKEY:
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_PSKEY_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_PSKEY_R:
#endif
/* validate HASH */
{
char *r_hash;
if (iph1->id_p == NULL || iph1->pl_hash == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"few isakmp message received.\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
if (iph1->approval->authmethod == OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_PSKEY_I &&
((iph1->mode_cfg->flags & ISAKMP_CFG_VENDORID_XAUTH) == 0))
{
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL, "No SIG was passed, "
"hybrid auth is enabled, "
"but peer is no Xauth compliant\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
break;
}
#endif
r_hash = (caddr_t)(iph1->pl_hash + 1);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH received:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, r_hash,
ntohs(iph1->pl_hash->h.len) - sizeof(*iph1->pl_hash));
switch (iph1->etype) {
case ISAKMP_ETYPE_IDENT:
case ISAKMP_ETYPE_AGG:
my_hash = oakley_ph1hash_common(iph1, VALIDATE);
break;
case ISAKMP_ETYPE_BASE:
if (iph1->side == INITIATOR)
my_hash = oakley_ph1hash_common(iph1, VALIDATE);
else
my_hash = oakley_ph1hash_base_i(iph1, VALIDATE);
break;
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid etype %d\n", iph1->etype);
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_EXCHANGE_TYPE;
}
if (my_hash == NULL)
return ISAKMP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
result = memcmp(my_hash->v, r_hash, my_hash->l);
vfree(my_hash);
if (result) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH mismatched\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH for PSK validated.\n");
}
break;
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_DSSSIG:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_RSASIG:
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_RSA_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_DSS_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSASIG_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSASIG_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_DSSSIG_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_DSSSIG_R:
#endif
{
int error = 0;
int certtype;
/* validation */
if (iph1->id_p == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"no ID payload was passed.\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
}
if (iph1->sig_p == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"no SIG payload was passed.\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "SIGN passed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, iph1->sig_p->v, iph1->sig_p->l);
/* get peer's cert */
certtype = oakley_get_certtype(iph1->rmconf->peerscert);
switch (certtype) {
case ISAKMP_CERT_NONE:
/* expect to receive one from peer */
if (iph1->cert_p == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"no peer's CERT payload found.\n");
return ISAKMP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* verify the cert if needed */
if (!iph1->rmconf->verify_cert)
break;
switch (oakley_get_certtype(iph1->cert_p)) {
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509SIGN: {
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
char *ca;
if (iph1->rmconf->cacertfile != NULL) {
getpathname(path, sizeof(path),
LC_PATHTYPE_CERT,
iph1->rmconf->cacertfile);
ca = path;
} else {
ca = NULL;
}
error = eay_check_x509cert(
iph1->cert_p,
lcconf->pathinfo[LC_PATHTYPE_CERT],
ca, 0);
break;
}
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"peers_cert certtype %d was not expected\n",
certtype);
return ISAKMP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (error != 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"the peer's certificate is not verified.\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY;
}
break;
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509SIGN:
if (iph1->rmconf->peerscert == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"no peer's CERT file found.\n");
return ISAKMP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* don't use received cert */
if (iph1->cert_p != NULL) {
vfree(iph1->cert_p);
iph1->cert_p = NULL;
}
/* copy from remoteconf instead */
iph1->cert_p = vdup(iph1->rmconf->peerscert);
break;
#ifndef ANDROID_PATCHED
case ISAKMP_CERT_PLAINRSA:
if (get_plainrsa_fromlocal(iph1, 0))
return ISAKMP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
break;
case ISAKMP_CERT_DNS:
/* don't use received cert */
if (iph1->cert_p != NULL) {
vfree(iph1->cert_p);
iph1->cert_p = NULL;
}
iph1->cert_p = dnssec_getcert(iph1->id_p);
if (iph1->cert_p == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"no CERT RR found.\n");
return ISAKMP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
break;
#endif
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid certificate type: %d\n",
oakley_get_certtype(iph1->rmconf->peerscert));
return ISAKMP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* compare ID payload and certificate name */
if ((error = oakley_check_certid(iph1)) != 0)
return error;
/* Generate a warning if verify_cert */
if (iph1->rmconf->verify_cert) {
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"CERT validated\n");
} else {
plog(LLV_WARNING, LOCATION, NULL,
"CERT validation disabled by configuration\n");
}
/* compute hash */
switch (iph1->etype) {
case ISAKMP_ETYPE_IDENT:
case ISAKMP_ETYPE_AGG:
my_hash = oakley_ph1hash_common(iph1, VALIDATE);
break;
case ISAKMP_ETYPE_BASE:
if (iph1->side == INITIATOR)
my_hash = oakley_ph1hash_base_r(iph1, VALIDATE);
else
my_hash = oakley_ph1hash_base_i(iph1, VALIDATE);
break;
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid etype %d\n", iph1->etype);
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_EXCHANGE_TYPE;
}
if (my_hash == NULL)
return ISAKMP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* check signature */
certtype = oakley_get_certtype(iph1->cert_p);
if (certtype == ISAKMP_CERT_NONE)
certtype = oakley_get_certtype(iph1->rmconf->peerscert);
switch (certtype) {
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509SIGN:
case ISAKMP_CERT_DNS:
error = eay_check_x509sign(my_hash,
iph1->sig_p,
iph1->cert_p);
break;
#ifndef ANDROID_PATCHED
case ISAKMP_CERT_PLAINRSA:
iph1->rsa_p = rsa_try_check_rsasign(my_hash,
iph1->sig_p, iph1->rsa_candidates);
error = iph1->rsa_p ? 0 : -1;
genlist_free(iph1->rsa_candidates, NULL);
iph1->rsa_candidates = NULL;
break;
#endif
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"cannot check signature for certtype %d\n",
certtype);
vfree(my_hash);
return ISAKMP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
vfree(my_hash);
if (error != 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Invalid SIG.\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "SIG authenticated\n");
}
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_RSA_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_DSS_R:
{
if ((iph1->mode_cfg->flags & ISAKMP_CFG_VENDORID_XAUTH) == 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL, "No SIG was passed, "
"hybrid auth is enabled, "
"but peer is no Xauth compliant\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
break;
}
plog(LLV_INFO, LOCATION, NULL, "No SIG was passed, "
"but hybrid auth is enabled\n");
return 0;
break;
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_GSSAPI_KRB:
/* check if we're not into XAUTH_PSKEY_I instead */
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
if (iph1->rmconf->xauth)
break;
#endif
switch (iph1->etype) {
case ISAKMP_ETYPE_IDENT:
case ISAKMP_ETYPE_AGG:
my_hash = oakley_ph1hash_common(iph1, VALIDATE);
break;
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid etype %d\n", iph1->etype);
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_EXCHANGE_TYPE;
}
if (my_hash == NULL) {
if (gssapi_more_tokens(iph1))
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_EXCHANGE_TYPE;
else
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION;
}
gsshash = gssapi_unwraphash(iph1);
if (gsshash == NULL) {
vfree(my_hash);
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION;
}
result = memcmp(my_hash->v, gsshash->v, my_hash->l);
vfree(my_hash);
vfree(gsshash);
if (result) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL, "HASH mismatched\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "hash compared OK\n");
break;
#endif
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_RSAENC:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_RSAREV:
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAENC_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAENC_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAREV_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAREV_R:
#endif
if (iph1->id_p == NULL || iph1->pl_hash == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"few isakmp message received.\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
}
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"not supported authmethod type %s\n",
s_oakley_attr_method(iph1->approval->authmethod));
return ISAKMP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"invalid authmethod %d why ?\n",
iph1->approval->authmethod);
return ISAKMP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_STATS
gettimeofday(&end, NULL);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%s(%s): %8.6f", __func__,
s_oakley_attr_method(iph1->approval->authmethod),
timedelta(&start, &end));
#endif
return 0;
}
/* get my certificate
* NOTE: include certificate type.
*/
int
oakley_getmycert(iph1)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
switch (oakley_get_certtype(iph1->rmconf->mycert)) {
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509SIGN:
if (iph1->cert)
return 0;
iph1->cert = vdup(iph1->rmconf->mycert);
break;
#ifndef ANDROID_PATCHED
case ISAKMP_CERT_PLAINRSA:
if (iph1->rsa)
return 0;
return get_plainrsa_fromlocal(iph1, 1);
#endif
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Unknown certtype #%d\n",
oakley_get_certtype(iph1->rmconf->mycert));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
#ifndef ANDROID_PATCHED
static int
get_plainrsa_fromlocal(iph1, my)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
int my;
{
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
vchar_t *cert = NULL;
char *certfile;
int error = -1;
iph1->rsa_candidates = rsa_lookup_keys(iph1, my);
if (!iph1->rsa_candidates ||
rsa_list_count(iph1->rsa_candidates) == 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"%s RSA key not found for %s\n",
my ? "Private" : "Public",
saddr2str_fromto("%s <-> %s",
iph1->local, iph1->remote));
goto end;
}
if (my && rsa_list_count(iph1->rsa_candidates) > 1) {
plog(LLV_WARNING, LOCATION, NULL,
"More than one (=%lu) private "
"PlainRSA key found for %s\n",
rsa_list_count(iph1->rsa_candidates),
saddr2str_fromto("%s <-> %s",
iph1->local, iph1->remote));
plog(LLV_WARNING, LOCATION, NULL,
"This may have unpredictable results, "
"i.e. wrong key could be used!\n");
plog(LLV_WARNING, LOCATION, NULL,
"Consider using only one single private "
"key for all peers...\n");
}
if (my) {
iph1->rsa = ((struct rsa_key *)
genlist_next(iph1->rsa_candidates, NULL))->rsa;
genlist_free(iph1->rsa_candidates, NULL);
iph1->rsa_candidates = NULL;
if (iph1->rsa == NULL)
goto end;
}
error = 0;
end:
return error;
}
#endif
/* get signature */
int
oakley_getsign(iph1)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
vchar_t *privkey = NULL;
int error = -1;
switch (oakley_get_certtype(iph1->rmconf->mycert)) {
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509SIGN:
case ISAKMP_CERT_DNS:
if (iph1->rmconf->myprivfile == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL, "no cert defined.\n");
goto end;
}
/* make private file name */
getpathname(path, sizeof(path),
LC_PATHTYPE_CERT,
iph1->rmconf->myprivfile);
privkey = privsep_eay_get_pkcs1privkey(path);
if (privkey == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get private key.\n");
goto end;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG2, LOCATION, NULL, "private key:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG2, privkey->v, privkey->l);
iph1->sig = eay_get_x509sign(iph1->hash, privkey);
break;
#ifndef ANDROID_PATCHED
case ISAKMP_CERT_PLAINRSA:
iph1->sig = eay_get_rsasign(iph1->hash, iph1->rsa);
break;
#endif
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Unknown certtype #%d\n",
oakley_get_certtype(iph1->rmconf->mycert));
goto end;
}
if (iph1->sig == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL, "failed to sign.\n");
goto end;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "SIGN computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, iph1->sig->v, iph1->sig->l);
error = 0;
end:
if (privkey != NULL)
vfree(privkey);
return error;
}
/*
* compare certificate name and ID value.
*/
static int
oakley_check_certid(iph1)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
struct ipsecdoi_id_b *id_b;
vchar_t *name = NULL;
char *altname = NULL;
int idlen, type;
int error;
if (iph1->rmconf == NULL || iph1->rmconf->verify_cert == FALSE)
return 0;
if (iph1->id_p == NULL || iph1->cert_p == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote, "no ID nor CERT found.\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
}
id_b = (struct ipsecdoi_id_b *)iph1->id_p->v;
idlen = iph1->id_p->l - sizeof(*id_b);
switch (id_b->type) {
case IPSECDOI_ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
name = eay_get_x509asn1subjectname(iph1->cert_p);
if (!name) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"failed to get subjectName\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
if (idlen != name->l) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"Invalid ID length in phase 1.\n");
vfree(name);
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
}
error = memcmp(id_b + 1, name->v, idlen);
if (error != 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"ID mismatched with ASN1 SubjectName.\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, id_b + 1, idlen);
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, name->v, idlen);
if (iph1->rmconf->verify_identifier) {
vfree(name);
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
}
}
vfree(name);
return 0;
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
{
/*
* converting to binary from string because openssl return
* a string even if object is a binary.
* XXX fix it ! access by ASN.1 directly without.
*/
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
caddr_t a = NULL;
int pos;
for (pos = 1; ; pos++) {
if (eay_get_x509subjectaltname(iph1->cert_p,
&altname, &type, pos) !=0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get subjectAltName\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
/* it's the end condition of the loop. */
if (!altname) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"no proper subjectAltName.\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
if (check_typeofcertname(id_b->type, type) == 0)
break;
/* next name */
racoon_free(altname);
altname = NULL;
}
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_RAW;
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
error = getaddrinfo(altname, NULL, &hints, &res);
racoon_free(altname);
altname = NULL;
if (error != 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"no proper subjectAltName.\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
switch (res->ai_family) {
case AF_INET:
a = (caddr_t)&((struct sockaddr_in *)res->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr;
break;
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
a = (caddr_t)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
break;
#endif
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"family not supported: %d.\n", res->ai_family);
freeaddrinfo(res);
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
error = memcmp(id_b + 1, a, idlen);
freeaddrinfo(res);
vfree(name);
if (error != 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"ID mismatched with subjectAltName.\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, id_b + 1, idlen);
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, a, idlen);
if (iph1->rmconf->verify_identifier)
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
}
return 0;
}
case IPSECDOI_ID_FQDN:
case IPSECDOI_ID_USER_FQDN:
{
int pos;
for (pos = 1; ; pos++) {
if (eay_get_x509subjectaltname(iph1->cert_p,
&altname, &type, pos) != 0){
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get subjectAltName\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
/* it's the end condition of the loop. */
if (!altname) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"no proper subjectAltName.\n");
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
if (check_typeofcertname(id_b->type, type) == 0)
break;
/* next name */
racoon_free(altname);
altname = NULL;
}
if (idlen != strlen(altname)) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Invalid ID length in phase 1.\n");
racoon_free(altname);
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
}
if (check_typeofcertname(id_b->type, type) != 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"ID type mismatched. ID: %s CERT: %s.\n",
s_ipsecdoi_ident(id_b->type),
s_ipsecdoi_ident(type));
racoon_free(altname);
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
}
error = memcmp(id_b + 1, altname, idlen);
if (error) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL, "ID mismatched.\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, id_b + 1, idlen);
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, altname, idlen);
racoon_free(altname);
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
}
racoon_free(altname);
return 0;
}
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Inpropper ID type passed: %s.\n",
s_ipsecdoi_ident(id_b->type));
return ISAKMP_NTYPE_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
}
/*NOTREACHED*/
}
static int
check_typeofcertname(doi, genid)
int doi, genid;
{
switch (doi) {
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
if (genid != GENT_IPADD)
return -1;
return 0;
case IPSECDOI_ID_FQDN:
if (genid != GENT_DNS)
return -1;
return 0;
case IPSECDOI_ID_USER_FQDN:
if (genid != GENT_EMAIL)
return -1;
return 0;
case IPSECDOI_ID_DER_ASN1_DN: /* should not be passed to this function*/
case IPSECDOI_ID_DER_ASN1_GN:
case IPSECDOI_ID_KEY_ID:
default:
return -1;
}
/*NOTREACHED*/
}
/*
* save certificate including certificate type.
*/
int
oakley_savecert(iph1, gen)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
struct isakmp_gen *gen;
{
vchar_t **c;
u_int8_t type;
STACK_OF(X509) *certs=NULL;
PKCS7 *p7;
type = *(u_int8_t *)(gen + 1) & 0xff;
switch (type) {
case ISAKMP_CERT_DNS:
plog(LLV_WARNING, LOCATION, NULL,
"CERT payload is unnecessary in DNSSEC. "
"ignore this CERT payload.\n");
return 0;
case ISAKMP_CERT_PKCS7:
case ISAKMP_CERT_PGP:
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509SIGN:
case ISAKMP_CERT_KERBEROS:
case ISAKMP_CERT_SPKI:
c = &iph1->cert_p;
break;
case ISAKMP_CERT_CRL:
c = &iph1->crl_p;
break;
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509KE:
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509ATTR:
case ISAKMP_CERT_ARL:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"No supported such CERT type %d\n", type);
return -1;
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Invalid CERT type %d\n", type);
return -1;
}
/* XXX choice the 1th cert, ignore after the cert. */
/* XXX should be processed. */
if (*c) {
plog(LLV_WARNING, LOCATION, NULL,
"ignore 2nd CERT payload.\n");
return 0;
}
if (type == ISAKMP_CERT_PKCS7) {
u_char *bp;
int i;
/* Skip the header */
bp = (u_char *)(gen + 1);
/* And the first byte is the certificate type,
* we know that already
*/
bp++;
p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, (void *)&bp,
ntohs(gen->len) - sizeof(*gen) - 1);
if (!p7) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Failed to parse PKCS#7 CERT.\n");
return -1;
}
/* Copied this from the openssl pkcs7 application;
* there"s little by way of documentation for any of
* it. I can only presume it"s correct.
*/
i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
switch (i) {
case NID_pkcs7_signed:
certs=p7->d.sign->cert;
break;
case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
certs=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (!certs) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"CERT PKCS#7 bundle contains no certs.\n");
PKCS7_free(p7);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
int len;
u_char *bp;
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs,i);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"Trying PKCS#7 cert %d.\n", i);
/* We'll just try each cert in turn */
*c = dump_x509(cert);
if (!*c) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Failed to get CERT buffer.\n");
continue;
}
/* Ignore cert if it doesn't match identity
* XXX If verify cert is disabled, we still just take
* the first certificate....
*/
if (oakley_check_certid(iph1)) {
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"Discarding CERT: does not match ID.\n");
vfree((*c));
*c = NULL;
continue;
}
{
char *p = eay_get_x509text(*c);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "CERT saved:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, (*c)->v, (*c)->l);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "%s",
p ? p : "\n");
racoon_free(p);
}
break;
}
PKCS7_free(p7);
} else {
*c = dump_isakmp_payload(gen);
if (!*c) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Failed to get CERT buffer.\n");
return -1;
}
switch (type) {
case ISAKMP_CERT_PGP:
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509SIGN:
case ISAKMP_CERT_KERBEROS:
case ISAKMP_CERT_SPKI:
/* Ignore cert if it doesn't match identity
* XXX If verify cert is disabled, we still just take
* the first certificate....
*/
if (oakley_check_certid(iph1)){
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"Discarding CERT: does not match ID.\n");
vfree((*c));
*c = NULL;
return 0;
}
{
char *p = eay_get_x509text(*c);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "CERT saved:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, (*c)->v, (*c)->l);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "%s", p ? p : "\n");
racoon_free(p);
}
break;
case ISAKMP_CERT_CRL:
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "CRL saved:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, (*c)->v, (*c)->l);
break;
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509KE:
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509ATTR:
case ISAKMP_CERT_ARL:
default:
/* XXX */
vfree(*c);
*c = NULL;
return 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* save certificate including certificate type.
*/
int
oakley_savecr(iph1, gen)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
struct isakmp_gen *gen;
{
vchar_t *cert;
vchar_t **c;
u_int8_t type;
type = *(u_int8_t *)(gen + 1) & 0xff;
switch (type) {
case ISAKMP_CERT_DNS:
plog(LLV_WARNING, LOCATION, NULL,
"CERT payload is unnecessary in DNSSEC\n");
/*FALLTHRU*/
case ISAKMP_CERT_PKCS7:
case ISAKMP_CERT_PGP:
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509SIGN:
case ISAKMP_CERT_KERBEROS:
case ISAKMP_CERT_SPKI:
c = &iph1->cr_p;
break;
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509KE:
case ISAKMP_CERT_X509ATTR:
case ISAKMP_CERT_ARL:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"No supported such CR type %d\n", type);
return -1;
case ISAKMP_CERT_CRL:
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Invalid CR type %d\n", type);
return -1;
}
/* Already found an acceptable CR? */
if (*c != NULL)
return 0;
cert = dump_isakmp_payload(gen);
if (cert == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"Failed to get CR buffer.\n");
return -1;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "CR received:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, cert->v, cert->l);
*c = cert;
if (resolveph1rmconf(iph1) == 0) {
/* Found unique match */
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "CR saved.\n");
} else {
/* Still ambiguous or matches nothing, ignore this CR */
*c = NULL;
vfree(cert);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Add a single CR.
*/
struct append_cr_ctx {
struct ph1handle *iph1;
struct payload_list *plist;
};
static int
oakley_append_rmconf_cr(rmconf, ctx)
struct remoteconf *rmconf;
void *ctx;
{
struct append_cr_ctx *actx = (struct append_cr_ctx *) ctx;
vchar_t *buf, *asn1dn = NULL;
int type;
/* Do we want to send CR about this? */
if (rmconf->send_cr == FALSE)
return 0;
if (rmconf->peerscert != NULL) {
type = oakley_get_certtype(rmconf->peerscert);
asn1dn = eay_get_x509asn1issuername(rmconf->peerscert);
} else if (rmconf->cacert != NULL) {
type = oakley_get_certtype(rmconf->cacert);
asn1dn = eay_get_x509asn1subjectname(rmconf->cacert);
} else
return 0;
if (asn1dn == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, actx->iph1->remote,
"Failed to get CR ASN1 DN from certificate\n");
return 0;
}
buf = vmalloc(1 + asn1dn->l);
if (buf == NULL)
goto err;
buf->v[0] = type;
memcpy(&buf->v[1], asn1dn->v, asn1dn->l);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, actx->iph1->remote,
"appending CR: %s\n",
s_isakmp_certtype(buf->v[0]));
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
actx->plist = isakmp_plist_append_full(actx->plist, buf, ISAKMP_NPTYPE_CR, 1);
err:
vfree(asn1dn);
return 0;
}
/*
* Append list of acceptable CRs.
* RFC2048 3.10
*/
struct payload_list *
oakley_append_cr(plist, iph1)
struct payload_list *plist;
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
struct append_cr_ctx ctx;
struct rmconfselector sel;
ctx.iph1 = iph1;
ctx.plist = plist;
if (iph1->rmconf == NULL) {
rmconf_selector_from_ph1(&sel, iph1);
enumrmconf(&sel, oakley_append_rmconf_cr, &ctx);
} else {
oakley_append_rmconf_cr(iph1->rmconf, &ctx);
}
return ctx.plist;
}
/*
* check peer's CR.
*/
int
oakley_checkcr(iph1)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
int type;
if (iph1->cr_p == NULL)
return 0;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"peer transmitted CR: %s\n",
s_isakmp_certtype(oakley_get_certtype(iph1->cr_p)));
type = oakley_get_certtype(iph1->cr_p);
if (type != oakley_get_certtype(iph1->rmconf->mycert)) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"such a cert type isn't supported: %d\n",
type);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* check to need CR payload.
*/
int
oakley_needcr(type)
int type;
{
switch (type) {
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_DSSSIG:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_RSASIG:
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_RSA_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_DSS_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSASIG_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSASIG_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_DSSSIG_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_DSSSIG_R:
#endif
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
/*NOTREACHED*/
}
/*
* compute SKEYID
* see seciton 5. Exchanges in RFC 2409
* psk: SKEYID = prf(pre-shared-key, Ni_b | Nr_b)
* sig: SKEYID = prf(Ni_b | Nr_b, g^ir)
* enc: SKEYID = prf(H(Ni_b | Nr_b), CKY-I | CKY-R)
*/
int
oakley_skeyid(iph1)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
vchar_t *buf = NULL, *bp;
char *p;
int len;
int error = -1;
/* SKEYID */
switch (iph1->approval->authmethod) {
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_PSKEY:
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_PSKEY_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_PSKEY_R:
#endif
if (iph1->etype != ISAKMP_ETYPE_IDENT) {
iph1->authstr = getpskbyname(iph1->id_p);
if (iph1->authstr == NULL) {
if (iph1->rmconf->verify_identifier) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"couldn't find the pskey.\n");
goto end;
}
plog(LLV_NOTIFY, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"couldn't find the proper pskey, "
"try to get one by the peer's address.\n");
}
}
if (iph1->authstr == NULL) {
/*
* If the exchange type is the main mode or if it's
* failed to get the psk by ID, racoon try to get
* the psk by remote IP address.
* It may be nonsense.
*/
iph1->authstr = getpskbyaddr(iph1->remote);
if (iph1->authstr == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, iph1->remote,
"couldn't find the pskey for %s.\n",
saddrwop2str(iph1->remote));
goto end;
}
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "the psk found.\n");
/* should be secret PSK */
plog(LLV_DEBUG2, LOCATION, NULL, "psk: ");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG2, iph1->authstr->v, iph1->authstr->l);
len = iph1->nonce->l + iph1->nonce_p->l;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get skeyid buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
bp = (iph1->side == INITIATOR ? iph1->nonce : iph1->nonce_p);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "nonce 1: ");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, bp->v, bp->l);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
bp = (iph1->side == INITIATOR ? iph1->nonce_p : iph1->nonce);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "nonce 2: ");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, bp->v, bp->l);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
iph1->skeyid = oakley_prf(iph1->authstr, buf, iph1);
if (iph1->skeyid == NULL)
goto end;
break;
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_DSSSIG:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_RSASIG:
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_RSA_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_DSS_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_RSA_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_HYBRID_DSS_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSASIG_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSASIG_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_DSSSIG_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_DSSSIG_R:
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_GSSAPI_KRB:
#endif
len = iph1->nonce->l + iph1->nonce_p->l;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get nonce buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
bp = (iph1->side == INITIATOR ? iph1->nonce : iph1->nonce_p);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "nonce1: ");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, bp->v, bp->l);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
bp = (iph1->side == INITIATOR ? iph1->nonce_p : iph1->nonce);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "nonce2: ");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, bp->v, bp->l);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
iph1->skeyid = oakley_prf(buf, iph1->dhgxy, iph1);
if (iph1->skeyid == NULL)
goto end;
break;
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_RSAENC:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_RSAREV:
#ifdef ENABLE_HYBRID
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAENC_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAENC_R:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAREV_I:
case OAKLEY_ATTR_AUTH_METHOD_XAUTH_RSAREV_R:
#endif
plog(LLV_WARNING, LOCATION, NULL,
"not supported authentication method %s\n",
s_oakley_attr_method(iph1->approval->authmethod));
goto end;
default:
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid authentication method %d\n",
iph1->approval->authmethod);
goto end;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "SKEYID computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, iph1->skeyid->v, iph1->skeyid->l);
error = 0;
end:
if (buf != NULL)
vfree(buf);
return error;
}
/*
* compute SKEYID_[dae]
* see seciton 5. Exchanges in RFC 2409
* SKEYID_d = prf(SKEYID, g^ir | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0)
* SKEYID_a = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_d | g^ir | CKY-I | CKY-R | 1)
* SKEYID_e = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_a | g^ir | CKY-I | CKY-R | 2)
*/
int
oakley_skeyid_dae(iph1)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
vchar_t *buf = NULL;
char *p;
int len;
int error = -1;
if (iph1->skeyid == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL, "no SKEYID found.\n");
goto end;
}
/* SKEYID D */
/* SKEYID_d = prf(SKEYID, g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0) */
len = iph1->dhgxy->l + sizeof(cookie_t) * 2 + 1;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get skeyid buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
memcpy(p, iph1->dhgxy->v, iph1->dhgxy->l);
p += iph1->dhgxy->l;
memcpy(p, (caddr_t)&iph1->index.i_ck, sizeof(cookie_t));
p += sizeof(cookie_t);
memcpy(p, (caddr_t)&iph1->index.r_ck, sizeof(cookie_t));
p += sizeof(cookie_t);
*p = 0;
iph1->skeyid_d = oakley_prf(iph1->skeyid, buf, iph1);
if (iph1->skeyid_d == NULL)
goto end;
vfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "SKEYID_d computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, iph1->skeyid_d->v, iph1->skeyid_d->l);
/* SKEYID A */
/* SKEYID_a = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_d | g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 1) */
len = iph1->skeyid_d->l + iph1->dhgxy->l + sizeof(cookie_t) * 2 + 1;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get skeyid buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
memcpy(p, iph1->skeyid_d->v, iph1->skeyid_d->l);
p += iph1->skeyid_d->l;
memcpy(p, iph1->dhgxy->v, iph1->dhgxy->l);
p += iph1->dhgxy->l;
memcpy(p, (caddr_t)&iph1->index.i_ck, sizeof(cookie_t));
p += sizeof(cookie_t);
memcpy(p, (caddr_t)&iph1->index.r_ck, sizeof(cookie_t));
p += sizeof(cookie_t);
*p = 1;
iph1->skeyid_a = oakley_prf(iph1->skeyid, buf, iph1);
if (iph1->skeyid_a == NULL)
goto end;
vfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "SKEYID_a computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, iph1->skeyid_a->v, iph1->skeyid_a->l);
/* SKEYID E */
/* SKEYID_e = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_a | g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 2) */
len = iph1->skeyid_a->l + iph1->dhgxy->l + sizeof(cookie_t) * 2 + 1;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get skeyid buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
memcpy(p, iph1->skeyid_a->v, iph1->skeyid_a->l);
p += iph1->skeyid_a->l;
memcpy(p, iph1->dhgxy->v, iph1->dhgxy->l);
p += iph1->dhgxy->l;
memcpy(p, (caddr_t)&iph1->index.i_ck, sizeof(cookie_t));
p += sizeof(cookie_t);
memcpy(p, (caddr_t)&iph1->index.r_ck, sizeof(cookie_t));
p += sizeof(cookie_t);
*p = 2;
iph1->skeyid_e = oakley_prf(iph1->skeyid, buf, iph1);
if (iph1->skeyid_e == NULL)
goto end;
vfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "SKEYID_e computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, iph1->skeyid_e->v, iph1->skeyid_e->l);
error = 0;
end:
if (buf != NULL)
vfree(buf);
return error;
}
/*
* compute final encryption key.
* see Appendix B.
*/
int
oakley_compute_enckey(iph1)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
u_int keylen, prflen;
int error = -1;
/* RFC2409 p39 */
keylen = alg_oakley_encdef_keylen(iph1->approval->enctype,
iph1->approval->encklen);
if (keylen == -1) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid encryption algorithm %d, "
"or invalid key length %d.\n",
iph1->approval->enctype,
iph1->approval->encklen);
goto end;
}
iph1->key = vmalloc(keylen >> 3);
if (iph1->key == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get key buffer\n");
goto end;
}
/* set prf length */
prflen = alg_oakley_hashdef_hashlen(iph1->approval->hashtype);
if (prflen == -1) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid hash type %d.\n", iph1->approval->hashtype);
goto end;
}
/* see isakmp-oakley-08 5.3. */
if (iph1->key->l <= iph1->skeyid_e->l) {
/*
* if length(Ka) <= length(SKEYID_e)
* Ka = first length(K) bit of SKEYID_e
*/
memcpy(iph1->key->v, iph1->skeyid_e->v, iph1->key->l);
} else {
vchar_t *buf = NULL, *res = NULL;
u_char *p, *ep;
int cplen;
int subkey;
/*
* otherwise,
* Ka = K1 | K2 | K3
* where
* K1 = prf(SKEYID_e, 0)
* K2 = prf(SKEYID_e, K1)
* K3 = prf(SKEYID_e, K2)
*/
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"len(SKEYID_e) < len(Ka) (%zu < %zu), "
"generating long key (Ka = K1 | K2 | ...)\n",
iph1->skeyid_e->l, iph1->key->l);
if ((buf = vmalloc(prflen >> 3)) == 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get key buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = (u_char *)iph1->key->v;
ep = p + iph1->key->l;
subkey = 1;
while (p < ep) {
if (p == (u_char *)iph1->key->v) {
/* just for computing K1 */
buf->v[0] = 0;
buf->l = 1;
}
res = oakley_prf(iph1->skeyid_e, buf, iph1);
if (res == NULL) {
vfree(buf);
goto end;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"compute intermediate encryption key K%d\n",
subkey);
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, res->v, res->l);
cplen = (res->l < ep - p) ? res->l : ep - p;
memcpy(p, res->v, cplen);
p += cplen;
buf->l = prflen >> 3; /* to cancel K1 speciality */
if (res->l != buf->l) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"internal error: res->l=%zu buf->l=%zu\n",
res->l, buf->l);
vfree(res);
vfree(buf);
goto end;
}
memcpy(buf->v, res->v, res->l);
vfree(res);
subkey++;
}
vfree(buf);
}
/*
* don't check any weak key or not.
* draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt Appendix B.
* draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-aes-cbc-00.txt Section 2.3.
*/
#if 0
/* weakkey check */
if (iph1->approval->enctype > ARRAYLEN(oakley_encdef)
|| oakley_encdef[iph1->approval->enctype].weakkey == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"encryption algorithm %d isn't supported.\n",
iph1->approval->enctype);
goto end;
}
if ((oakley_encdef[iph1->approval->enctype].weakkey)(iph1->key)) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"weakkey was generated.\n");
goto end;
}
#endif
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "final encryption key computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, iph1->key->v, iph1->key->l);
error = 0;
end:
return error;
}
/*
* compute IV and set to ph1handle
* IV = hash(g^xi | g^xr)
* see 4.1 Phase 1 state in draft-ietf-ipsec-ike.
*/
int
oakley_newiv(iph1)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
{
struct isakmp_ivm *newivm = NULL;
vchar_t *buf = NULL, *bp;
char *p;
int len;
/* create buffer */
len = iph1->dhpub->l + iph1->dhpub_p->l;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get iv buffer\n");
return -1;
}
p = buf->v;
bp = (iph1->side == INITIATOR ? iph1->dhpub : iph1->dhpub_p);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
bp = (iph1->side == INITIATOR ? iph1->dhpub_p : iph1->dhpub);
memcpy(p, bp->v, bp->l);
p += bp->l;
/* allocate IVm */
newivm = racoon_calloc(1, sizeof(struct isakmp_ivm));
if (newivm == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get iv buffer\n");
vfree(buf);
return -1;
}
/* compute IV */
newivm->iv = oakley_hash(buf, iph1);
if (newivm->iv == NULL) {
vfree(buf);
oakley_delivm(newivm);
return -1;
}
/* adjust length of iv */
newivm->iv->l = alg_oakley_encdef_blocklen(iph1->approval->enctype);
if (newivm->iv->l == -1) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid encryption algorithm %d.\n",
iph1->approval->enctype);
vfree(buf);
oakley_delivm(newivm);
return -1;
}
/* create buffer to save iv */
if ((newivm->ive = vdup(newivm->iv)) == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"vdup (%s)\n", strerror(errno));
vfree(buf);
oakley_delivm(newivm);
return -1;
}
vfree(buf);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "IV computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, newivm->iv->v, newivm->iv->l);
iph1->ivm = newivm;
return 0;
}
/*
* compute IV for the payload after phase 1.
* It's not limited for phase 2.
* if pahse 1 was encrypted.
* IV = hash(last CBC block of Phase 1 | M-ID)
* if phase 1 was not encrypted.
* IV = hash(phase 1 IV | M-ID)
* see 4.2 Phase 2 state in draft-ietf-ipsec-ike.
*/
struct isakmp_ivm *
oakley_newiv2(iph1, msgid)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
u_int32_t msgid;
{
struct isakmp_ivm *newivm = NULL;
vchar_t *buf = NULL;
char *p;
int len;
int error = -1;
/* create buffer */
len = iph1->ivm->iv->l + sizeof(msgid_t);
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get iv buffer\n");
goto end;
}
p = buf->v;
memcpy(p, iph1->ivm->iv->v, iph1->ivm->iv->l);
p += iph1->ivm->iv->l;
memcpy(p, &msgid, sizeof(msgid));
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "compute IV for phase2\n");
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "phase1 last IV:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
/* allocate IVm */
newivm = racoon_calloc(1, sizeof(struct isakmp_ivm));
if (newivm == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get iv buffer\n");
goto end;
}
/* compute IV */
if ((newivm->iv = oakley_hash(buf, iph1)) == NULL)
goto end;
/* adjust length of iv */
newivm->iv->l = alg_oakley_encdef_blocklen(iph1->approval->enctype);
if (newivm->iv->l == -1) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid encryption algorithm %d.\n",
iph1->approval->enctype);
goto end;
}
/* create buffer to save new iv */
if ((newivm->ive = vdup(newivm->iv)) == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL, "vdup (%s)\n", strerror(errno));
goto end;
}
error = 0;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "phase2 IV computed:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, newivm->iv->v, newivm->iv->l);
end:
if (error && newivm != NULL){
oakley_delivm(newivm);
newivm=NULL;
}
if (buf != NULL)
vfree(buf);
return newivm;
}
void
oakley_delivm(ivm)
struct isakmp_ivm *ivm;
{
if (ivm == NULL)
return;
if (ivm->iv != NULL)
vfree(ivm->iv);
if (ivm->ive != NULL)
vfree(ivm->ive);
racoon_free(ivm);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "IV freed\n");
return;
}
/*
* decrypt packet.
* save new iv and old iv.
*/
vchar_t *
oakley_do_decrypt(iph1, msg, ivdp, ivep)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
vchar_t *msg, *ivdp, *ivep;
{
vchar_t *buf = NULL, *new = NULL;
char *pl;
int len;
u_int8_t padlen;
int blen;
int error = -1;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "begin decryption.\n");
blen = alg_oakley_encdef_blocklen(iph1->approval->enctype);
if (blen == -1) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid encryption algorithm %d.\n",
iph1->approval->enctype);
goto end;
}
/* save IV for next, but not sync. */
memset(ivep->v, 0, ivep->l);
memcpy(ivep->v, (caddr_t)&msg->v[msg->l - blen], blen);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"IV was saved for next processing:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, ivep->v, ivep->l);
pl = msg->v + sizeof(struct isakmp);
len = msg->l - sizeof(struct isakmp);
/* create buffer */
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get buffer to decrypt.\n");
goto end;
}
memcpy(buf->v, pl, len);
/* do decrypt */
new = alg_oakley_encdef_decrypt(iph1->approval->enctype,
buf, iph1->key, ivdp);
if (new == NULL || new->v == NULL || new->l == 0) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"decryption %d failed.\n", iph1->approval->enctype);
goto end;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "with key:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, iph1->key->v, iph1->key->l);
vfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "decrypted payload by IV:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, ivdp->v, ivdp->l);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL,
"decrypted payload, but not trimed.\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, new->v, new->l);
/* get padding length */
if (lcconf->pad_excltail)
padlen = new->v[new->l - 1] + 1;
else
padlen = new->v[new->l - 1];
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "padding len=%u\n", padlen);
/* trim padding */
if (lcconf->pad_strict) {
if (padlen > new->l) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalied padding len=%u, buflen=%zu.\n",
padlen, new->l);
plogdump(LLV_ERROR, new->v, new->l);
goto end;
}
new->l -= padlen;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "trimmed padding\n");
} else {
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "skip to trim padding.\n");
}
/* create new buffer */
len = sizeof(struct isakmp) + new->l;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get buffer to decrypt.\n");
goto end;
}
memcpy(buf->v, msg->v, sizeof(struct isakmp));
memcpy(buf->v + sizeof(struct isakmp), new->v, new->l);
((struct isakmp *)buf->v)->len = htonl(buf->l);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "decrypted.\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
#ifdef HAVE_PRINT_ISAKMP_C
isakmp_printpacket(buf, iph1->remote, iph1->local, 1);
#endif
error = 0;
end:
if (error && buf != NULL) {
vfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
}
if (new != NULL)
vfree(new);
return buf;
}
/*
* encrypt packet.
*/
vchar_t *
oakley_do_encrypt(iph1, msg, ivep, ivp)
struct ph1handle *iph1;
vchar_t *msg, *ivep, *ivp;
{
vchar_t *buf = 0, *new = 0;
char *pl;
int len;
u_int padlen;
int blen;
int error = -1;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "begin encryption.\n");
/* set cbc block length */
blen = alg_oakley_encdef_blocklen(iph1->approval->enctype);
if (blen == -1) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"invalid encryption algorithm %d.\n",
iph1->approval->enctype);
goto end;
}
pl = msg->v + sizeof(struct isakmp);
len = msg->l - sizeof(struct isakmp);
/* add padding */
padlen = oakley_padlen(len, blen);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "pad length = %u\n", padlen);
/* create buffer */
buf = vmalloc(len + padlen);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get buffer to encrypt.\n");
goto end;
}
if (padlen) {
int i;
char *p = &buf->v[len];
if (lcconf->pad_random) {
for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++)
*p++ = eay_random() & 0xff;
}
}
memcpy(buf->v, pl, len);
/* make pad into tail */
if (lcconf->pad_excltail)
buf->v[len + padlen - 1] = padlen - 1;
else
buf->v[len + padlen - 1] = padlen;
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, buf->v, buf->l);
/* do encrypt */
new = alg_oakley_encdef_encrypt(iph1->approval->enctype,
buf, iph1->key, ivep);
if (new == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"encryption %d failed.\n", iph1->approval->enctype);
goto end;
}
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "with key:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, iph1->key->v, iph1->key->l);
vfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "encrypted payload by IV:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, ivep->v, ivep->l);
/* save IV for next */
memset(ivp->v, 0, ivp->l);
memcpy(ivp->v, (caddr_t)&new->v[new->l - blen], blen);
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "save IV for next:\n");
plogdump(LLV_DEBUG, ivp->v, ivp->l);
/* create new buffer */
len = sizeof(struct isakmp) + new->l;
buf = vmalloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
plog(LLV_ERROR, LOCATION, NULL,
"failed to get buffer to encrypt.\n");
goto end;
}
memcpy(buf->v, msg->v, sizeof(struct isakmp));
memcpy(buf->v + sizeof(struct isakmp), new->v, new->l);
((struct isakmp *)buf->v)->len = htonl(buf->l);
error = 0;
plog(LLV_DEBUG, LOCATION, NULL, "encrypted.\n");
end:
if (error && buf != NULL) {
vfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
}
if (new != NULL)
vfree(new);
return buf;
}
/* culculate padding length */
static int
oakley_padlen(len, base)
int len, base;
{
int padlen;
padlen = base - len % base;
if (lcconf->pad_randomlen)
padlen += ((eay_random() % (lcconf->pad_maxsize + 1) + 1) *
base);
return padlen;
}