/******************************************************************************
*
* Copyright 1999-2012 Broadcom Corporation
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at:
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
*****************************************************************************/
/******************************************************************************
*
* This file contains functions for the SMP L2CAP utility functions
*
******************************************************************************/
#include "bt_target.h"
#include <ctype.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bt_types.h"
#include "bt_utils.h"
#include "btm_ble_api.h"
#include "btm_int.h"
#include "common/metrics.h"
#include "device/include/controller.h"
#include "hcidefs.h"
#include "l2c_api.h"
#include "l2c_int.h"
#include "osi/include/osi.h"
#include "smp_int.h"
#define SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE 7
#define SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1)
#define SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1)
#define SMP_INIT_CMD_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1)
#define SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1)
#define SMP_MASTER_ID_SIZE (BT_OCTET8_LEN + 2 + 1)
#define SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1)
#define SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE (BD_ADDR_LEN + 1 + 1)
#define SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1)
#define SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE 2
#define SMP_SECURITY_REQUEST_SIZE 2
#define SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE (1 /* opcode */ + (2 * BT_OCTET32_LEN))
#define SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE (1 /* opcode */ + OCTET16_LEN /*Commitment*/)
#define SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE \
(1 /* opcode */ + OCTET16_LEN /*DHKey \
Check*/)
#define SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE (1 /* opcode */ + 1 /*Notif Type*/)
/* SMP command sizes per spec */
static const uint8_t smp_cmd_size_per_spec[] = {
0,
SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE, /* 0x01: pairing request */
SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE, /* 0x02: pairing response */
SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */
SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE, /* 0x04: pairing random */
SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE, /* 0x05: pairing failed */
SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE, /* 0x06: encryption information */
SMP_MASTER_ID_SIZE, /* 0x07: master identification */
SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE, /* 0x08: identity information */
SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE, /* 0x09: identity address information */
SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE, /* 0x0A: signing information */
SMP_SECURITY_REQUEST_SIZE, /* 0x0B: security request */
SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */
SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE, /* 0x0D: pairing dhkey check */
SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress notification */
SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */
};
static bool smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static bool smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid(tSMP_CB* p_cb);
/* type for SMP command length validation functions */
typedef bool (*tSMP_CMD_LEN_VALID)(tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static bool smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length(tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static const tSMP_CMD_LEN_VALID smp_cmd_len_is_valid[] = {
smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid,
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x01: pairing request */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x02: pairing response */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x04: pairing random */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x05: pairing failed */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x06: encryption information */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x07: master identification */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x08: identity information */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x09: identity address information */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0A: signing information */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0B: security request */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0D: pairing dhkey check */
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress notification*/
smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */
};
/* type for SMP command parameter ranges validation functions */
typedef bool (*tSMP_CMD_PARAM_RANGES_VALID)(tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static bool smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static bool smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static const tSMP_CMD_PARAM_RANGES_VALID smp_cmd_param_ranges_are_valid[] = {
smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid,
smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid, /* 0x01: pairing
request */
smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid, /* 0x02: pairing
response */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x04: pairing random */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x05: pairing failed */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x06: encryption information */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x07: master identification */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x08: identity information */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x09: identity address
information */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0A: signing information */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0B: security request */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0D: pairing dhkey check */
smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress
notification */
smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */
};
/* type for action functions */
typedef BT_HDR* (*tSMP_CMD_ACT)(uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_cmd(uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_confirm_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_rand_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_fail(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_identity_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_security_request(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_signing_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_master_id_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_id_addr_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd(
UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static const tSMP_CMD_ACT smp_cmd_build_act[] = {
NULL, smp_build_pairing_cmd, /* 0x01: pairing request */
smp_build_pairing_cmd, /* 0x02: pairing response */
smp_build_confirm_cmd, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */
smp_build_rand_cmd, /* 0x04: pairing random */
smp_build_pairing_fail, /* 0x05: pairing failure */
smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd, /* 0x06: encryption information */
smp_build_master_id_cmd, /* 0x07: master identification */
smp_build_identity_info_cmd, /* 0x08: identity information */
smp_build_id_addr_cmd, /* 0x09: identity address information */
smp_build_signing_info_cmd, /* 0x0A: signing information */
smp_build_security_request, /* 0x0B: security request */
smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */
smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd, /* 0x0D: pairing DHKey check */
smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress
notification */
smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */
};
static const uint8_t smp_association_table[2][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX] =
{
/* display only */ /* Display Yes/No */ /* keyboard only */
/* No Input/Output */ /* keyboard display */
/* initiator */
/* model = tbl[peer_io_caps][loc_io_caps] */
/* Display Only */
{{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY,
SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY},
/* Display Yes/No */
{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY,
SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY},
/* Keyboard only */
{SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY,
SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF},
/* No Input No Output */
{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY,
SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY,
SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY},
/* keyboard display */
{SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY,
SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}},
/* responder */
/* model = tbl[loc_io_caps][peer_io_caps] */
/* Display Only */
{{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY,
SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF},
/* Display Yes/No */
{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY,
SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF},
/* keyboard only */
{SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY,
SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY},
/* No Input No Output */
{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY,
SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY,
SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY},
/* keyboard display */
{SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF,
SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}}};
static const uint8_t
smp_association_table_sc[2][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX] = {
/* display only */ /* Display Yes/No */ /* keyboard only */
/* No InputOutput */ /* keyboard display */
/* initiator */
/* model = tbl[peer_io_caps][loc_io_caps] */
/* Display Only */
{{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT},
/* Display Yes/No */
{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP},
/* keyboard only */
{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP},
/* No Input No Output */
{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS},
/* keyboard display */
{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP}},
/* responder */
/* model = tbl[loc_io_caps][peer_io_caps] */
/* Display Only */
{{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP},
/* Display Yes/No */
{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP},
/* keyboard only */
{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT},
/* No Input No Output */
{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS},
/* keyboard display */
{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP}}};
static tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_legacy_association_model(tSMP_CB* p_cb);
static tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_association_model_secure_connections(
tSMP_CB* p_cb);
/**
* Log metrics data for SMP command
*
* @param bd_addr current pairing address
* @param is_outgoing whether this command is outgoing
* @param p_buf buffer to the beginning of SMP command
* @param buf_len length available to read for p_buf
*/
void smp_log_metrics(const RawAddress& bd_addr, bool is_outgoing,
const uint8_t* p_buf, size_t buf_len) {
if (buf_len < 1) {
LOG(WARNING) << __func__ << ": buffer is too small, size is " << buf_len;
return;
}
uint8_t cmd;
STREAM_TO_UINT8(cmd, p_buf);
buf_len--;
uint8_t failure_reason = 0;
if (cmd == SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED && buf_len >= 1) {
STREAM_TO_UINT8(failure_reason, p_buf);
}
android::bluetooth::DirectionEnum direction =
is_outgoing ? android::bluetooth::DirectionEnum::DIRECTION_OUTGOING
: android::bluetooth::DirectionEnum::DIRECTION_INCOMING;
bluetooth::common::LogSmpPairingEvent(bd_addr, cmd, direction,
failure_reason);
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP
*
* Description Send message to L2CAP.
*
******************************************************************************/
bool smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP(const RawAddress& rem_bda, BT_HDR* p_toL2CAP) {
uint16_t l2cap_ret;
uint16_t fixed_cid = L2CAP_SMP_CID;
if (smp_cb.smp_over_br) {
fixed_cid = L2CAP_SMP_BR_CID;
}
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
smp_cb.total_tx_unacked += 1;
smp_log_metrics(rem_bda, true /* outgoing */,
p_toL2CAP->data + p_toL2CAP->offset, p_toL2CAP->len);
l2cap_ret = L2CA_SendFixedChnlData(fixed_cid, rem_bda, p_toL2CAP);
if (l2cap_ret == L2CAP_DW_FAILED) {
smp_cb.total_tx_unacked -= 1;
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("SMP failed to pass msg to L2CAP");
return false;
} else
return true;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_send_cmd
*
* Description send a SMP command on L2CAP channel.
*
******************************************************************************/
bool smp_send_cmd(uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
BT_HDR* p_buf;
bool sent = false;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s: on l2cap cmd_code=0x%x, pairing_bda=%s", __func__,
cmd_code, p_cb->pairing_bda.ToString().c_str());
if (cmd_code <= (SMP_OPCODE_MAX + 1 /* for SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_COMMITM */) &&
smp_cmd_build_act[cmd_code] != NULL) {
p_buf = (*smp_cmd_build_act[cmd_code])(cmd_code, p_cb);
if (p_buf != NULL && smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP(p_cb->pairing_bda, p_buf)) {
sent = true;
alarm_set_on_mloop(p_cb->smp_rsp_timer_ent, SMP_WAIT_FOR_RSP_TIMEOUT_MS,
smp_rsp_timeout, NULL);
}
}
if (!sent) {
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_PAIR_INTERNAL_ERR;
if (p_cb->smp_over_br) {
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
} else {
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
}
}
return sent;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_rsp_timeout
*
* Description Called when SMP wait for SMP command response timer expires
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_rsp_timeout(UNUSED_ATTR void* data) {
tSMP_CB* p_cb = &smp_cb;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s state:%d br_state:%d", __func__, p_cb->state,
p_cb->br_state);
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_RSP_TIMEOUT;
if (p_cb->smp_over_br) {
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
} else {
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_delayed_auth_complete_timeout
*
* Description Called when no pairing failed command received within
* timeout period.
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_delayed_auth_complete_timeout(UNUSED_ATTR void* data) {
/*
* Waited for potential pair failure. Send SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT if
* the state is still in bond pending.
*/
if (smp_get_state() == SMP_STATE_BOND_PENDING) {
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s sending delayed auth complete.", __func__);
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_SUCCESS;
smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_pairing_req_cmd
*
* Description Build pairing request command.
*
******************************************************************************/
BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_cmd(uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE +
L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, cmd_code);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->local_io_capability);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->loc_oob_flag);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->loc_auth_req);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->loc_enc_size);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->local_i_key);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->local_r_key);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
/* 1B ERR_RSP op code + 1B cmd_op_code + 2B handle + 1B status */
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_confirm_cmd
*
* Description Build confirm request command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_confirm_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE +
L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_CONFIRM);
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->confirm, OCTET16_LEN);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_rand_cmd
*
* Description Build Random command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_rand_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE +
L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_RAND);
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->rand, OCTET16_LEN);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd
*
* Description Build security information command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE +
L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_ENCRYPT_INFO);
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->ltk, OCTET16_LEN);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_master_id_cmd
*
* Description Build security information command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_master_id_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_MASTER_ID_SIZE +
L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_MASTER_ID);
UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->ediv);
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->enc_rand, BT_OCTET8_LEN);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_MASTER_ID_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_identity_info_cmd
*
* Description Build identity information command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_identity_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
UNUSED_ATTR tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf =
(BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
const Octet16& irk = BTM_GetDeviceIDRoot();
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_IDENTITY_INFO);
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, irk.data(), OCTET16_LEN);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_id_addr_cmd
*
* Description Build identity address information command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_id_addr_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
UNUSED_ATTR tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf =
(BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_ID_ADDR);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, 0);
BDADDR_TO_STREAM(p, *controller_get_interface()->get_address());
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_signing_info_cmd
*
* Description Build signing information command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_signing_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE +
L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_SIGN_INFO);
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->csrk, OCTET16_LEN);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_pairing_fail
*
* Description Build Pairing Fail command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_fail(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE +
L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->failure);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_security_request
*
* Description Build security request command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_security_request(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + 2 + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_SEC_REQ);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->loc_auth_req);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_SECURITY_REQUEST_SIZE;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("opcode=%d auth_req=0x%x", SMP_OPCODE_SEC_REQ,
p_cb->loc_auth_req);
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd
*
* Description Build pairing public key command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
uint8_t publ_key[2 * BT_OCTET32_LEN];
uint8_t* p_publ_key = publ_key;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE +
L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
memcpy(p_publ_key, p_cb->loc_publ_key.x, BT_OCTET32_LEN);
memcpy(p_publ_key + BT_OCTET32_LEN, p_cb->loc_publ_key.y, BT_OCTET32_LEN);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_PUBLIC_KEY);
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_publ_key, 2 * BT_OCTET32_LEN);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd
*
* Description Build pairing commitment command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE +
L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_CONFIRM);
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->commitment, OCTET16_LEN);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd
*
* Description Build pairing DHKey check command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code,
tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(
sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK);
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->dhkey_check, OCTET16_LEN);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd
*
* Description Build keypress notification command.
*
******************************************************************************/
static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd(
UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(
sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->local_keypress_notification);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE;
return p_buf;
}
/** This function is called to convert a 6 to 16 digits numeric character string
* into SMP TK. */
void smp_convert_string_to_tk(Octet16* tk, uint32_t passkey) {
uint8_t* p = tk->data();
tSMP_KEY key;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_convert_string_to_tk");
UINT32_TO_STREAM(p, passkey);
key.key_type = SMP_KEY_TYPE_TK;
key.p_data = tk->data();
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.key = key;
smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_KEY_READY_EVT, &smp_int_data);
}
/** This function is called to mask off the encryption key based on the maximum
* encryption key size. */
void smp_mask_enc_key(uint8_t loc_enc_size, Octet16* p_data) {
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_mask_enc_key");
if (loc_enc_size < OCTET16_LEN) {
for (; loc_enc_size < OCTET16_LEN; loc_enc_size++)
(*p_data)[loc_enc_size] = 0;
}
return;
}
/** utility function to do an biteise exclusive-OR of two bit strings of the
* length of OCTET16_LEN. Result is stored in first argument.
*/
void smp_xor_128(Octet16* a, const Octet16& b) {
CHECK(a);
uint8_t i, *aa = a->data();
const uint8_t* bb = b.data();
for (i = 0; i < OCTET16_LEN; i++) {
aa[i] = aa[i] ^ bb[i];
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_cb_cleanup
*
* Description Clean up SMP control block
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_cb_cleanup(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
tSMP_CALLBACK* p_callback = p_cb->p_callback;
uint8_t trace_level = p_cb->trace_level;
alarm_t* smp_rsp_timer_ent = p_cb->smp_rsp_timer_ent;
alarm_t* delayed_auth_timer_ent = p_cb->delayed_auth_timer_ent;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_cb_cleanup");
alarm_cancel(p_cb->smp_rsp_timer_ent);
alarm_cancel(p_cb->delayed_auth_timer_ent);
memset(p_cb, 0, sizeof(tSMP_CB));
p_cb->p_callback = p_callback;
p_cb->trace_level = trace_level;
p_cb->smp_rsp_timer_ent = smp_rsp_timer_ent;
p_cb->delayed_auth_timer_ent = delayed_auth_timer_ent;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_remove_fixed_channel
*
* Description This function is called to remove the fixed channel
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_remove_fixed_channel(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (p_cb->smp_over_br)
L2CA_RemoveFixedChnl(L2CAP_SMP_BR_CID, p_cb->pairing_bda);
else
L2CA_RemoveFixedChnl(L2CAP_SMP_CID, p_cb->pairing_bda);
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_reset_control_value
*
* Description This function is called to reset the control block value
* when the pairing procedure finished.
*
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_reset_control_value(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
alarm_cancel(p_cb->smp_rsp_timer_ent);
p_cb->flags = 0;
/* set the link idle timer to drop the link when pairing is done
usually service discovery will follow authentication complete, to avoid
racing condition for a link down/up, set link idle timer to be
SMP_LINK_TOUT_MIN to guarantee SMP key exchange */
L2CA_SetIdleTimeoutByBdAddr(p_cb->pairing_bda, SMP_LINK_TOUT_MIN,
BT_TRANSPORT_LE);
/* We can tell L2CAP to remove the fixed channel (if it has one) */
smp_remove_fixed_channel(p_cb);
smp_cb_cleanup(p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_proc_pairing_cmpl
*
* Description This function is called to process pairing complete
*
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
tSMP_EVT_DATA evt_data = {0};
tSMP_CALLBACK* p_callback = p_cb->p_callback;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: pairing_bda=%s", __func__,
p_cb->pairing_bda.ToString().c_str());
evt_data.cmplt.reason = p_cb->status;
evt_data.cmplt.smp_over_br = p_cb->smp_over_br;
if (p_cb->status == SMP_SUCCESS) evt_data.cmplt.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
evt_data.cmplt.is_pair_cancel = false;
if (p_cb->is_pair_cancel) evt_data.cmplt.is_pair_cancel = true;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("send SMP_COMPLT_EVT reason=0x%0x sec_level=0x%0x",
evt_data.cmplt.reason, evt_data.cmplt.sec_level);
RawAddress pairing_bda = p_cb->pairing_bda;
smp_reset_control_value(p_cb);
if (p_callback) (*p_callback)(SMP_COMPLT_EVT, pairing_bda, &evt_data);
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_command_has_invalid_length
*
* Description Checks if the received SMP command has invalid length
* It returns true if the command has invalid length.
*
* Returns true if the command has invalid length, false otherwise.
*
******************************************************************************/
bool smp_command_has_invalid_length(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t cmd_code = p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code;
if ((cmd_code > (SMP_OPCODE_MAX + 1 /* for SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_COMMITM */)) ||
(cmd_code < SMP_OPCODE_MIN)) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Received command with RESERVED code 0x%02x",
__func__, cmd_code);
return true;
}
if (!smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length(p_cb)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_command_has_invalid_parameters
*
* Description Checks if the received SMP command has invalid parameters
* i.e. if the command length is valid and the command
* parameters are inside specified range.
* It returns true if the command has invalid parameters.
*
* Returns true if the command has invalid parameters, false otherwise.
*
******************************************************************************/
bool smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t cmd_code = p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code;
if ((cmd_code > (SMP_OPCODE_MAX + 1 /* for SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_COMMITM */)) ||
(cmd_code < SMP_OPCODE_MIN)) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Received command with RESERVED code 0x%02x",
__func__, cmd_code);
return true;
}
if (!(*smp_cmd_len_is_valid[cmd_code])(p_cb)) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Command length not valid for cmd_code 0x%02x",
__func__, cmd_code);
return true;
}
if (!(*smp_cmd_param_ranges_are_valid[cmd_code])(p_cb)) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Parameter ranges not valid code 0x%02x", __func__,
cmd_code);
return true;
}
return false;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length
*
* Description Checks if the received command size is equal to the size
* according to specs.
*
* Returns true if the command size is as expected, false otherwise.
*
* Note The command is expected to have fixed length.
******************************************************************************/
bool smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t cmd_code = p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s for cmd code 0x%02x", __func__, cmd_code);
if (p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len != smp_cmd_size_per_spec[cmd_code]) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with invalid length "
"0x%02x (per spec the length is 0x%02x).",
cmd_code, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len, smp_cmd_size_per_spec[cmd_code]);
return false;
}
return true;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid
*
* Description Validates parameter ranges in the received SMP command
* pairing request or pairing response.
* The parameters to validate:
* IO capability,
* OOB data flag,
* Bonding_flags in AuthReq
* Maximum encryption key size.
* Returns false if at least one of these parameters is out of
* range.
*
******************************************************************************/
bool smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t io_caps = p_cb->peer_io_caps;
uint8_t oob_flag = p_cb->peer_oob_flag;
uint8_t bond_flag =
p_cb->peer_auth_req & 0x03; // 0x03 is gen bond with appropriate mask
uint8_t enc_size = p_cb->peer_enc_size;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s for cmd code 0x%02x", __func__, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code);
if (io_caps >= BTM_IO_CAP_MAX) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with IO Capability "
"value (0x%02x) out of range).",
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, io_caps);
return false;
}
if (!((oob_flag == SMP_OOB_NONE) || (oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT))) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with OOB data flag value "
"(0x%02x) out of range).",
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, oob_flag);
return false;
}
if (!((bond_flag == SMP_AUTH_NO_BOND) || (bond_flag == SMP_AUTH_BOND))) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Bonding_Flags value (0x%02x) "
"out of range).",
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, bond_flag);
return false;
}
if ((enc_size < SMP_ENCR_KEY_SIZE_MIN) ||
(enc_size > SMP_ENCR_KEY_SIZE_MAX)) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Maximum Encryption "
"Key value (0x%02x) out of range).",
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, enc_size);
return false;
}
return true;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid
*
* Description Validates Notification Type parameter range in the received
* SMP command pairing keypress notification.
* Returns false if this parameter is out of range.
*
******************************************************************************/
bool smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
tBTM_SP_KEY_TYPE keypress_notification = p_cb->peer_keypress_notification;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s for cmd code 0x%02x", __func__, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code);
if (keypress_notification >= BTM_SP_KEY_OUT_OF_RANGE) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
"Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Pairing Keypress "
"Notification value (0x%02x) out of range).",
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, keypress_notification);
return false;
}
return true;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid
*
* Description Always returns true.
*
******************************************************************************/
bool smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid(UNUSED_ATTR tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
return true;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid
*
* Description Always returns false.
*
******************************************************************************/
bool smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid(UNUSED_ATTR tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
return false;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_reject_unexpected_pairing_command
*
* Description send pairing failure to an unexpected pairing command during
* an active pairing process.
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_reject_unexpected_pairing_command(const RawAddress& bd_addr) {
uint8_t* p;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE +
L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_PAIR_NOT_SUPPORT);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE;
smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP(bd_addr, p_buf);
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Function smp_select_association_model
*
* Description This function selects association model to use for STK
* generation. Selection is based on both sides' io capability,
* oob data flag and authentication request.
*
* Note If Secure Connections Only mode is required locally then we
* come to this point only if both sides support Secure
* Connections mode, i.e.
* if p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required = true
* then we come to this point only if
* (p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) ==
* (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) ==
* SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT
*
******************************************************************************/
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_association_model(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL model = SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE;
p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used = false;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->peer_io_caps = %d p_cb->local_io_capability = %d",
__func__, p_cb->peer_io_caps, p_cb->local_io_capability);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->peer_oob_flag = %d p_cb->loc_oob_flag = %d",
__func__, p_cb->peer_oob_flag, p_cb->loc_oob_flag);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->peer_auth_req = 0x%02x p_cb->loc_auth_req = 0x%02x",
__func__, p_cb->peer_auth_req, p_cb->loc_auth_req);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG(
"%s p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required = %s", __func__,
p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required ? "true" : "false");
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) &&
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT)) {
p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used = true;
}
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_H7_SUPPORT_BIT) &&
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_H7_SUPPORT_BIT)) {
p_cb->key_derivation_h7_used = TRUE;
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("use_sc_process = %d, h7 use = %d",
p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used,
p_cb->key_derivation_h7_used);
if (p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) {
model = smp_select_association_model_secure_connections(p_cb);
} else {
model = smp_select_legacy_association_model(p_cb);
}
return model;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Function smp_select_legacy_association_model
*
* Description This function is called to select association mode if at
* least one side doesn't support secure connections.
*
******************************************************************************/
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_legacy_association_model(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL model = SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
/* if OOB data is present on both devices, then use OOB association model */
if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT &&
p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
return SMP_MODEL_OOB;
/* else if neither device requires MITM, then use Just Works association model
*/
if (SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(p_cb->peer_auth_req) &&
SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(p_cb->loc_auth_req))
return SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY;
/* otherwise use IO capability to select association model */
if (p_cb->peer_io_caps < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX &&
p_cb->local_io_capability < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX) {
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
model = smp_association_table[p_cb->role][p_cb->peer_io_caps]
[p_cb->local_io_capability];
} else {
model = smp_association_table[p_cb->role][p_cb->local_io_capability]
[p_cb->peer_io_caps];
}
}
return model;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Function smp_select_association_model_secure_connections
*
* Description This function is called to select association mode if both
* sides support secure connections.
*
******************************************************************************/
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_association_model_secure_connections(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL model = SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
/* if OOB data is present on at least one device, then use OOB association
* model */
if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT ||
p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
return SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB;
/* else if neither device requires MITM, then use Just Works association model
*/
if (SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(p_cb->peer_auth_req) &&
SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(p_cb->loc_auth_req))
return SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS;
/* otherwise use IO capability to select association model */
if (p_cb->peer_io_caps < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX &&
p_cb->local_io_capability < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX) {
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
model = smp_association_table_sc[p_cb->role][p_cb->peer_io_caps]
[p_cb->local_io_capability];
} else {
model = smp_association_table_sc[p_cb->role][p_cb->local_io_capability]
[p_cb->peer_io_caps];
}
}
return model;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Function smp_reverse_array
*
* Description This function reverses array bytes
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_reverse_array(uint8_t* arr, uint8_t len) {
uint8_t i = 0, tmp;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("smp_reverse_array");
for (i = 0; i < len / 2; i++) {
tmp = arr[i];
arr[i] = arr[len - 1 - i];
arr[len - 1 - i] = tmp;
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Function smp_calculate_random_input
*
* Description This function returns random input value to be used in
* commitment calculation for SC passkey entry association mode
* (if bit["round"] in "random" array == 1 then returns 0x81
* else returns 0x80).
*
* Returns ri value
*
******************************************************************************/
uint8_t smp_calculate_random_input(uint8_t* random, uint8_t round) {
uint8_t i = round / 8;
uint8_t j = round % 8;
uint8_t ri;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("random: 0x%02x, round: %d, i: %d, j: %d", random[i], round,
i, j);
ri = ((random[i] >> j) & 1) | 0x80;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s ri=0x%02x", __func__, ri);
return ri;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Function smp_collect_local_io_capabilities
*
* Description This function puts into IOcap array local device
* IOCapability, OOB data, AuthReq.
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_collect_local_io_capabilities(uint8_t* iocap, tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
iocap[0] = p_cb->local_io_capability;
iocap[1] = p_cb->loc_oob_flag;
iocap[2] = p_cb->loc_auth_req;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Function smp_collect_peer_io_capabilities
*
* Description This function puts into IOcap array peer device
* IOCapability, OOB data, AuthReq.
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_collect_peer_io_capabilities(uint8_t* iocap, tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
iocap[0] = p_cb->peer_io_caps;
iocap[1] = p_cb->peer_oob_flag;
iocap[2] = p_cb->peer_auth_req;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Function smp_collect_local_ble_address
*
* Description Put the the local device LE address into the le_addr array:
* le_addr[0-5] = local BD ADDR,
* le_addr[6] = local le address type (PUBLIC/RANDOM).
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_collect_local_ble_address(uint8_t* le_addr, tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
tBLE_ADDR_TYPE addr_type = 0;
RawAddress bda;
uint8_t* p = le_addr;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
BTM_ReadConnectionAddr(p_cb->pairing_bda, bda, &addr_type);
BDADDR_TO_STREAM(p, bda);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, addr_type);
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Function smp_collect_peer_ble_address
*
* Description Put the peer device LE addr into the le_addr array:
* le_addr[0-5] = peer BD ADDR,
* le_addr[6] = peer le address type (PUBLIC/RANDOM).
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_collect_peer_ble_address(uint8_t* le_addr, tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
tBLE_ADDR_TYPE addr_type = 0;
RawAddress bda;
uint8_t* p = le_addr;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (!BTM_ReadRemoteConnectionAddr(p_cb->pairing_bda, bda, &addr_type)) {
SMP_TRACE_ERROR(
"can not collect peer le addr information for unknown device");
return;
}
BDADDR_TO_STREAM(p, bda);
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, addr_type);
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Function smp_check_commitment
*
* Description This function compares peer commitment values:
* - expected (i.e. calculated locally),
* - received from the peer.
*
* Returns true if the values are the same
* false otherwise
*
******************************************************************************/
bool smp_check_commitment(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
Octet16 expected = smp_calculate_peer_commitment(p_cb);
print128(expected, (const uint8_t*)"calculated peer commitment");
print128(p_cb->remote_commitment, (const uint8_t*)"received peer commitment");
if (memcmp(p_cb->remote_commitment.data(), expected.data(), OCTET16_LEN)) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Commitment check fails", __func__);
return false;
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Commitment check succeeds", __func__);
return true;
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_save_secure_connections_long_term_key
*
* Description The function saves SC LTK as BLE key for future use as local
* and/or peer key.
*
* Returns void
*
******************************************************************************/
void smp_save_secure_connections_long_term_key(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE lle_key;
tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE ple_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s-Save LTK as local LTK key", __func__);
lle_key.lenc_key.ltk = p_cb->ltk;
lle_key.lenc_key.div = 0;
lle_key.lenc_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
lle_key.lenc_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_LENC, &lle_key, true);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s-Save LTK as peer LTK key", __func__);
ple_key.penc_key.ediv = 0;
memset(ple_key.penc_key.rand, 0, BT_OCTET8_LEN);
ple_key.penc_key.ltk = p_cb->ltk;
ple_key.penc_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
ple_key.penc_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PENC, &ple_key, true);
}
/** The function calculates MacKey and LTK and saves them in CB. To calculate
* MacKey and LTK it calls smp_calc_f5(...). MacKey is used in dhkey
* calculation, LTK is used to encrypt the link. */
void smp_calculate_f5_mackey_and_long_term_key(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
uint8_t a[7];
uint8_t b[7];
Octet16 na;
Octet16 nb;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
smp_collect_local_ble_address(a, p_cb);
smp_collect_peer_ble_address(b, p_cb);
na = p_cb->rand;
nb = p_cb->rrand;
} else {
smp_collect_local_ble_address(b, p_cb);
smp_collect_peer_ble_address(a, p_cb);
na = p_cb->rrand;
nb = p_cb->rand;
}
crypto_toolbox::f5(p_cb->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, &p_cb->mac_key, &p_cb->ltk);
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s is completed", __func__);
}
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_request_oob_data
*
* Description Requests application to provide OOB data.
*
* Returns true - OOB data has to be provided by application
* false - otherwise (unexpected)
*
******************************************************************************/
bool smp_request_oob_data(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
tSMP_OOB_DATA_TYPE req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_INVALID_TYPE;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT &&
p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) {
/* both local and peer rcvd data OOB */
req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_BOTH;
} else if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) {
/* peer rcvd OOB local data, local didn't receive OOB peer data */
req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_LOCAL;
} else if (p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) {
req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_PEER;
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("req_oob_type = %d", req_oob_type);
if (req_oob_type == SMP_OOB_INVALID_TYPE) return false;
p_cb->req_oob_type = req_oob_type;
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_SC_OOB_REQ_EVT;
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.req_oob_type = req_oob_type;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_TK_REQ_EVT, &smp_int_data);
return true;
}
void print128(const Octet16& x, const uint8_t* key_name) {
if (VLOG_IS_ON(2) && DLOG_IS_ON(INFO)) {
uint8_t* p = (uint8_t*)x.data();
DVLOG(2) << key_name << " (MSB ~ LSB) = ";
for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
DVLOG(2) << +p[OCTET16_LEN - i * 4 - 1] << +p[OCTET16_LEN - i * 4 - 2]
<< +p[OCTET16_LEN - i * 4 - 3] << +p[OCTET16_LEN - i * 4 - 4];
}
}
}